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The Structure of Moral Action: A Hermeneutic Study of Moral Conflict

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But let me consider.
The drop falls; another stage has been reached. Stage upon stage.
And why should there be an end of stages? and where do they le.
To what conclusion?
For they come wearing robes of solemnity.
In these dilemmas the devout consult those violet-sashed and
sensual-looking gentry who are trooping past me.
But for ourselves, we resent teachers.
Let a man get up and say, 'Behold, this is the truth', and instantly
I perceive a sandy cat filching a piece of fish in the backg
Look, you have forgotten the cat, I say.

[Virginia Woolf, The Waves, 1931.]
Preface

During its 60-year history the psychological study of moral development can be schematically considered to have swung through three positions. First was an early interest in ‘objectively categorizable’ moral and immoral acts, such as helping and cheating [Hartshorne and May, 1928]. Next came the cognitive-developmentalists’ focus on moral judgment, with an emphasis on clinical interviews and discussion as the high route to the study of morality. Kohlberg [1958] and others argued that whether an act was moral or immoral depended not on its consequences or its social desirability, but on the form of reasoning which was used to justify it, and which supposedly led to its production. Faced with a hypothetical dilemma, such as the famous story of Heinz and the druggist (Heinz’s wife is dying of cancer; there is a drug which can save her, but the price asked by the druggist who developed it is far more than Heinz can afford; should he steal the drug or not?), either horn of the dilemma can be proposed and defended with morally adequate argument.

The third position is the current one; it is marked by a renewed interest in action and social interaction as important influences in the development of morality, and also as a source of information for researchers on just what it is that develops. Interest is turning to ‘process’ in children’s and adults’ interchanges, demonstrating that it has become appreciated that human action has a temporal flow and structure to it; that it is praxis rather than objectifiable data.

It is here that this monograph takes its starting point. The inquiry centers on the interactions that take place among ten groups of young adults, as they experience conflicts which developed in the course of a session of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The young men and women were all friends, but were divided into two teams for the game. Frequently the team which was winning indulged in a ‘burning’ of their friends, even though they had just agreed to cooperate with them. The grounding of this act in the emotions that motivate it, and the way it is unreflectively understood by those who did it, are considered first. Then the virulent conflict which the
burning puts into motion is examined in detail. Its victims see it as a shocking act, but those responsible for it consider it appropriate and harmless.

The ensuing conflict passes through three phases. The first is one of shock and withdrawal on the part of the Losing Team. As a consequence of this sudden reaction, the participants find themselves with a new understanding of their situation, and of the events which have transpired. These ways of understanding are very different for the two teams, but the young men and women are so caught up within them that they do not begin to notice that their perspectives are not shared. In the second phase members of each team act immediately in the way they now find appropriate: the Losing Team want recompense for the burning; the Winning Team want cooperation to continue as before. Each team finds the others' conduct incomprehensible, and attribute it to malevolent motives. In the third phase the young adults begin to reflect upon and articulate their understanding as they talk, but only at the very end of this phase do they recognize what a more detached interpreter notes much earlier: that there are at least two incompatible perspectives upon events.

In this third phase explicit issues arise in the talk. At first glance they are factual, but they are linked to specific evaluative concerns which have been apparent throughout the conflict at the level of action. As accounts of events are progressively articulated, the young men and women begin to discover that their emotions and involvement determined what count as 'facts', and they finally begin to talk about the pleasures and frustrations that they experienced as 'winners' and 'losers' at the very start of the session.

The method I adopt in this study is a hermeneutic or interpretive one, based in the work of Heidegger [1962]. It begins with the assumption that human action has an organization to it that is semantic, rather than causal or logical. The aim is to take a fresh look at the course and character of moral conflicts, to provide an account which is more than superficial, and to uncover aspects which we often ignore or dismiss. The conclusions I draw concern the role that emotions play in moral conflict; the nature of the particular type of talk which begins in the second phase of the conflict; an explanation for the inability of those in conflict to understand one another's point of view; and the way that disagreements over 'facts' actually involve evaluative concerns. It becomes clear that practical moral conflicts bear little resemblance to armchair discussion of moral issues, and that to look for forms of 'argumentation' or 'rational reconstruction', as has recently been proposed by cognitively oriented researchers, will provide little insight into the moral concerns and forms of interchange which are involved.

The Prisoner's Dilemma has been taken as a model of international relations, of arms negotiation, the positions of women and minorities in our society, labor-management relations, and other real-life situations of potential conflict. This study goes beyond much experimental work with the Prisoner's Dilemma in that the persons involved were friends, and the form of analysis adopted focusses in detail on moral conflicts which grew out of the game, and which were as a consequence not overly constrained by minor procedural details. The account will be useful, I believe, to psychologists, educators, and others conducting research on morality and on interpersonal conflict, to those who work to facilitate and resolve the conflicts of others, and to those of us who find ourselves, at least from time to time, involved in conflicts of a moral kind!

There are several people whose help, advice, inspiration, and encouragement I am grateful to acknowledge. Gerry Mendelsohn and Norma Haan provided support and encouragement during the course of this work, and I thank them both for stimulating and enjoyable discussions. Dr. Haan generously made available to me the video-recordings which formed the basis for the study. Hubert Dreyfus has taught me a great deal about hermeneutics and phenomenology; I am grateful for his support and for many helpful suggestions. Eleanor Rosch provided feedback and a helpful reading of the manuscript in its final stages. Michael Morgan first introduced me to phenomenology, some years ago, and stimulated my curiosity concerning its application to psychology. John Watson encouraged my earlier attempts at research of this type. Ritch Addison, Diana Currie, Dan Kahn, and John Mergendoller also provided encouragement.

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1. Introduction

Are we now contemplating an actual or even realistically imaginable situation of the relevant kind? Or is the moral engine idling here, turning, racing ever more furiously just because it is unimpeded by the friction of reality and the work-effort of actual use [Fingarette, 1967, p. 36–37]? If we were to ask a person “What are his moral principles?”, the way in which we could be most sure of a true answer would be by studying what he did. He might, to be sure, profess in his conversation all sorts of principles, which in his actions he completely disregarded; but it would be when, knowing all the relevant facts of a situation, he was faced with choices or decisions between alternative courses of action, between alternative answers to the question “What shall I do?”, that he would reveal in what principles of conduct he really believed. The reason why actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the function of moral principles is to guide conduct [Hare, 1964, p. 1].

What I have attempted to do in this monograph is essentially straightforward. I have hoped to learn something about moral development by examining carefully some actual cases of moral conflict among young people in their late teens and early twenties. The analytic philosopher Hare is surely correct in his view that, in the study of morality, actions are revelatory (though I would disagree with his conception of the importance of moral principles). The psychological study of morality should surely focus its attention primarily on moral action, rather than on reasoning about moral situations. Yet the major focus of research for the past twenty years has been the latter. Kohlberg apparently started a trend in 1958 with his introduction into this area of the Piagetian ‘méthode clinique’, coupled as it is with a Kantian emphasis on the preeminence of rationality in human conduct [Kohlberg, 1958]. But as Hare points out, morality is first and foremost concerned with action: with what it is appropriate, fair and right to do in a particular situation. What people say in response to questioning about moral issues is not always directly related to what they do. It would seem time for the overemphasis on reasoning to be corrected, for several reasons. Not the least of these is that reasoning and action are, I shall maintain, related in a manner that is more complex than the Kohlberg
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school acknowledges. In the next chapter I shall introduce the view of action which guides the research reported here.

When I started to look at the conflicts that I shall be describing below, I immediately became aware of issues I had not considered before. I began to realize that the type of conflict I was seeing was different from the conflicts I had previously found discussed in the experimental literature.

First, they were not hypothetical, but ‘real’; not third-person but first-person. There is a growing suspicion among researchers that discussing hypothetical conflicts is not a very good source of information on a person’s actual moral decisions. Among other things, such a task may measure cognitive skills rather than moral ones. Mandelbaum [1955] describes the character of various types of moral situation, and finds major experiential differences between situations of ‘direct moral judgement’, where a person deals with an immediate moral problem which confronts him or her, and those of ‘removed moral judgement’, where another’s actions are judged from a third-person perspective. For instance, in the former, but not the latter, one experiences a pressing moral imperative, an ‘ought’, which acts directly upon one from outside. These differences make it unlikely that people respond to hypothetical moral dilemmas (which are an extreme form of the ‘removed’ situation) in the same ways as they do to real, personal issues; the two are structurally different. Roberts [1965] also compares the two types of situation, and points out that reflective decision-making is structurally impossible in direct moral conflicts:

“When an agent is faced with the need for action, he does not see himself and his action as one, for his action is not yet done. He may contrive to imagine himself as acting, but he cannot look at this objectively in the way that an observer could. He is imprisoned in the present, and he only ceases to be confronted with the need for action when the action is completed, and he can survey its results. At no time can he say ‘I should have chosen otherwise’ except when it is too late for him to change his action’ [Roberts, 1965, p. 193].

Reasoning about hypothetical conflicts is standard methodological practice, however, employed by Kohlberg [1971], Damon [1984], Turiel [1983], and many others [e.g. Stanton, 1974; Kruglanski and Yinon, 1974; Weiner, 1980]. It is simply assumed that there is a ‘straightforward and close connection’, a ‘direct transfer from the moral judgement formed in a hypothetical situation to the decision made and the action performed in a real-life situation’ [Straughan, 1975]. Straughan argues that hypothetical dilemmas (such as that of Heinz and the druggist) are presented as a conflict between principles and obligations (Heinz’s principle not to steal, and his obligations to his wife). Real moral conflicts, on the other hand, often take the form of a struggle between principle and inclination (an impulse to copy another’s answer in a test, versus a belief that it is a wrong action, for example). If such a conflict is presented hypothetically, however, it lacks all immediacy, and it is this aspect which is responsible for the experienced conflict: the motivational influence of emotions such as fear, love, respect, and resentment, all of which a real Heinz would feel, cannot be properly appreciated secondhand.

The hypothetical dilemma was originally used by Piaget, but only as a secondary method: Piaget was very aware of its limitations: ‘When a child simply has stories told to him, he will be led to make judgements devoid of pity and lacking in psychological insight, testifying therefore to a more or less systematic moral realism, whereas in real life he would undoubtedly sympathize with those whom from afar he regards as the greatest sinners’ [Piaget, 1965 (1932)].

Second, there are different kinds of first-person (experienced directly by self) conflict. The one thought of most frequently is that where one experiences an internal conflict [e.g. Miller and Swanson, 1960]. For example, Hoffman [1982] describes several forms that moral conflict can take, but the particular form he is most interested in examining is internal conflict: the inner struggle between egoistic impulses and moral (often altruistic) constraints: inclination versus obligation or principle. Such a conflict may be experienced prior to action. Hoffman contrasts this with this type of conflict which has been focussed upon by the cognitivists: that between one’s own ‘level’ of moral reasoning and the level to which one is exposed. This is intellectual conflict, of a sort which occurs in hypothetical rational discourse between peers.

In the conflicts I was studying, I realized I was seeing a third form of conflict, what I shall term ‘exogenous conflict’. This is the conflict experienced on occasions where one acts in good faith, only to find that others judge one’s act to be immoral; or where one trusts another to act morally, only to find that he or she does not. Internal conflict is between what I want to do, and what I ought to do (and Hoffman makes the rather questionable assumption that these two are frequently felt to be in clear opposition). Intellectual conflict is between what I think ought to be done, and what you think ought to be done. Exogenous conflict – conflicts in action – on the other hand, occur when one acts with good intentions and finds that one has hurt someone; or when one ‘plays’ and discovers that the others are serious:
where there is a conflict between the moral worth which agent and others find in the agent’s action, already enacted. Study of such conflicts provides an advantage over investigation of endogenous or internal conflict, in that the former are far more amenable to empirical study. They are also, I believe, more frequently experienced, and have perhaps a developmental priority.

These different types of conflict each bring to light a different aspect of the phenomena we call morality. When one examines cases of exogenous conflict, morality is seen less as a process of reflecting and of resolving conflicting tendencies, before acting, and more as the clearing up of injustices and wrongs that were unanticipated. The distinction in advance between what one wants and what one ought to do is, after all, often not a clear one. An obvious conflict between these two implies that one already has an articulated grasp of the situation one is in, and of the interests and rights of those others who are involved. It involves a morality of authority and obligation, of prohibition and constraint, for it is these which are felt to be inhibiting one’s desired actions. Experiencing such a conflict between ‘wants’ and ‘oughts’ occurs when one is already in a defined and known situation, where the ‘oughts’ which apply are clear. In practice this is rarely the case; generally, it is not immediately apparent what sort of moral issue one is dealing with, and the dilemma will often be first disclosed as an exogenous conflict. How often does one sit consumed with indecision before taking more than one’s share of the cookies? Equivocation such as this occurs only when there is a clearly defined ‘ought’, a ‘proper’ action known in advance, against which one’s own desires are felt to be at odds. Such a state of affairs appears to be a late psychological development, at best; first (ontogenetically and, often, microgenetically) one disingenuously grabs the cookies, only to find oneself confronted by indignant others.

So I am concerned here with the question of how it is that a certain class of moral conflicts arise and are resolved, and the conflicts I shall consider are ones that arise unbidden in the course of everyday social interaction: ‘mundane’ moral conflicts. Surprisingly, the question of what happens in moral conflicts such as these has received very little empirical attention. This is, I believe, largely because an answer to the question has been taken for granted. In fact a whole set of assumptions have been made. First, that when moral conflict arises in action, people switch to a ‘theoretical mode’ in order to go about solving it. Second, that within this mode, moral conflicts are resolved by means of logical argumentation: the presenting of items of factual evidence, and the application of syllogistic reasoning.

Third, that the ultimate ground for these arguments will be moral ‘principles’, which will define one of several alternative moral philosophies or moral systems (utilitarianism, ethical relativism, eudaimonism, etc.). Fourth, that reasons ‘determine’ moral acts, with the twin consequences that conflicts arising in action can be adequately dealt with by reasoned argument, and that the results of such theoretical discussion are directly reapplicable to practice. Fifth, that moral and immoral acts (e.g. ‘cheating’, delinquency) can be objectively identified: they are ‘factual’.

Studies of moral action by and large treat action as though it is objective and quantifiable; they count the frequency of coded acts, and relate them statistically to the assessed level of moral reasoning, or to some other personality or situational variable. If we examine the social psychology literature on conflict in small group processes we find much the same state of affairs. Not much has changed since Bales [1951] developed a behavioral coding for group research – the Interaction Process Analysis – with twelve categories of social behavior (shows solidarity; agrees; disagrees; gives opinion...). Baxter [1982] complains of this state of affairs, and of the atomistic approach: ‘Unfortunately, research in small group conflict has frequently exhibited a rather limited operationalization of the conflict concept. Typically, a single act or utterance of expressed disagreement operationalizes conflict, with conflict resolution implicit in single acts of expressed agreement.’ Baxter then proceeds to study ‘episodes’ of conflict, which begin with an expression of disagreement, and end with consensus or abandonment of the topic. This is undoubtedly an advance, but Baxter still employs a coding-scheme approach, and the conflict episodes he identifies are very brief segments with an average length of only seven utterances.

The thesis I begin with is that moral action has been underemphasized, misconceived, and in general mistreated by psychologists, because of the adoption of mistaken assumptions about its nature. It has been regarded as unproblematic (as obvious in its forms; as unambiguous in its meanings), because of the adoption of, first, behaviorist and, later, cognitivist, meta-theoretical assumptions.

Moral action should be studied in a way that takes accounts of its complexities, and such peculiar phenomena as akrasia, the unanticipated consequences and unintended effects of disingenuous action, self-deception, and so on. It needs to be reconsidered as a phenomenon distinct from moral reasoning. The role of nonrational elements, especially emotion, must be appreciated too [cf. Gibson, 1979; Leather, 1983]. For example, Rybash and Roodin [1982] find that children as young as first through third graders pay
more attention, when judging moral transgressions, to the emotions shown after the outcome than to intentions before the act. Even the youngest children are sensitive to the role that emotions play in behavior. A methodology for the study of moral action must have as one of its major aims the description of these aspects of action, and I shall argue that such a methodology must be interpretive, because of the ‘uncovering’ that such inquiry necessitates.

This is not to say that there is no interest in communicative interaction; on the contrary, this is the direction in which some psychologists’ interest appears to be turning [cf. Haan, 1982; Habermas, 1971; Weinreich-Haste and Locke, 1983]. But social interaction is frequently regarded as though it is merely an overt form of reasoning. In a recent exchange, Youniss and Shweder take up this issue. Youniss [1981, 1982] proposes that ‘communication’ be seen as a source of morality which supplants and to a certain extent unifies behaviorist and cognitivist approaches. His intention is to correct the overly logical constructivist view of moral development held by Kohlberg, Piaget, and others, which is based, incorrectly he believes, on the model of an isolated self-reflecting individual. Shweder [1981, 1982] replies that the account Youniss is proposing itself appeals to an over-rational account of communication. Youniss does, indeed, talk of ‘social procedures’ by means of which social reality, and moral ‘codes’, are constructed. These procedures would include: argumentation, discussion, debate, compromise, negotiation, and the like [Youniss, 1981, p. 389], and by their use people solve the ‘communication problem’ of multiple views of morality and reality. Such a view implies that these ‘procedures’ guarantee solutions to social problems; Youniss compares them to game rules. The terminology reflects the rationalist framework within which Youniss approaches social interaction.

Shweder [1981, p. 409] points out that social construction is rarely a rational, egalitarian, and well-defined process. ‘It looks far more like the diffusion of “collective representations” from one generation to the next, far more like tacit cultural domination.’ There are implicit messages in communicative exchanges, he argues, which constitute forms of enculturation and cultural domination: hegemony. In effect, he illuminates the Piagetian framework – and consequent rationalism – that Youniss’s formulation continues to operate within, even though it avoids the narrow constructivist interpretation that Kohlberg adopts. Both behaviorism and cognitivism have in common, Shweder argues, a view that the individual must essentially come to terms with, and ultimately psychologically subordinate him-
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The 'mutual knowledge', expressed and organized in the practical context of language-use, which lay actors draw upon in the process of the production and reproduction of society, has to be accepted by the observer also as the necessary means of describing social life [Giddens, 1976, p. 11].

There is among developmental psychologists a growing interest in social interaction as a source of developmental change [e.g. Damon, 1984; Bearison, 1983; Doise et al., 1975]. At the same time, researchers in the fields of both cognitive and moral development are becoming dissatisfied with paradigms which involve interview situations and hypothetical discussions; opinion is growing that these lack ecological validity. However, there is confusion over how best to study a social exchange, either in the context of an instrumental problem-solving task, or in that of a moral conflict. The reason for this confusion, I believe, is that psychology has hitherto adopted two inadequate models of human action: a mechanical or causal model, and a logical or computational model. Recent research on social interaction has attempted, with no great success, to apply these models, particularly the second, to group settings.

I believe that both these models of action are seriously flawed. They both have a long history as philosophical positions, as well as psychological ones. I have described them in more detail elsewhere [Packer, 1984], so my discussion here will be brief. The first corresponds to empiricism; action is assumed to be the result of mechanistic exchanges: the causal influence of organism on environment and vice versa. Classical behaviorism and social learning theory are two psychological versions of this model. It has lost a great deal of its initial appeal as an explicit theory of action, but its influence remains strong at the level of methodology and research procedure: experimental manipulation assumes the mechanistic model, as do approaches to observation which employ context-free and elemental coding categories.

The computational model corresponds to the philosophical position known as rationalism. Here, action is seen as the outcome of rules, proce-
involved in it. In our day-to-day practice we also tend to see things as 'making sense', unreflectively glossing over gaps and contradictions [cf. Cicourel, 1964]. One task of the interpretive method is to render problematic our original experience, and thereby make it more accessible to thematic description. This is done by attending primarily to the lacunae of understanding. Focusing on these has the consequence of bringing to light those aspects of the interaction which we do understand: the significant details of the events interpreted become 'lit up'. I have turned to a number of writers in developing and applying hermeneutics: including Palmer [1969], Ricoeur [1976], de Rivera [1981], Rabinow and Sullivan [1979], McCarthy [1978], Haan et al. [1983], Sullivan [not dated], Bleicher [1980], Giddens [1976], and, most fundamentally, Heidegger [1962].

The 'data' for such an inquiry must be the everyday 'talk' that Schweder urges us to take seriously. It must be available in such a way that the temporality of the talk can be experienced: a video-recording suits well. The temporal structuring of our practical experience of everyday action and interaction is a crucial aspect of that involvement: social scientific procedures of investigation generally provide a type of access to their 'object' (either structuralist abstract entity (deep structure; competence), or behaviorist 'elements') that is qualitatively different.

Three related ways of considering human conduct guide this research: distinguishing, with Heidegger, between the ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand, and present-at-hand modes of engagement; regarding emotions as active structurings of action and experience; and considering social action from the point of view of its persuasive force.

Practical Activity as a Distinct Mode of Engagement

Heidegger's hermeneutics rests upon the distinction between three modes of engagement in human activity. Such a distinction provides an account of, and an access to, human action as a phenomenon in its own right, distinct from – indeed prior to – reasoning and thought. It is thus particularly fitting to the topic of this investigation; indeed, adopting a hermeneutic approach leads one directly, I believe, to the question of what it is right to do, and to the study of moral conduct. I have described the three modes more fully elsewhere [Packer, 1984]; their relevance here is that they provide a way of comprehending the changes in involvement which we shall find occurring during a moral conflict.

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The ready-to-hand mode is the form of engagement characteristic of our everyday mundane practical involvement with tools, paraphernalia, and other people. This mode is not instrumental in the regular sense: we do not have to employ means-ends planning in order to take up and utilize our common utensils, or to engage others in conversation, or even in pragmatically directed discourse. Instead, our acts are unquestioned and transparent. This mode of conduct is structured, according to Heidegger, by our concerns and moods as we act, and by the way a culture's language and social practices uncover what are to count as its objects.

The unready-to-hand mode we enter when some problem or breakdown develops in our unreflective conduct. We do not necessarily pause in our action, but its character changes: now we begin to plan instrumental strategies, as we become aware of the particular problem we have encountered (or which has encountered us). Various aspects of the situation begin to stand out, where before they were not distinct.

The present-at-hand mode, in contrast to the other two, is one of detached reflection and contemplation. When we withdraw from our everyday concerns and interests, the objects around us are given to us in a new manner: as context-free entities, with defined and permanent features and properties, rather than context-situated aspects and characteristics. It is from within the present-at-hand mode that theorizing and most philosophical discussion is conducted. Hypothetical discussions place one in the present-at-hand mode, detached and rational, with regard to their subject matter. Hermeneutic inquiry, in contrast, operates in the ready-to-hand and unready-to-hand modes, at least initially, and involves the study of ready-to-hand conduct. The conflicts studied here have their genesis in unproblematic, ready-to-hand activity.

Conduct as Structured by Emotionality

The second way to study human conduct is in terms of the experiences and motivations of emotion which have play in it. By and large, for the past several decades psychology has assumed a privileging of logic over feeling, of the rational over the emotional, of fact over value, but this view is changing. When we assume humans to be essentially rational beings then emotions appear as secondary phenomena, 'lower' than the mental functions which we seek to facilitate. It becomes easy to conclude that they hinder our reasoning, plague our attempts to be moral [cf. Lickona, 1976],
and should be suppressed and eliminated, as Kant [1929, p. 61] at times maintained ('the concepts of pleasure and pain, of the desires and inclinations ... are either a hindrance, which we have to overcome, or an allurement, which must not be made into a motive').

The psychological literature and research on emotions falls into the same two broad camps which characterize the study of action: empiricist and rationalist approaches, emphasizing, in this case, impulsive reaction and cognitive appraisal, respectively. The first of these breaks the phenomena of emotion into components, which are then linked in a classically causal manner. The second takes the same or similar components and links them by rule-following cognitions. In both cases emotions tend to be regarded as primarily energetic and quantitative, rather than as structured and qualitative: affect is considered the 'fuel' that motivates psychological systems whose organization and functioning is otherwise determined by cognitive components. The centrality of the notion of 'arousal' in theories of emotion attests to this focus on the energetic aspect of the phenomenon.

The experiences which characterize the various emotions are of central importance for the current study, but they are dealt with unsatisfactorily by both these classes of theory. In most theories of the causal type, the object or the environment is assumed to exert a material influence on the organism, with the experience of emotion being an end product, or an epiphenomenal parallel, of the causal process. Theories of instinctual response represent the clearest form of such an approach. McDougall [1928] and James [1890/1950; James and Lange, 1922] both posit on the part of the organism an intrinsic, automatic reaction to specific objects in the environment, with consciousness serving some more secondary role. McDougall talks of conscious feelings 'serving as signs of the nature of the impulse at work ... to the self-conscious organism'.

Proponents of the cognitive view generally complain that the causal approach fails to explain why people respond differently to the same objects, or the same environment. Such variation is due, they claim, to the different ways in which people 'evaluate' or 'appraise' what they are confronted with. Arnold [1968] maintains that the environment is first subjected to an automatic, unconscious process of appraisal that evaluates it in terms of its survival-threatening or enhancing possibilities. Appraisal is followed by a tendency to approach or avoid the object, depending on its assessed value, and it is this tendency which, when felt, constitutes the emotional experience.

2. Understanding Action

There are a number of difficulties with both types of theory. First, they attribute an almost entirely epiphenomenal role to the experiential character of an emotion. It is hard to consider complete an account of emotion which does not include experience. These theories tend to add on the experiences of emotion to a deterministic logical or causal process involving specific forms of behavior and physiological arousal. In James's theory this neglect takes perhaps its most extreme form: an emotion for James is the result of a secondary process which is entirely separate from the actual response to the threatening object. In James's [1950, p. 450] famous aphorism, 'we feel angry because we strike', which leaves unanswered the question: Why do we not just strike the blow, and feel nothing at all? A consequence of this odd treatment of experience is the appearance of disagreements concerning exactly where in the process 'felt emotion' appears. For Ekman [1980] emotion as felt is the 'entire process' of recognition, appraisal, and activation of specific 'programs' of facial expression. For Arnold, it is the tendency to action which becomes manifest in consciousness. For Bowlby [1969], it is an 'aspect' of the appraisal process, just as redness is an aspect of heated metal.

Both causal and formal explanations blur or ignore Hume's distinction between the object of an emotion and its cause: 'There is an obvious distinction to be made between the object of the passion and its cause ... The causes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its views to when the emotion is excited' [Hume, 1825, p. 176]. This distinction is, indeed, easily lost if we consider only cases such as the fear of concrete threatening entities. An attacking lion — clearly the object of our fear — is all too easily seen also as its cause, mediated perhaps by some underlying process of appraisal. But we can also fear immaterial phenomena (the dark), future events (nuclear war), and even imaginary objects (ghosts), none of which can exercise material causality on us to produce the emotion. As Hampshire [1959] points out, talk of the 'sensations' and 'feelings' involved in emotion leads easily to an ignoring of emotions' objects, for the experiences we typically discuss in such terms are those rare objectless ones: pains, itchings, and physical irritations, which don't seem to have anything to do with emotion.

The root problem of both causal and cognitive theories is that they render the experience of emotion unnecessary (and largely unanalyzed). If, indeed, the fear of nuclear war, failure, dogs, and strange noises at night can be fully characterized in terms of logical, computational, and rational processes of evaluation (comparison against set goals, and so on), or explained
in terms of material causation, then there is no account given of why we do, in addition to these processes, have a certain kind of experience (of danger, threat, foreboding); or indeed why we should feel anything special at all. There is, consequently, no role which the experience of emotion can play in the theories which are trying to explain it.

Recently, however, there has been work in several disciplines which tries to overcome this artificial hierarchizing. Researchers have suggested that emotions are not simply disrupters of rationality, but have their own structure and are systematically interrelated [e.g. de Rivera, 1977]. Rather than seeing them as being the outcome of essentially rational processes of perception and evaluation, some psychologists are beginning to argue that emotions must occur prior to such processes [e.g. Zajonc, 1980]. Researchers are beginning to become cognizant that the investigation of moral action must examine the role of feeling and emotion [e.g. Gilligan and Murphy, 1979; Mergendoller, 1981], recognizing that a morality based on logical grounds does not encompass all the phenomena of human moral experience. As yet, however, such research has not incorporated any positive account of the experiential character of emotion. Such an account begins by examining the manner in which emotions are experienced and, by describing this closely, attempts an explanatory characterization of the phenomena of emotion.

Our experience changes: distances shrink or expand, colors change, and we perceive possibilities for action that were not apparent to us in our previous, instrumentally oriented, rational mode [Sartre, 1948]. Emotion plays a structuring, organizing role, focusing and directing our attention in particular ways. In each emotion, objects in the world manifest certain qualities in a newly perceived manner, and certain possibilities for action stand out in a striking way. As de Sousa [1980, p. 137] puts it: ‘emotions are determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies’. They constitute ‘perceptual gestalts’. In strong emotion the world takes on a particular quality of immutability (in contrast with the open-ended possibilities of the rationally conceived-of world), and this provides us with a pressing impetus to take action [Hall and Cobey, 1976].

Indeed, in contrast with our experience when carrying out detached, rational appraisal, in strong emotion our world changes its character, and we are led, are ‘moved’ towards certain forms of action. The term ‘emotion’ derives from the Latin verb ‘emovere’, meaning ‘to move out’. De Rivera [1977] notes that this has the sense of an authoritative force moving a resisting mass: a sense of being moved, which is neither willed action nor being impelled by an external force: emotions move us to action but paradoxically they are experienced as having their source within us. If these impelled actions prove adequate for dealing with the situation the emotion subsides and the world tends to resume a ‘normal’ appearance, but with lingering changes; the particular objects of the emotion change their character – the quality of the emotion is now ‘projected’ onto them, and becomes part of their character. The dog that attacked and bit us has now become, through the transformation of emotion, a ‘fearsome’ dog.

De Rivera [1977, 1981] constructs a dimensional characterization of emotions on the basis of the types of movement they involve. By comparing and contrasting pairs of emotions and moods, he describes a ‘semantic space’ within which he places 48 different affects. His argument is that each emotion involves a unique way of understanding a situation, and so entails implicit ‘choices’ (which differ from conscious ‘decisions’): while seeming to be passive, it is actually a highly active structuring. ‘There are different ways that a person can organize what has happened, different choices he can make that will yield quite different interpretations of his situation and transform his ways of being-in-the-world. The choices he makes organize an emotional structure that transforms his situation and instructs (or demands) him to behave in specified ways’ [de Rivera, 1977, p. 73]. ‘Emotion occurs when activity cannot be initiated by the self but instead is required by the world, which confronts the person with a fait accompli affecting his interests (a challenge, a success or failure, a danger, goodness, evil). The emotion is a transformation of our relation to this world, the transformation that is required to deal with this change in the world’ [de Rivera, 1977, p. 122].

De Rivera grounds his analysis in the Human observation that emotions are intentional: they involve a subject and an object. There are then a variety of ways in which subject and object are moved by an emotion, as we experience it. The movement between subject and object can take the form either of approach or of distancing. There are two forms of approach, one where subject moves towards object, and the other where object moves towards subject. There are two corresponding forms of distancing, with self moving away and object moving away, respectively. Finally, emotions differ in whether the person experiencing the emotion is subject or object of the movement.

Each of the eight combinations of movement just described can occur in three distinct regions. The first of these is that of a change in ‘Belonging’.
Emotions involving such movements transform the relationship of self and other: love, anger, desire, and fear are examples of emotions of this type. The second region involves changes of ‘Being’. These emotions (such as acceptance, wonder, rejection, and dread) operate by affecting the way in which the object’s (or subject’s) existence or nature is understood. For instance, acceptance is the granting of the existence of something whose nature is undesirable. Rejection, in contrast, is the denial of the existence of such an object. The third region is that of ‘Recognition’. Those emotions involve the acknowledgement or denial of the other as member of a group. They are concerned with social self and concerns of honor, reputation, and morality. Esteem, admiration, contempt, shame, and guilt all involve movements in this region.

For Heidegger, one of the equiprimordial structures of practical activity is ‘Befindlichkeit’, a neologism which translates roughly as ‘Mood’ [cf. Guignon, 1984]. The term covers both emotions and moods. Heidegger notes that ‘in every case Dasein always has some mood’ (‘Dasein’ is Heidegger’s term for human being, which he regards primarily as an active taking of a stand on what it is to be human). He does not consider moods and emotions to be subjective experiences and internal states, fleeting feelings which merely color our experience: emotions are active structurings of our activity and experience, and are only reduced and misunderstood when regarded as inner conditions caused by external events.

Heidegger maintains that moods and emotions have an experiential and methodological priority over reflective thinking and other forms of cognition. Mood provides an access to phenomena – an understanding of them – which is more complete and ‘far-reaching’, more ‘primordial’, than that provided by logic and theorizing: ‘...the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 173]. Just as deliberation follows upon the heels of action, and can take up and articulate only what stands out in practical activity, so it takes up what is given in emotion, and can only begin to articulate, in its own more delimited and objectifying way, what has already been disclosed in Mood. An emotion cannot, then, be identified simply with what Dasein is acquainted with, knows, and believes ‘at the same time’ when it has such a mood’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 175]. For: ‘Ontologically Mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 175].

Emotions disclose new phenomena as ‘evident’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 175], not in the same way that theoretical knowledge presents certain truths, but not, on the other hand, in a merely irrational way. Emotions provide us with a source of knowledge which confronts us with our ‘facticity’: the actual situation we find ourselves to be in; the sort of being we ourselves have become. Mood is what makes it possible for us to direct our will, and to identify and think about a ‘fact’ or ‘state of affairs’. An emotion discloses to us – presents us with – a situation, as our situation; the one we are now in, in all its complexity and interrelatedness. It lets us encounter fresh aspects of this situation, for we encounter things only as they ‘matter’ to us, only when they affect us, and have significance to us: ‘Only something which is in the Mood of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein’s openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a Mood’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 176]. ‘Pure beholding ... could never discover anything like that which is threatening’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 177].

A mood or an emotion is a ‘style’ of meaningful activity; a structuring of our engagement in the world. But what of the familiar claim that emotions distort our comprehension of the world? Do they not delude us, and hide from us the true nature of reality? On the contrary:

‘If we make [such] evaluations ..., we shall completely fail to recognize the existentially positive character of the capacity for delusion. It is precisely when we see the “world” unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific workhood, which is never the same from day to day. By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at-hand ...’ [Heidegger, 1962, p. 177].

It is the theoretical attitude, which sees the world as a ‘dimmed down’ uniformity, which distorts and deludes us. And theorizing itself, Heidegger goes on to say, involves a mood of tranquility, of ‘comfort and recreation’, without which it would not be possible.

I noted earlier that Heidegger attaches a particular methodological significance to emotion, because the disclosure it provides is far more complete and far reaching than that of theorizing, or even practical deliberation. Since hermeneutics attempts to achieve the most direct access to human phenomena, emotions and moods will be of crucial importance to an interpretive investigation. ‘Interpretation... will attach itself to Dasein’s distinctive and most far-reaching possibilities of disclosure, in order to get information about [an] entity from these ... Such Interpretation takes part in this
disclosure only in order to raise to a conceptual level the phenomenal content of what has been disclosed, and to do so existentially" [Heidegger, 1962, p. 179]. Interpretation can only pick up and explicate what has already become known in a more tacit and engaged manner; and Mood is the 'distinctive' form of such a disclosure. Consequently, an interpreter must attend to his or her own emotional responses in the course of interpretation, because of the disclosure these provide of what is going on. There is also a second methodological contribution which emotion can make: a phenomenological account of emotional experience can provide a 'forestructure' for interpretation. In the course of the analysis that follows I shall make use of de Rivera's regions of movement in this way. Considering emotions in terms of their movement enables one to look at speech (discourse; social interaction) in its dynamic aspect, as interpersonal action. Talk is one form in which – one means by which – emotional movement is realized, and it is to social interaction considered as persuasive discourse that I turn next.

The Rhetorical Character of Action

The third way to consider human action is in terms of its power to influence others. Rhetoric is the study of social action – primarily speech, of course – as persuasive discourse. Moral conflict, when it occurs between people (and occasionally when it is a solitary individual who experiences the conflict), is an occasion when the persuasive character of discourse may come to the fore. As Blasi [not dated] points out, moral action involves considerations of self-image, moral worth, and personal consistency, and the study of rhetoric makes us particularly attuned to these. Furthermore, rhetoric is intimately interrelated with emotion: emotions give rise to persuasive discourse, motivated to convince and move others; reciprocally, one way of persuading others is to rouse emotions in them. This intrinsic connection between emotion and rhetoric is noted by Heidegger:

'It is not an accident that the earliest systematic Interpretation of affects that has come down to us is not treated in the framework of "psychology". Aristotle investigates the affects in the second book of his Rhetoric. Contrary to the traditional orientation, according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we "learn in school"; this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one another. Publicness ... not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and "makes" them for itself. It is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks' [Heidegger, 1962, p. 178].

In his Rhetoric, Aristotle [1954] distinguishes three components of persuasive discourse, which have certain interesting parallels with de Rivera's dimensions of emotion.

"Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself" [Aristotle, 1954, I, 2, 1356a].

... the orator must not only make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind" [Aristotle, 1954, II, 1, 1377b].

As Aristotle approaches it, any rhetorical presentation – any persuasive discourse, in fact – will use three 'modes of persuasion'. First, the Ethical Argument, which derives from the influence, or presumed influence, of the speaker. Such aspects as the speaker's apparent expertise, intentions, and sincerity play a role in this mode of the discourse. Second, the Pathetic Argument ('pathos' meaning emotion), which persuades by rousing emotion in the audience, and precipitating certain actions. Third, the Logical Argument, which rests on the rationality, or appearance of rationality, of the presentation. Two of de Rivera's regions of movement closely resemble the first two of Aristotle's three rhetorical components, to give us two aspects of conduct to pay attention to in our work of interpretation:

Aristotle's first 'mode' is that of the Ethical Argument, which concerns the manner in which the speaker presents him- or herself during the talk. This involves the assuming of some kind of status (moral, social, etc.) on the part of the speaker, and, correlatively, a presentation to the other of their presumed status. This assuming of status of a certain kind corresponds to one form of movement within emotion: the 'vertical' one that de Rivera identifies with the Recognition region. I shall refer to this as the region of Moral Status.

Aristotle's second component of rhetoric is the Pathetic Argument: discourse aims to move others in a certain way; to have them perform certain acts. For Aristotle this component is the one chiefly concerned with affect, but I shall consider it to be only one of affect's manifestations in social action. The corresponding form of movement in emotion is the 'horizontal' one of changed intimacy: the talk between people constantly alters or maintains their interpersonal closeness to one another [cf. Krellkamp, 1981], and this is a fundamental way of moving them in a social exchange. This is the Belonging region in de Rivera's analysis, which, it will be recalled, involves
a change in the social relationship, the bond, between self and other. This aspect of social action I shall term the Intimacy region.

The third aspect of social action which I shall be attending to is not one of movement (so I will ignore, for the purposes of the analysis here, de Rivera’s third region: Being). It corresponds loosely to Aristotle’s Logical Argument: the rationality, or appearance of rationality, in persuasive speech. Here one looks at the form of the talk, rather than its effect: the mythology it expresses; what images are used; the manner in which speech is framed; what types of topic are raised; what counts as a ‘fact’. I shall refer to this in the analyses which follow as the Mythology region.

Such a combining of the facets of emotion and of rhetoric provides us with a threefold ‘fore-structure’ for the interpretive description of social interaction: in terms of the manner in which participants present themselves; the behavior and reactions they try to arouse, and those they succeed in rousing, in those they interact with; and the apparent forms of discursive presentation in their speech. Of course, these three facets are not independent of one another; they are ways of viewing a body of social action which has its own unity. The motivation behind this threefold analytical scheme is to allow a point of entry to the structure of social action which involves less distortion than either the causal (e.g. quantification and correlation) or the logical (e.g. structuralist) approaches.

The task undertaken in this research is, then, to study in detail the complex interactions that occasion and constitute interpersonal moral conflict and give rise to moral concerns. At the same time, I take it as a test of the usefulness and insightfulness of a hermeneutic approach. The reader will be the final judge of whether or not such an approach succeeds in its aim of illuminating what goes on in moral conflict, and bringing to light aspects of events which were not apparent before.

3. Details of the Data

It might seem that games are just the wrong thing to take as models for understanding moral responsibility; after all, we usually think of games as relaxation, a relaxation from our responsibilities. Is it possible that in using games or gambling as illustrations I have introduced a serious error? One may not care in playing tennis or bridge, but can one just not care to be morally responsible and in this way ‘get out of it’ [Fingarette, 1967, p. 36]?

The moral conflicts which I shall examine were gleaned from video-recordings of college students engaged in a version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) — a ‘game’ much used by social psychologists and game theoreticians. The version used was ‘NeoPD’: a modification of PD developed by Pilisuk [cf. Haan, 1978]. In this chapter I briefly discuss details of the game procedure and of participant selection.

But first, what are the consequences of using social interaction in a ‘game’ setting? Fingarette’s point in the quotation above is that moral prescriptions cannot be considered analogous to the rules of a game. This runs counter to what Piaget [1965] held to be the case in his early work on morality. There he argued that:

‘All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules.... Now, the rules of the game of marbles are handed down, just like so-called moral realities, from one generation to another, and are preserved solely by the respect that is felt for them by individuals.... If this is not “morality”, then where does morality begin? [Piaget, 1965, p. 13–14].

Fingarette argues, in contrast, that games have a contingent and temporally binding character that moral proscriptions do not. While agreeing with this, I want to draw another conclusion from the contrast of game rules and moral forces. Since morality cannot be shrugged off in the way that rules of a game can, it follows that morality must still apply, even in a ‘game’. We cannot just choose not to be moral, because we are ‘bound’ by our morality, even within what may appear the most trivial and innocuous of games. And the problems that arise in NeoPD for the young adults studied here are neither trivial nor innocuous.
The Structure of Moral Action

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

PD is a structured interaction between two players who have limited direct contact with one another. They communicate via an intermediary (called, below, the staff leader) and inform him or her of their ‘choices’. The game is designed to emulate the following situation:

‘Two suspects are taken into custody and separated. The district attorney is certain that they are guilty of a certain crime, but he does not have adequate evidence to convict them at a trial. He points out to each prisoner that each has two alternatives: to confess to the crime the police are sure they have done, or not to confess. If they both do not confess, then the district attorney states he will book them on some very minor trumped-up charge such as petty larceny and illegal possession of a weapon, and they will both receive minor punishment; if they both confess they will be prosecuted, but he will recommend less than the most severe sentence; but if one confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will receive lenient treatment for turning state’s evidence whereas the latter will get “the book” slapped at him’ [Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p. 95, reprinted by permission of John Wiley & Sons].

The ‘dilemma’ that faces each suspect in these circumstances is that each stands to gain the most by confessing if the other does not confess, but will lose the most by confessing if the other does confess. If the two prisoners could communicate their decisions would become straightforward: neither would confess. In the absence of communication each is faced with the choice of confessing (thereby risking prosecution if his collaborator does the same) or not confessing (risking severe punishment if the other turns state’s evidence).

In the game simulation of this situation each player has a card, blue on one side and white on the other, which they can choose to play with either side uppermost. Choosing blue is equivalent to confessing (playing ‘competitively’); choosing white is equivalent to staying silent (playing ‘cooperatively’). The terms ‘competitive’ and ‘cooperative’ reflect the fact that if both prisoners confess both suffer; if both stay silent each will receive only minor punishment.

In game theoretic terms, PD, first described in detail by Luce and Raiffa [1957], is a noncooperative, nonzero sum simulation game. The nature of its payoff matrix makes it a mixed-motive game; it is characterized by a mixture of cooperative and competitive motives whose source is inherent in the game’s structure. The game has a strongly stable (i.e. frequently chosen) equilibrium outcome – mutual competition – which is, ironically, deficient in payoff to both players. This selection of an unfavorable outcome reflects the nature of the game’s dilemma. PD has been thought by many to have a structure similar to real-life conflict situations, where achieving individual goals at the other’s expense is incompatible with achieving mutual or group goals. Each player is tempted to seek personal gain by competing, but if both compete, both lose. If both cooperate, both profit. The similarity of PD to real conflict situations lies in the fact that the participants, who suffer from restricted opportunities for communication, find themselves faced with good reasons both to cooperate and to compete. Deciding which is the optimal choice depends on an assessment in advance of the other participant’s choice. Such an assessment is necessarily incomplete, and there is inadequate information to provide the basis for choosing.

Similarities are often thought to exist between PD and situations such as international arms talks and hostage negotiations where neither side quite trusts the other’s motives, but is unable to obtain the information needed to render trust unnecessary [Deutsch, 1973; White, 1965; Axelrod, 1970]. PD has become a very popular tool for social psychologists who are interested in studying conflict and its resolution, and has been called the E. coli of social psychology. Rapoport has proposed that the study of simulation games is a necessary, first simplifying step for the development of theories of conflict, before more complex conflict situations are studied [Rapoport, 1970; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965].

The standard two-person, two-choice version of the game has a payoff matrix of the form shown in figure 1.

C here represents a cooperative choice, and D a competitive choice. X1 through X4 represent the payoffs in each of the four outcome conditions, with the first player’s payoff on the left. To take a concrete example, we might have the matrix shown in figure 2.
It must be the case that $X_3 > X_1 > X_4 > X_2$, and it is usually the case that $2X_1 > X_2 + X_3 > 2X_4$, in order to ensure that CC will provide the largest joint payoff.

Expansion of Prisoner’s Dilemma

The prototypic form of PD involves, then, two players making a choice from two options. Various modifications of the game have been introduced, the most frequent one being that of iteration: having multiple repetitions of the game, one after another. This introduces fresh complexities, as well as making the game somewhat more realistic. Issues of strategy develop, since the players are now able to make predictions of each other’s likely choices based on their past behavior [cf. Oskamp, 1971]. Computer analyses have been performed on various strategies, though human players tend not to play in accordance with any pure form of these. Parenthetically, it is interesting that the computer program which has gained the most points in recent computer tournaments of iterated PD plays a strategy named ‘Tit-for-Tat’, which involves cooperating on the first choice and thereafter choosing what the other player chose on the last play. Thus, the other player’s cooperative choices are rewarded and competitive choices punished, a form of machine ‘morality’ which is none too advanced (resembling an early stage of instrumental relativism).

The form of PD used here – ‘NeoPD’ – makes two further departures from PD in addition to iteration: it is a multi-choice, multiperson game. Two teams, each of four members, have a choice of four possible options, ranging between an extreme of cooperation and an extreme of competition. The payoff matrix is more complex in this case (see fig. 3), but the logic of the game remains the same, as does, more importantly, the nature of the dilemma.

NeoPD also involves alterations of procedure which are highly important for the research reported here. The most significant of these is in the degree and type of communication which is allowed between the two teams. After playing a number of rounds of the game (each round comprising five choices) the teams are told that they may, if they wish, each select one of their members to act as representative in a negotiation between the two teams. The two negotiators talk together in full view of the remainder of the group. This arrangement introduces a whole new domain of action for the participants, and fresh interest for the researcher. Many experiments with the PD have seated players in separate rooms, so that they are aware of each other’s responses only by means of lights on a display panel. Others have allowed some communication as an experimental variable, but limited its form (to written notes, for example) and its extent. And even then, the focus of interest in such experiments has not been in the content of the notes exchanged, but in their effect upon quantitative outcome measures, such as the overall ratio of cooperative to competitive choices.

Here lies the major difference between the use of NeoPD in the study I describe and the use of PD in the majority of social psychological experiments which employ it to study conflict. The ‘data’ which these latter examine are the choices made in the game, considered usually in the form of gross cumulative measures, though occasionally approaches such as time-series analysis have been used [Anchor and Cross, 1974; Benton et al. 1969; Druckman, 1971; Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Scheff, 1967; Terhune, 1968, 1970]. So, for example, a researcher will attempt to ascertain the consequences of the first choice of a game (whether it is CC or DD) on subsequent performance (total score; number of subsequent CCs and DDs, etc.). The ‘data’ for my analysis, on the other hand, are the acts that the group participants perform during their playing of the game, not (or not only) those acts which constitute the game. These acts are considered hermeneutically, not quantitatively.
But the significance of NeoPD goes beyond the fact that it is more amenable to interpretive analysis. The dilemma of PD is, as I have explained, that no rational basis exists upon which to base the decision of whether to cooperate or compete. Now, as far as the rational processes of game playing are concerned, this dilemma dissolves as soon as communication is introduced into the game. If the players can communicate, they can both agree to cooperate, and this is the rational choice for both of them; it makes it possible for them to resolve their dilemma and optimize their winnings, within the limitations of the game's circumstances. Communication provides the information needed to resolve the indecision. The descriptions given below of actual game sessions will show, however, that in practice such a 'rational' outcome is a trivial part of the conflict that develops in NeoPD. Taking advantage of the opportunity to make an agreement between the two teams is the start of major conflict between the teams; the mathematical or logical 'solution' to the game is not a psychological (or behavioral, 'actual') solution to the experienced situation. But to say more on this point would anticipate the analyses which are to follow.

Ten video-recorded sessions of NeoPD with college students were the basis for this study. The sessions were conducted as part of a study by Dr. Norma Haan and associates, and the video-tapes were made by Dr. Haan. That study, with full details of procedure, rationale, and participants, is reported elsewhere [Haan et al., 1984], and only the few details relevant to NeoPD are given here.

Participants

The young adults were all first-year undergraduates at the University of California at Berkeley, of modal age 19 years. All lived in college dormitories, from which they were recruited. They were homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and ability. (In order to be admitted to the university all had been within the top 10% of their high school graduating class.)

The students volunteered to take part in the project as a group of friends. Ten friendship groups were recruited for NeoPD and other game sessions, each composed of four females and four males. Almost all members of each friendship group lived in the same dormitory, often on the same floor.

Procedure

NeoPD was the second game of five in which these young adults participated as friendship groups. Members were also interviewed individually before and twice after the games but these interviews and the other four game sessions will not concern us here. The groups met once a week for the game sessions. One group resolved NeoPD in about 30 min, the other nine took up to 2 h. The staff leader separated participants into two teams, randomly, save that each had two men and two women. The teams sat on opposite sides of a curtain, which prevented them from seeing what the others were doing, but they could easily hear comments made by the other team. Each participant was given a card, blue on one side and white on the other, and a copy of the 'payoff' matrix. The matrix showed the points each team received, according to the number of blue cards each team turned up on each choice. The points were to be paid in pennies to each team as a whole at the end of the session. The game was divided into 'rounds', each of which was made up of five 'choices'. On each choice, the staff leader called out to the teams 'ready, choose', at which point each team member placed a card down on the table they were seated around. Sometimes each played independently, sometimes the team conferred and they played according to some strategy. The staff leader then called out the cards played, for instance 'four, one', calling first the play of the team to the left. The staff leader then often announced the points won and lost on the last choice ('six minus three' for the example just used). At the end of the round, the staff leader announced the total points won or lost during the five choices, and then the cumulative score thus far. When the game ended - either drawn to a close by the participants, or at the suggestion of the staff leader - soft drinks were provided and the staff leader encouraged a post-game discussion, and some reflection upon and commentary about what had just occurred.

Transcripts

Complete transcripts were developed for each session studied in detail. First the audio from the video-recording was dubbed across to a cassette tape. This was transcribed, and the transcription checked carefully, first with the cassette, then with the original video. Speakers were identified, and then utterances were numbered sequentially. Transcripts varied in length from 650 to 1,700 lines.
The following transcription conventions were adopted. Each line was sequentially numbered; this is the number at the start of each line in the excerpts appearing in following chapters. Lines are referred to in the body of the text with a preceding hatch mark, e.g. # 157.

The groups were each given an identifying letter, A–Z. The two teams in each session of NeoPD were identified as the Losing (L) and Winning (W) Teams, on the basis of the points they had gained some way into the game. On one occasion (group X) neither team were consistently ahead in points, and the designations were Team One (O) and Team Two (T). Individual team members were identified with a three-part code which indicated their team (L or W, or O or T); their sex (F or M); and a number indicating whether they were the first or second person of each sex in their team (numbering was according to seating position during the session). For example, WF2 is the second female member of the Winning Team; LM1 is the first male member of the Losing Team. The staff leader was designated SL.

Thus the codes that follow the line number in the excerpts indicate the person speaking. Question marks indicate ambiguity in the identification of a speaker. For example, LM? indicates that one of the two males in the Losing Team spoke. W? indicates that a member of the Winning Team, sex unidentified, spoke. A lone? reflects occasions when a remark, although heard, could not be definitely attributed to any specific individual.

The utterance follows these codes, transcribed in a conventional form. Questionable portions of an utterance are enclosed in parentheses; an empty pair of parentheses indicates an inaudible segment. Material between slashes (/) is explanatory material, to provide the reader with some degree of context, or to record nonverbal behavior.

Participants' Understanding of the Study

The recruitment and treatment of participants was intended to encourage from the outset a particular way of understanding the study and their role within it. First, they were with their friends, and so their conduct in the game took place against the background of their practiced ways of dealing with each other as roommates, study partners, and peers. They related to each other not as strangers, but as known others, with familiar ways of being. In their talk and other actions they could presuppose and make reference to a shared history and certain taken-for-granted practices. One assumes that rivalries, alliances, and established obligations played a role in structuring the situation for participants.

Second, participants were informed at the outset that the intent of the research was the study of morality. They were introduced to the observers who were to watch them, from behind a one-way mirror, during the sessions. They were shown the video-recording equipment, and arrangements were made for them to view, at a later date, any of the sessions they wished. In general, the effort was made to inform and respect them as individuals, and as participants. On the one hand this may have led to a certain self-consciousness on their part about being observed (although this is probably always present in research with adults), and an alertness to the moral issues which they knew were a topic of interest. On the other hand, their curiosity, undoubtedly piqued, had been satisfied, and they were perhaps more able to relax and defend themselves against the intrusions of the research than subjects in psychology experiments usually are.

A certain ambiguity remained about the nature of the game sessions, however, and it will prove to be of great importance for understanding what transpires in the conflicts that develop in NeoPD. On the one hand, NeoPD is a game situation, and has a competitive structure: participants were divided into teams, pitted against each other, separated by a curtain, and rewarded with pennies for the points they won. On the other hand, they were being observed and studied by psychologists who were, they knew, interested in moral development, and so morality took on an uncertain problematic status.
4. The Occurrence of Burning

Those among mankind who proceed according to principles, are but very few, which is no doubt good, as it can so easily happen to err in these principles, and then the disadvantage which arises therefrom extends itself the farther, the more general the principle and the more steadfast the person is, who has laid them down for himself [Kant, 1798].

A variety of different kinds of conflict and disagreement occurred in the videotaped sessions of NeoPD. One in particular stands out, however: it is initiated by a specific action, which occurs in a surprisingly high proportion of groups; the action is given a special name by some of the participants; and it occurs at a key point in the game, where an agreement to cooperate has been made between the teams, and so where the dilemma of NeoPD has, ostensibly, been resolved.

The action that initiates the conflicts I study here is the deliberate breaking of this agreement by the Winning Team: not, note, the Losing Team, who would seem to have more to gain by cheating. There were three occasions where a Losing Team cheated, but such conduct did not lead to prolonged conflict between the teams, apparently because the Losing Team’s motivation was so apparent, and comparatively innocuous. The participants called the breaking of the agreement ‘burning’, and I have adopted the term, because it catches the sense of intentional wrongdoing that the Losing Team find in the act.

The point in the game where the burning occurs is highly significant, for it is just as the teams have finally reached the ‘Nash Equilibrium’: the mathematical, rational solution to the game, as far as game theoreticians are concerned. The agreement to cooperate provides both teams with moderate points, and is the appropriate solution to the game for those who consider social interaction a purely prudential matter. Why should anyone see another action preferable to cooperative play, particularly when the new course of action involves breaking the agreement, in the course of participation in a psychological study of morality? Yet it is precisely when the agreement to cooperate is made that the moral problems in NeoPD begin – the temptation to burn is felt, and the conflict between the teams follows if this is done. When burning occurs the Losing Team always real terms, and the remainder of the session is taken up by deals concerns which the burning gives rise to.

The Occurrence of Burning in NeoPD

In the remainder of this chapter, I shall examine four NeoPD to ascertain what aspects of the situation account for the or nonoccurrence of burning, and the conflict associated with it ter will focus only on the events which lead up to conflict. I which the conflict develops and is reconciled will be the topic following chapters. My purpose is to try to understand what m burning, and the meaning the act has for the Winning Team. I we shall be examining the Losing Team’s uptake of the same will see that the two teams comprehend it in very different wa Uncovering the burning’s motivation entails trying to und interpret the way the teams – the Winning Team especially – ex social situation they find themselves in. Four sessions will be co contrasted: two where burning occurred (groups A and B), and did not (groups X and Y). Issues and occurrences which are several sessions will be identified, on the assumption that the experiential structure common to the NeoPD situation. As the examined, particular aspects become salient, as they are repeat sessions. These aspects vary in their degree of abstraction, wh garnered from participants’ comments or are, instead, interpration of actions performed, and so on. A number of these com will be discussed, with illustrative excerpts from the transcr session. It is not necessarily the case that all of the four session aspect for it to be included in this analysis. In particular, it seen to identify any aspects of the sessions which are common to gro but are not present in groups X’s or group Y’s session of Neo

Group A

In the first few choices of the game, the members of the Wi in group A find themselves, fortuitously, with a clear lead in 15 choices, the score is 10 for the Losing Team, 38 for the Wi
The comments by members of the Losing Team change from enthusiasm at the start:

16 LM1 We're rolling!

... to self-criticism and complaints:

35 LM1 A complete bone job.
51 LM1 Oh, we're just getting killed here.

... and this continues, until they are in dismay at losing further points:

70 LM1 I don't believe it.

By this time, the Winning Team is making fun of them:

74 W? How'd they ever make it into this school? /Laughter./

At this point there is still good humor about what is going on. There is much laughter, and the participants seem relaxed. Furthermore, it is clear that the Losing Team feel that it is still possible for them to win:

96 LM1 All right! We're gaining on 'em. Suckers!

However, they are increasingly aware of the difference in points:

99 SL Winning Team has 44. Losing Team has 16.
100 LM1 This isn't even close. /Winning Team are talking animatedly together, with lots of energy. Losing Team are subdued; LM1 talks to no one in particular, and the others are silent./

Very shortly, however, this team recognize that they actually have little or no chance of winning, since they are far behind and the points are changing very little on each round:

45 LM2 (Well every time, we're gonna lose.)
47 LM2 They/Winning Team/can't lose.

When the points are announced now there is silence; no laughter. The team play another round, with the Winning Team playing four on all but one choice, thereby forcing the Losing Team to play competitively, gaining no points:

67 LM2 See we just ( ) every time.
68 LM1 I know.
69 LM2 We just get total negatives.

We see a change in emotions here: in the mood with which the teams participate. Both teams show an initial enthusiasm: a competitive wrangling. As the disparity in the total points for each of the two teams begins to increase, members of both teams begin to criticize the Losing Team for this state of affairs: they are regarded as incompetent. At first this increases the Losing Team's involvement, as they strive to improve their lot, but finally they become aware that they cannot possibly catch up. At this point they become withdrawn and despondent; the course of action they were intent on pursuing is now perceived as closed off to them. As LM1 puts it at #152, as the points are announced once more, 'What a downer.'

The Winning Team's attitude becomes increasingly one of self-assured superiority. When the staff leader asks the team if they wish to play another round, WM2 replies insouciantly, to his team's laughter, 'Yeah, I don't care', and WM1 adds, with a grin, 'Ask the losers!'

After two further rounds of play the staff leader suggests that the two teams each select one of their members to talk together. The outcome of the negotiation that follows is an agreement to play zero, zero, so the teams can get 'maximum money'. At first the Winning Team aren't sure they will talk:

212 LM1 Can I...? (Alright), let's negotiate. /Calling to the other team./
214 WM2 Well, you're getting killed.
216 LM1 So what, all we're gonna do is for both teams to make the maximum money. /Said to his teammates./
217 W? I don't want to negotiate.
218 WF? We're doing okay by chance.
228 LF1 What exactly are we negotiating?
230 LM1 So, we're gonna put so we're both making, instead of ( ) against each other, some... One time we'll get zero, and then one time we'll say, we'll... they'll get zero, they'll get zero and we'll get six...
239 LM1 So we're gonna do that, okay? I'm gonna try to figure out the moves, okay? Okay. We're ready for it. /He goes over to the Winning Team's table./

LM1 and WM1 start to negotiate:

251 LM1 We're in it together; we're just trying to make money.
252 WM2 /Calls out/ You're in the money? (We're the leaders.)
253 LM1 I know, we got totally...

LM1 immediately suggests the play which will bring in the maximum total points:

255 LM1 It's zero, zero every time.
262 WM1 Okay. It's (two), makes a total of eight. Sounds cool. /LM1 nods in agreement/ Want to opt for it?
266 LM1 I opt for it. Yes.
268 ? All in favor say aye.
269 LM1 Do we need this in writing?
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LM1 seems relieved and cheered by the new arrangement. He cracks a joke:

274 LM1 We should have figured this out so long ago. I swear you guys are so dense. /Try to win!/WM1 laughs./
276 WM1 We did, we figured out what’s going on...

The Winning Team readily agree to this arrangement, but they break it on the third choice of the very next round:

302 SL Ready? Choose. /WF1 and WM1 are talking. It’s not clear who makes the suggestion, but finally they both play a blue card. WF2 laughs broadly./ Zero, two.
303 LM1 What? Eh? Wait a minute. /Laughter from the Winning Team. WF1 laughs silently, and shakes her fist at the other team./

In the discussion following the game the Winning Team try to justify their action, saying ‘We just wanted to have fun’, and ‘It was just a boring game with pennies, and we made it fun.’ Similar remarks crop up during the game itself when they try to convince the Losing Team to negotiate again. I will consider in detail below the suggestion that it is ‘boredom’ and the absence of ‘fun’ which motivate the burning. Consistent with such an interpretation the fact that, just before the game ends, at a time when the teams are again, finally, playing in accord with a cooperative agreement, the suggestion is made that the game be changed to make it more fun. Playing cooperatively it, would seem, for some reason a boring course of activity. From group A we gather, then, a first candidate for the grounds or motivation of the act of burning.

Group X

Group X’s session of NeoPD is notable in that no conflict occurs at all; this is an infrequent occurrence in the ten groups. The session is short, lasting only 28 min, and ends with the two teams on good terms with one another, and with no residual hostility or resentment.

There is the now familiar appearance of both positive and negative emotions at the beginning of the game, as one team gains points at the other’s expense. Whichever team are winning the points at a given time express pleasure and competitive satisfaction, laughing, while the other team groan and complain. However, neither team stays in the lead for very long (hence they cannot be identified unambiguously as Winning and Losing Teams; instead, I will designate them Team One and Team Two). Prob-

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ably because the teams never differ greatly in their total points, the emotions are never very fiery: they are generally of a positive valence, and they soon dissolve into a mood of relative calm.

As the session begins, there is good humored teasing at the early scores:

063 SL Uh, Team One has minus one, Team Two /has/ two. /Laughter./
063 TM2 Blah! /TF1 and TF2 laugh. TM2 puts his hand over his mouth in mock remorse at what he’s said./

At the end of the second round there is still a competitive response as points are won, but it is minimal:

091 SL So, Team One has 15 points.
092 OM1 Hey, we’re rich! /Ironically./
093 SL Team Two has nine points.
094 TM1 We’ll bill ya. /Laughter./

When two rounds later, the teams reverse their supremacy, there’s a similar reaction:

147 SL Team One has 19 points; Team Two has 22.
148 OF2 (How did...?)
149 TM2 Ha, war! /His team-mates laugh./
150 OF2 ( ) lose.
151 TM1 I’d rather have M&Ms than (be) losing points.

The score goes to 15,9, and then to 14,21 over the next two rounds. Unlike the case of group A, no great disparity in points is developing. Play continues, the points creep up approximately equally for the two teams, and the students’ reactions change in their emotional tone. By the time the score is 39,24, they listen to the staff leader read their points at the end of each round with no great surprise or excitement, though without any complaints of boredom.

The staff leader suggests that the teams each select one of their members, to talk together. The score is now 39,36: the teams are still very close in points. The two representatives – OM1 and TM1 – very quickly agree on an arrangement to play zero, zero, thus maximizing the total points received by the teams, despite some suspicion at the outset:

253 TM1 If you screw us up, boy, you’re in big trouble. /Mock tough tone. Laughter./
254 OM1 Okay. (You know what’s) profitable on it.
255 TM1 Okay. There’s the four, four, and there’s the six, zero, depending on how you want to do it.
258 OM1 Six, zero?
259 TM1 Yeah.
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260 OM1 Yeah, no, the four, four, zero, zero combinations.
262 TM1 Yeah, that's the most...
263 OM1 Right, that would be most profitable for the two groups.
264 TM1 For the group as a whole. The individual teams ( ) two, zero.
265 OM1 Right. But if anybody pulls a blue.../Laughter from Team Two./
266 TM1 Well, it doesn't matter.
267 OM1 It's gonna be trust. Nobody pull any blues.
268 TM1 So; you want, um, zero, zero?
269 OM1 We'll go for zero, zero.
270 TM1 /He pauses; looks to his team for confirmation./ All right.

It will be recalled that when both teams play zero blue cards, each receive four points, and the resulting total of eight is the maximum total score that can be achieved on a single choice. The 'six, zero' combination that TM1 refers to is the score when one team plays two blues, and the other none. This is the maximum score an individual team can get without the other team actually losing points but, of course, the combined total is lower than the 'four, four combination'.

The two teams stick to this agreed strategy until the very last few choices, 33 choices later. Only in these last choices does cheating occur, and it is markedly different from burning, as I will demonstrate shortly. However, during the course of the session it becomes apparent that individual members of both teams apparently want to cheat, but are overruled or otherwise constrained by the rest of the team. OM2 in Team One and TM2 in Team Two act similarly. For example:

304 SL Choose...
305 TM2 /Puts down a blue card, but TM1 turns it over. TF1 laughs./
305 SL Zero, zero.
306 SL Four and four /points/.
307 TM2 Don't we want to hurt someone?
308 TM1 No! /Indignant/ (sadist).
309 TF1 No!

TM2 continues to put pressure on his team, and especially TM1, but no cheating by the losing team, nor burning by the winning team, occurs, and neither team see a need to negotiate again until the staff leader suggests that they play for only two more rounds (i.e. ten choices). Presumably they are not uncomfortable or bored with what they are doing: the playful threat of cheating is enough to sustain a sense of competition in the game. At this point, both OM2 and TM2 are pushing their respective teams to let them cheat, so OM1 and TM1 each agree that they will let TM2 cheat on the very last choice of the game:

487 TM1 You wanna talk?
488 OM1 Yeah. Even though we know we could nail your ass on the last one, you could nail our ass on the last one! /Laughter./ Let's just stay...
492 TM1 Zero, zero.
493 OM1 Right, except for me, and OM2.
494 TM1 Okay, but, but if OM2 throws a, a blue, then we all get to, um, get to take 4 cents from him after the...
495 OM2 No!
498 OM2 I'll tell you what... maybe we should let them throw one blue, because...
501 OF2 Well, well, if OM2 throws the blue, then you get to throw one too.
505 OM1 You can throw one blue at the end. How about that? Cuz we know OM2 wants to.
508 TM1 All right, the last one goes blue.
509 OM1 Okay.
510 TM1 All right.

What actually happens, not surprisingly, is that TM2 cheats on the next-to-last choice, and so Team One respond with four blue cards on the last choice. There is some joking and teasing about this, but no one is genuinely upset; after all, they have arranged that the 'cheating' take place.

551 SL Choose.
552 TM2 /Plays a blue card. TM1 sees him do it, and pulls a face, but does not attempt to stop him./
553 SL Zero, one. /Laughter./
555 SL Choose. /Team One play four blue cards./
556 SL Four and one.
558 TM2 Told you. /To TM1./
563 OF1 /Cheerfully. / ( ) anyone taking credit for this? /OM2 waves a reprimanding finger at her./
566 TM1 If you'd just followed orders! /Mock critical, to TM2./

This reaction will later be contrasted with the reaction to what is ostensibly the same behavior at the end of group A's session (see chapter 7), when a final burning is seen as proof of the moral turpitude of the cheating team. Here we find a clear illustration that the moral worth of an action depends on the context in which it occurs.

The attempt to cheat (by TM2) and 'mock cheating' during the game (banging cards down loudly, in order to have the other team think that cooperation has ended) maintain a level of excitement and amusement. Although TM2 expresses some frustration at not being allowed to play his blue card and 'hurt' the other team, his interactions with his team members have a distinctly playful quality: he's not fully serious. It may be, of course, that had he been able to carry through with his action things would have
become much more serious, but as things stand he is simply searching for more 'fun'. Nonetheless, he confesses to experiencing some guilt during the discussion following the game. OF2 says that she felt that the participants were one big group, not two separate teams, and TM2, who had been confessing his desire to 'hurt' the other team, pauses and then says with a rueful smile, 'Why do I feel guilty?'

It is probably no coincidence that TM1, who prevents TM2 from cheating, is Team Two's negotiator. Shortly after TM2's first attempt to cheat, TM1 says to him:

313 TM1 I made an agreement. I stand by that! /He taps himself on the chest for emphasis./

During the discussion TM1 admits to feeling a certain responsibility, which he characterizes in an interesting manner. He describes it as primarily a feeling, not as specific obligations which follow from his role as negotiator for his team. It is a sense of responsibility rather than a specific set of actual responsibilities:

TM1: It doesn't matter if you feel responsible, I feel responsible. I don't know if responsibility is the right word; it wasn’t that 'deep' of a feeling.

SL: What was the issue for you?

TM1: Trust versus the betrayal of trust. We had to trust them; we trusted them because we agreed with them.

The game ends, and the debriefing begins, with all participants apparently in good humor, though in the post-game discussion several of the students say that the game was boring. One of them states that 'there's no way of making this game fun', and another of the Team One members says that it was the agreement which made it no fun. Other participants disagree, saying that, in their opinion, the game would have got boring in time anyway.

Group B

The NeoPD session of group B is long (it lasts over 70 min), and it has many convolutions. An extreme points disparity is set up from the very start of the game, with the score at the end of the first round being 24–12. In part this is due to the Winning Team's luck with their first choices, but the Losing Team also give every indication of throwing away points (this interpretation receives corroboration from the post-game discussion, which

will be discussed in chapter 5). The Winning Team members show a range of strong emotions: they are excited and energetic, and they laugh at their successes, in what is at times an extreme manner. The Losing Team, in contrast, become more and more sober, sitting seriously in silence as the scores are read at the end of each choice.

023 SL Choose. Four, zero. /Loud laughter from the Winning Team./ Choose. Four, zero. /The Winning Team laugh again. They get more hysterical as the points mount up. The Losing Team look very serious. LM2 in particular looks very glum, as though he is only too aware what is going on./

031 SL The Winning Team earned eight points each time; and the Losing Team earned minus four. /Loud laughter again from the Winning Team. The Losing Team are very serious./

032 SL Choose. Four, four. /The Losing Team very deliberately have played four blue cards. /

033 WM2 Oh!

034 WF1 No! /The Winning Team become more serious. /

035 SL Zero, zero /points. /

In the second round the Losing Team start to play four blue cards on each choice, forcing the Winning Team to do the same or else lose points. Consequently, in this round the points change very little (to 26–13), but the Winning Team members still greet their announcement with loud and extreme laughter. They are far enough ahead to appreciate the fun; getting pleasure from the score even when they are not winning further points. In the next round the Losing Team start to give away points again and the Winning Team are clearly aware of this, though they seem unsure as to the motive:

096 SL Choose. Four, zero.

097 SL Eight and minus four.

099 WM2 They’re giving us all these points. /Quietly, to WM1./

When the score (48,–21) is announced at the end of this round, there is no longer any laughter from the Winning Team.

The staff leader now suggests a negotiation, and after some discussion within each team WM1 calls out 'Hey, you guys! You guys, we could really rack up some bucks here if you, if you keep...'. LM2 replies, however, that the Losing Team would 'just as soon not talk'. The Winning Team laugh at this, but they concur. In the next round the Losing Team play strategically again, and the Winning Team begin to consider why this may be:

136 WM2 They're (trying to get us) to change (%). (It's not going to work). /Whispered to his teammates. /

151 WM2 (What they're trying to get us to do is twos)
Another round is played, and then the teams discuss whether or not to negotiate. This time it is the Winning Team who reject the possibility, first postponing it a round, then saying ‘We don’t want to talk’. Finally, after one more round, WM2 and LM2 are selected to negotiate. WM2 begins with a joke:

278 WM2 Now you realize what we can do is we can make a lot of bucks here /Laughter/ and screw them. /He gestures, indicating the other participants./
279 ? ( ) split it.
280 LM2 No! I know I want (on) my paycheck.
282 WM2 We don’t, we want ( ) /Laughter from the Winning Team./
283 LM2 You guys, you guys ( ) to us. See we lose though. I mean we lose every time you get eight, so basically we’re only getting four for getting...
288 WM2 But it’s not coming out of your paycheck.
289 LM2 Yeah, but we have ( )....
290 WM2 ...right, right, right.
291 LM2 But if we both go here... /He points to his copy of the payoff matrix./
292 WM2 Here we’re getting five, but here we’re getting eight.
293 LM2 But here we’re getting eight, right. We’ll, we’re, we’re willing to deal. We’ll go zero every time you go zero, but the one time you change, we’ll put it in the corner, and no one will make any more money.
296 WM2 But if you put it in this corner... /Laughter from his teammates/ Yeah, okay.
289 WF1 Okay, all right! /She claps./
299 WM2 All right. So, we go zero, zero every time.
301 LM2 Right.

So the agreement is made that both teams play zero, presumably to maximize gain for the teams together. This is proposed by the negotiator from the Losing Team, and his justification for it is that it will give the teams a total number of points higher than they have been getting, with the Losing Team losing four points every time the Winning Team gains eight.

The agreement holds for four choices, and then WM2 puts down his card blue face up, with a huge grin on his face. WM1, WF1 and WF2 each cover their face with their hands, unsuccessfully trying to suppress their laughter. The Losing Team respond very differently, however:

333 LM1 That’s it; that’s it! /To WM2./
334 WM2 If they’re going to go down here, see ( ). /To WF1 and WF2, as he indicates the Losing Team’s likely response on the payoff matrix./
335 SL Winning Team have 147; Losing Team have minus... 31.
336 WM1 That was mean! /Laughs./
337 WM2 I know! /Members of the Winning Team laugh, and talk together in whispers./

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Group B is similar to group A in several respects. The large points disparity is responded to similarly; it soon becomes apparent which team will win, and the Winning Team clearly get pleasure from their status as winners in the game, from lording it over the other team, and from gaining points.

Group Y

Group Y’s session is different yet again, because the teams spend most of the session with the game broken down, unable to agree what to do. Only seven rounds of the game occur, in over 60 min. In the first round a clear points disparity develops between the two teams, with the Winning Team ending with 36 points to the Losing Team’s –18. The Winning Team show pleasure at this:

050 SL Choose. Four, one. Six points for the Winning Team, minus three for the Losing Team. /Laughter, especially from the Winning Team./

In the second round both teams play four blue cards, and so the points are unchanged. Members of the Losing Team begin to look happier, and ‘Someone’s getting smart!’ is called out. The staff leader suggests that the teams might like to pick negotiators. They do, and WM1 suggests picking zero, zero, so that both teams will receive four points on every choice. LM2 ridicules this as involving only pennies, and begins an incredibly long, drawn out, and ultimately unsuccessful search for a way of ‘making the game fun’:

100 WM2 It would benefit us both if we were less stubborn and we both chose zero and zero. That way each time we’ll get four.
101 SL You can talk louder.
102 WM2 Oh. We can gain 4 cents all, each time, if we both went zero, zero with more cooperation.
102 LM2 Yes, so then every five times you just want to get 4 cents?
103 WM2 We both get 4 cents apiece.
104 LM2 Okay, I mean it’s only pennies, WM2.
105 LF2 /Calls out/ That’s no fun!
107 LM2 Okay, now listen. I like this idea better. I mean, let’s face it, it’s only pennies, I mean she’s /SL/ not going to make us do this all night, we’re all going to make, what, 50 cents? Let’s do it this way. Every five times you can only do, you can only do the same number once. In other words you can’t show two fours and then like two threes. This way it’ll make a game of it, okay? The point is, that...
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206 ? Okay, so don’t you want to, don’t you want to turn it into a challenge where we can try and compete with a strategy?

207 WF2 Not particularly, really.

And some time later, after several suggestions have been implemented to make the game ‘fun’ without any success, WM1 again confronts LF2 on this issue:

301 WM1 Also, wait, let me say something () whole time.

302 LF2 Okay, go ahead.

303 WM1 Uh, why do you guys want to, why do you want to play a game? I mean, you say you want to play a game.

304 LF2 Because...

305 WM1 What’s the point of the game?

306 LF2 Well first of all...

307 WM1 Just what’s the point of the game?

308 LF2 To have fun.

309 WM1 To have fun?

310 LF2 Is having money fun? /Laugh./

311 WM1 That’s not...

315 LF2 No, wait, I don’t understand why you guys don’t want to play a game.

316 WM1 We have been playing a game and we’re ahead. /Laugh./

317 ? Yeah!

318 LF2 Why, why is being ahead so much better? Why is being ahead so great?

319 ? It’s the whole point.

320 LF2 No, it, I don’t think it is. I think it’s the fun of it. Whether you can, whether you’re having a good time while you’re doing it. I mean, whether it’s a challenge to play.

321 WM1 Do you think having, do you think it’s a, having fun is turning over little.../cards/?

322 LF2 No, /think it, I think it is fun to face a challenge, okay? And I find it a challenge to see if we can...

323 WM1 What’s the challenge?

324 LF2 The challenge is to bring up your point total compared to the other team.

325 WM1 Right; and so if we keep playing this way, then we’ll be ahead all ()

328 WM1 Look, ah, see, that means you want to win, right? That’s your eventual goal. If you were in our position, would you want to do what you want to do now?

329 LF2 Huh? Yeah, sure. /Laugh/ I think my ()

Finally the staff leader has to draw the session to a close, for the teams themselves manage no resolution.

Several aspects of what occurs with this group have already been seen with other groups, despite the difference in outcome. There is a points disparity, and then a round with the two teams playing competitively, and so stalemating each other. The Winning Team go as far as suggesting an agree-
ment to maximize mutual gain. If this session were to fall in line with the
others we have examined, the Losing Team should accept the agreement,
only to renege on it because of ‘boredom’. We do indeed find the search for
fun motivating the subsequent breakdown of the game, but it is the Losing
Team who lead this search. There is no breaking of an agreement (partly
because the only agreements that are made during this session concern con-
straints on which cards are chosen, in order to reintroduce the ‘fun’, and
each lasts only a single round), and so no moral conflict appears to occur.

Yet there are hints throughout this session that concerns of a moral
nature lurk beneath the surface. The Winning Team become increasingly
suspicious that LM2’s motive for changing the game may be linked less to a
selfless search for fun and a challenging game, and more to the fact that his
team are hopelessly behind on points and will never catch up unless some-
thing is done to change the rules of the game. If this is a correct interpreta-
tion then LM2’s search for ‘fun’ can be seen as a selfish attempt to regain
status lost in the game.

Comparing the Sessions

Of the four sessions summarized above, two contain instances of burn-
ing; in a third cheating is discussed but happens only in a playful manner at
the very end of the game; and in the fourth no agreement to cooperate is
made (so no cheating can occur) and instead the group members try to
change the form of the game. No single factor accounts for the presence or
absence of burning in these sessions. Several aspects combine to motivate
burning, or to rule it out.

The motivation for the strategy that is adopted by the members of group
Y provides us with a clue to the first of the pertinent situational aspects in
NeoPD. Group Y participants – particularly the Losing Team – want to
modify the game because it is no longer ‘fun’ to them, and this is a term, and
a concern, which occupies all of the groups at some time during their ses-
sions with NeoPD. When the game is no longer ‘fun’ it is ‘boring’, and it
becomes boring in a number of distinct ways. All involve situations where
the element of chance leaves the game. This can occur for either of the
teams. The Losing Team feel that there is no longer any chance of winning the
game when there is stalemated competitive play (both teams play all blue (‘four,
four’), and are unwilling to change because to do so will lead to a loss of
points), or when there is such a large disparity between the points won by the
two teams that it is clear they will be unable to catch up.

Actually, the presence of a large disparity in points reduces or entirely
removes both teams’ sense that there is an element of chance operative in
their performance. If a team is losing by –18 points to the opposition’s 36
(as the Losing Team in group B were after only one round), its members are
likely to have little sense that there is a real possibility to draw even, par-
ticularly when the score then goes unchanged for three further rounds. Con-
versely, the Winning Team in such a situation soon realize that victory is
inevitable, and their status assured.

Such a state of affairs early in the game leads to characteristic emotions:
excitement and amusement for the Winning Team, and anger or self-criti-
cism for the Losing Team. If the disparity persists, boredom and frustration
set in, as the Losing Team realize that they no longer have a chance of
winning, and the Winning Team recognize that they have as good as won
already. An early points disparity first encourages strong competitiveness,
and then gives rise to a sense of boredom and futility that, for the Winning
Team, is only reinforced by playing out a contract for mutual gain. It may
be that this is how it motivates burning later in the game.

Evidence for the connection between the element of chance and ‘fun’,
on the one hand, and ‘boredom’, on the other (though this time in a way
unconnected with burning), is provided by the frequency with which groups
decide that the game is ended once the conflict roused by the burning has
been at least temporarily resolved, and the game is running again in accord
with a zero, zero agreement. At this point, if they reach it, most groups
appear to find the state of affairs almost tedious and make movements to
draw the game to a close. My first examples are from group A, the third
from group X, though similar comments can be found in other groups.

Group A:
821 LF1 Well this way, this way at least, everyone’s getting their points.
822 LM2 It’s boring though. /Waves a hand lethargically/
...
961 LM1 I want to add some life to this game. So we have to turn cards every time.
Oh, can we?
962 LM2 Oh, we’re... It’s so we make more money.
963 LM1 It’s stupid to do the same thing; we just... we could change it, we just do
zero, four and four, zero...

Group X:
361 TM2 Do we get to know when it’s getting down close to the end? /After two
rounds of zero, zero following the group’s first and only negotiation/
There is a third, more striking situation which is boring to the Winning Team: when the teams are for the first time playing in accord with the agreement to cooperate, in order to maximize mutual gain. Members of the Winning Team complain that they soon get ‘bored’ with this. When we examine the reason for this change in mood, we come to a deeper understanding of the meaning of burning to the Winning Team.

Consider groups A and X, for example. In the first, burning occurs; in the second it does not, and yet there are several similarities between these groups’ handling of the session. In both cases the ‘rational’ cooperative agreement is readily made, and with similar justifications: the prudential goal of maximizing profit for both. In both cases the agreement leads to an experience of boredom, particularly for the Winning Team in group A; the game is no longer experienced as ‘fun’. In group X the boredom is reduced by the threat of cheating, which both teams indulge in. Yet the cheating is postponed for a long time, until the very end of the game, when it can, apparently, be unambiguously considered playful. For group A, on the other hand, the Winning Team burn very soon after the agreement is made, and the Losing Team are shocked and indignant at this, as we shall see in the next chapter.

It seems likely that the presence or absence of a points disparity is at the root of this difference between the two sessions. In group A the agreement deprives the teams of the pleasure of winning and losing points on each choice, just as in group X, but in addition the Winning Team loses the pleasure of actively beating the Losing Team. Their boredom reflects two aspects of their situation after the agreement: the loss of an element of chance or risk in the game, and also foregoing the feeling of superiority they had been enjoying. In group X, in contrast, neither team were far enough ahead in points to consider themselves as unequivocal winners.

This explains why cheating was suggested in group X, but not enacted except as a consensually arranged special event at the very end of the game, despite the fact that participants did experience boredom during the game and reported this feeling after the game, with one of them being perspicacious enough to link the experience of boredom to the presence of the agreement. Cheating was raised as a possibility but it never crossed the line into actuality, because the absence of a points disparity, and the consequent lack of distinct status as Winner and Loser, gave insufficient grounds for an act of this type.

In groups A and B, the burning appears to be enacted as part of a move to ameliorate the boredom that the Winning Team experienced, when following the cooperative agreement. This agreement, while it is a mathematically ‘correct’ solution to the ‘bargaining problem’ of NeoPD, is no solution to the psychological problem that NeoPD poses the students; indeed, it is only the beginning of the game’s moral problems. The superficial issue which the teams try to solve is that each team wants to win points, and consequently they quickly stalemate each other (playing competitively so that no points are won). The maximizing of joint gain apparently is seen as a viable compromise because it generalizes the motivations of each team to both teams together: here is a way that they can both win points at the same time. But what is ignored by the participants (and noted by an observer only because of the problems that emerge later in the game as a consequence) is that each team was originally motivated not by a simple desire for points, but by the desire to beat the other team.

In session after session the Winning Team, during the discussion following the game, talk about the fact that, without question, they perceived the structure of NeoPD as being one of competition. When the staff leader points out that the instructions at the start of the session contained no reference to ‘winning’ or to ‘beating’ each other, the Winning Team explain that, nonetheless, this is the ‘obvious’ way to understand the situation. They talk in this way, usually, when deliberating on the burning that has occurred, yet when they are in the process of making an agreement between the two teams, this competitiveness is ignored.

In summary, then: the agreement to compromise finds its grounds in the stalemate play which precedes it. For the Losing team, it is a chance to win points and evade their status as the game’s inevitable losers. For the Winning Team it is a release from the frustrations of stalemate and a chance to make money. Once the cooperative play begins the Losing Team are happy with their new situation, but the Winning Team find that they do not experience again the satisfaction which came from being beaten by their opponents; the game is no longer ‘fun’. At the same time, because they are playing cooperatively, the Losing Team are vulnerable: they are open to being ‘burnt’.

The Winning Team experience first the ‘fun’ that comes from playing competitively and winning (albeit essentially by accident), and then the boredom that develops rapidly when an agreement is made and the teams are moving toward the ‘appropriate’ cooperative outcome of achieving what is ostensibly their common goal. These two together provide an adequate motivation for the act of burning.
Without a points disparity, and the consequent status of the teams as Winners and Losers, cheating is still talked about – by both teams – but burning doesn’t occur. Group X’s was the only session where an agreement was made and not broken; it is also the only session of the four where there was no great disparity in the total number of points for each of the two teams in the early portion of the game.

So the mathematical ‘solution’ to the game of NeoPD turns out to be unsatisfactory for the winning Team. Burning (playing competitively in the face of an agreement to play cooperatively) strikes them as a viable action. There is no evidence that, at the time they burn, the Winning Team grasp it as an immoral act, but the burning proves to be the starting point of moral conflict.

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The Immediate Reaction to the Burning

In indignation and anger, we turn a personal offense into a violation of morality and humanity, preferring to fight self-righteously for ‘the principle of the thing’ rather than the explicit basis of our insecurities [Solomon, 1983, p. 385].

Thus far, I have examined empirically only the circumstances that lead up to conflict, or its absence, between the two teams of students. I have compared those sessions where the students resorted to ‘burning’ and those where they did not, and I have argued that the occasion of burning represents a situation of genuine moral conflict. I now turn to the hermeneutic examination of four cases of such a conflict.

In this chapter I begin, then, the empirical examination of what occurs after burning by the Winning Team. The complete examination of this material will occupy three chapters in all; this first one concerns the short-lived period of reorganization of participation (action and perception) on the part of the Losing Team: the immediate sequelae to the act of burning. My major task will be to describe the form of the Losing Team’s response, using the threefold rhetorical scheme introduced earlier.

Burning occurred in two sessions of the four examined in detail in the last chapter – groups A and B. In this chapter I will examine these two sessions and in addition two others – groups C and D. In the last of these I shall be looking not at the first cheating which occurs (by one member of the Losing Team, with little resulting conflict), but at an occasion later in the session where the same team member breaks an agreement with the staff leader. This is similar in certain ways to burning by a Winning Team, since the agreement with the staff leader was intended to benefit both teams, but there are also differences which will become apparent. A common pattern of response becomes articulated as the analysis proceeds. This common structure will be discussed in terms of regions of Intimacy and Moral Status, and the Mythology of the situation. Two specific concerns that have arisen for the participants in the sessions – trust and responsibility – stand out particularly.
indignant displeasure at something regarded as a wrong, insult, or injury. I should emphasize at this point that I am not overly concerned with attaching a 'correct' emotion-word as a label to each of the Losing Team's reactions; what is more important is to correctly interpret the movements in their actions.

Second, the appearance of the indigination corresponds to a breakdown in the ongoing 'flow' of the game, and the motive for this is not hard to find. The burning is an act that is unanticipated, one that pains those against whom it is directed, and which they strongly feel to be wrong. The first response to it involves a withdrawal from participation in the game, and from the origin of the wrong – the other team.

Third, despite the pain that LM1 clearly feels, it is interesting that he barely puts into words what it is about the situation that bothers him. The suppressed form of his accusations (e.g. # 323) is a phenomenon which will be seen in several of the groups at this phase of the conflict. One possible explanation is that the emotional response of indigination involves an understanding of the burning, but as a consequence of its immediacy it is comprehended only in a global, undifferentiated manner. A second interpretation is that LM1 is able, but unwilling, to put into words his moral indigination. There is a certain dramatization on LM1's part, and consequent laughter from LF1 and LF2. I shall discuss later the background practices which constrain the Losing Team in their expression of moral indigination. Overall, then, LM1's immediate response at this point is characterized by shock, disbelief, a suspension of his involvement in the game action, evident pained indigination, and an inarticulate accusation of the burners.

Let us examine the action that begins to develop in the situation that LM1 now finds himself in. The movement which the outrage entails continues to be primarily one of withdrawal. After the initial shock and surprise, the team members refuse to play with or even talk to the Winning Team:

324 SL Okay? Do you want to go another round? Ready?
325 WM1 I think we better negotiate, before we get (screwed).
326 LM1 Negotiate? Again? /His sense is, 'no way!' /Shit on you guys.
327 LF2 /Makes a gesture, palms down, hands moved laterally – a 'cut' gesture – to her teammates./
328 LM1 I don’t believe it.
329 SL The Winning Team wants to negotiate; does the Losing Team?
330 LF2 No more, no more.
331 LF1 We don’t trust them.
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The Losing Team now lay their cards down, blue faces up, and refuse to continue to actively engage in the game. (The blue cards block the other team from making any points.) They sit like this for the remainder of the round, with folded arms, and at the end of the round they again refuse to negotiate.

We now begin to see more clearly the situation that the Losing Team find themselves in. LM1’s action at #326 suggests that he feels that it was a mistake to negotiate with the Winning Team in the first place, and that the very suggestion of negotiating a second time is ridiculous and outrageous. LM1 also makes a number of derogatory remarks (#326, 343) which can be interpreted in terms of the Moral Status aspect of our threefold analytical scheme; both involve his ascribing to the Winning Team a newly lowered status. LM1 expresses clearly here his grasp of what has occurred, in a direct, albeit crude and graphic manner.

Similarly, LF1’s utterance at #337, ‘We’re not playing anymore’ communicates anger, rejection, and a self-protective withdrawal. The Losing Team appear to feel that they have been taken advantage of, and that they are not going to make the same mistake again. Withdrawal, given what has occurred, is a meaningful and fitting way of acting. The Winning Team at this moment appear to them as untrustworthy, and as hazardous to play with. More than this, even; they see the Winning Team as unworthy of further play; unworthy of talking to. LF2’s gesture at line #327 is appropriate: the Losing Team ‘cut’ the Winning Team at this point, in the sense of refusing to recognize them any longer as being trustworthy opponents. Note how rapid this restructuring is, and that the closest thing to a ‘reason’ offered for this new attitude on the part of the Losing Team is LF1’s comment that ‘we don’t trust them’, as an explanation of why she no longer wishes to play. This seems to be more an articulation of her experience than any type of principled statement, and this provides a modicum of empirical support for the theoretical claim I made earlier that moral confrontation does not necessarily lead to or require the presentation and comparison of moral principles. Indeed, no direct moral charge has been made as yet, though the conflict clearly involves moral concerns.

In the second choice of the next round (the second following the burning), the Winning Team play zero, perhaps anticipating that the Losing Team will no longer be playing four. The Losing Team are still passively retaining their blue cards on the table, however, and so the winning Team lose eight points. The Losing Team’s response to this is noteworthy:

345 WM1 /Blows a raspberry in disgust at losing so many points./
346 LM1 Yeah? So eat this! /He makes an obscene gesture of pretending to present his penis. LF2 grins and nudges him./

Here LM1 again uses obscenity to make evident how he views the status of the Winning Team, his pleasure that they have just lost points, and his anger and aggression towards them. LM1 arouses humor in his teammates, by framing his put-down in a socially objectionable form. They enjoy the show of strength he is making.

It is worth noting that, although LM1 is by far the most verbal of the Losing Team, his teammates appear to share his understanding of the situation. They support his actions, and the few things they say are in accord with what he does. It does not, therefore, seem to be too misrepresentative to take LM1’s actions as illustrative and representative of the team as a whole.

Group C

The second group, group C, provides insights into the manner in which changes can occur in the Losing Team’s grasp of the situation. The following excerpt begins while an agreement to cooperate is being made between the two teams, before burning occurs. Differences in the ways the two teams understand their aims in the game are apparent, with the Winning Team talking in terms of ‘making money’, while the Losing Team are ‘out to ... make it like a game’. The talk of making things ‘more fair’ is reminiscent of group Y, suggesting that the loss of a sense of chance motivates the Losing Team here:

01 WM2 See, we can make money on this. If we go zero, zero each time. We don’t have to beat each other, just both get four points every time.
02 LF1 Okay, that’s if you’re out to make money. But how about ... our side’s not really out to make like a lot of pennies. /LF2 Laughs./You know?
03 WM2 So what are you trying to do?
04 LF1 What we’re out to do is like, uh, make it like a game, make it more fair, so that we can’t do four, four each time, let’s say, like, you can’t do the same number twice in a row. and if you do, you get like heavy duty penalties.
Despite their different notions of what to do, WM2’s suggestion that money should be made prevails, and LF1 agrees to play zero, zero cooperatively ‘just a few times’, as WM2 puts it.

10 LF1 Okay, this round we go zero, zero the whole time?
11 WM2 Right.
12 LF2 And then random. /Called out to LF1 and WM2./
13 LF1 And then random? /Asking WM2./
14 WM2 Alright. /Negotiation ends; the two negotiators sit down./

However, the Winning Team immediately break the agreement, burning – playing four blue cards – on the second choice of the next round, in a clearly premeditated fashion. Note in particular the way that LF2 responds to the burning:

19 SL Zero and four.
20 LM2 They did it.
21 LF2 /Leaps from her chair./ I can’t believe that!
22 LF1 /The Winning team laugh loudly at this. They have been sitting quietly, waiting to see what the Losing Team’s reaction will be./ Everybody ready?
23 SL Losing Team, minus four points; Winning Team eight points.
24 LM1 Sit down. /He pulls LF2 down. She sits./
25 LF1 I knew they would do that.
26 LF2 I can’t believe that. I trusted you! /Called across to the Winning Team./
27 SL Yeah.
28 LM1 Stop, stop, stop, stop. /Quietly to LF2.
29 ? (Some trust)
31 LF2 /Laughs./
32 BF2 Let’s not do it /i.e. play/; I don’t want to do it.
33 LM1 /Shakes his head in disagreement./
34 LF2 I don’t. Why? /Angrily to LM1, who has just played a white card./

The Winning Team laugh, amused by the Losing Team’s response, and apparently unrepentent. Play continues, but with both teams now playing randomly, throwing their cards up into the air and onto the table with their eyes closed. The motivation for this somewhat unusual behavior will be considered in the next chapter.

The Losing Team’s immediate response to the burning shows considerable similarity to that of the Losing Team in group A. LF2 expresses disbelief in almost exactly the words that LM1 used in group A. She refers to trust, and its loss, just as LF1 did. And she tries to stop the game, just as did her counterparts in group A. Her movement here is again one of withdrawal and distancing. She too seems outraged or indignant. However, a few moments later we see something remarkable: there is a sudden restructuring of

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the perception of the burning, and the ‘choice’ of another view of things, a different emotional gestalt. What happens is that, perhaps motivated by the peer pressure which she is subjected to (notably from LM1 at #24, 29, 32, etc.), at the end of this round of the game LF2 starts to say that the experience of being burnt ‘was so funny, actually’. The indignation has been replaced (ostensibly at least, for we shall see later that it remains, beneath the surface) by a new structuring of events where the burning is now seen as having been motivated by fun, as indicating perhaps a certain irresponsibility on the part of the Winning Team, but no malicious intention.

34 SL Three and two. Losing Team three points; Winning Team zero points.
36 SL Four and three. Losing Team two points; Winning Team minus one point.
37 LF2 That was so funny, actually. /Looking around, with a strained laugh./
38 ? ( ) /Loud talking./

A clue to one possible explanation for this shifting of perspective is provided by the negotiation that preceded the burning (#01 to 04 above). Here, the Losing Team put forward a suggestion that the participants ‘make it like a game, make it more fair’ by placing restrictions on the number of blue cards that can be played (‘You can’t do the same number twice in a row’). They had just been complaining among themselves that the game was no longer ‘fun’; they were (as one of them put it in the post-game discussion) more than 40 points behind: not an enjoyable position to be in. Their emphasis on ‘making it more fair’ indicates that they felt that the circumstances as they stand are distinctly unfair.

So the search for ‘fun’ provides the Losing Team in group C with a context within which to place the Winning Team’s burning of them. Rather than see it as an egregious breaking of the agreement, an agreement which the Winning Team made only as part of an attempt to exploit them, they instead understand the action as motivated by fun. This in turn provides innocent grounds for avoiding further negotiations and for henceforth playing randomly. The tone adopted by LF1 at #04 suggests that the Losing Team – way behind in points – were already seeking a way of comprehending their situation which would minimize their experiential ‘losses’, since they had been unable to achieve economic gains. They were ‘out to … make it like a game’; a situation where their status would be less embarrassing. LF2 performs essentially the same restructuring to the post-burning situation.

These two alternative structurings of the situation are interesting to compare. They differ in their framing of the motivation of the Winning
Team, and in the form of Moral Status ascribed to them. The act of burning is redescribed as causing no pain, and so there is no harm which the Winning Team can be held responsible for. The second structuring no longer carries with it the sense that the Winning Team have transgressed a moral ought. LF2 actually declares that it is 'silly' not to negotiate again, as her team continues to discuss what to do next:

41 LF2 I wouldn't have done that, because we didn't arrange it that way.
42 LF1 Well, I don't trust them to negotiate.
43 LF2 Well, I trust them.
45 LM1 Now we know we can't trust them, there's no point negotiating at all.
   /Laughs/
46 LF1 That's right.
47 LF2 That's silly, that's silly.
48 LF1 Well let's do it my way, 'cos my way's totally random.
49 WF2 Can we negotiate again? /To SL/
50 SL Let's find out if the other team wants to. Do you want to negotiate again?
   /To Losing Team/
51 L? No!
52 L? No way! /The Winning Team laugh/.

What is striking is the substitution of one 'framing' of the situation for another, in a manner which requires that LF2 deny the pain she has felt. Yet the substitution cannot be said to be wholly convincing, or permanently effective. It becomes clear later that LF2, despite her protests to the contrary, still maintains a lingering conviction that the Winning Team's action was immoral. It may have been just a 'joke' to them, but it's still something she wouldn't have done herself. As she puts it in the discussion after the game:

LF2: For them it was supposed to be a joke. But ( ) I don't know why, I was ( ) accept someone's word, you know.
SL: What do you mean, you got angry?
LF2: I wasn't angry (but) I realized it was a joke, but I just thought, I thought that we were going to play fairly. And I decided ( ) played fairly.

It should be mentioned that members of the Losing Team show some variation in their reactions to the burning. While LF2 responds in the manner I have described, LF1 (who took the role of negotiator for her team) seems less surprised by what has happened: 'I knew they would do that' (#25). LM1 tries to restrain LF2's outrage, and he continues to play, despite her objections (#24, 29, 32). Both LF1 and LM1, however, do not want to negotiate at the point when LF2 has changed her attitude and declares 'Well / I trust them!'

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I have suggested that it is the disagreement between LF2 and LM1 that motivates the former to restructure her comprehension of events. LM1's message seems to be something like 'don't make a scene', and LF2 responds by changing her anger to amused and consequently indulgent tolerance. It may be that in doing this she goes further than is necessary; her denial of any mistrust of the miscreants is a salient change, but it is one that LM1 does not condone. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the team are tight knit and opaque at this point, and one is doomed to speculation, or at best to interpretation which is probably unconfirmable.

In summary, we again see – albeit with some individual variation – a pattern in the form of the immediate response to burning. Its aspects include a shocked outrage, an experience of broken trust, and a withdrawal from or suspension of the game. LF2's subsequent 'amusement' is best seen as superimposed upon this initial pattern.

Group D

Here the conflict develops in circumstances which differ from those of the other groups. For this group, agreement has been made with the staff leader, rather than between the two teams. The teams, having reached a strategy of mutual cooperation, agree with the staff leader to continue as though they have played zero, zero for 'eight more times'. The suggestion is made by WM1 and agreed to by the other team. LM1 tells the staff leader that they would play cooperatively for eight additional times, and the staff leader agrees to award them the appropriate points for these five rounds. 'Let's just say you did it eight times, then.'

WM1 readily accepts this, but LM1 disagrees, calling out,

49 LM1 No! Let's do it one more time though, for real.

He apparently thinks the game has been ended, and it looks as though he wants to play competitively. The other participants suspect as much:

51 WF2 Oh LM1, you're going to screw us! He is, he is!
52 WM2 We know what you're going to do, LM1. /Laughter/

WM1 then says that now there will be, indeed, competitive play:

56 WM1 Yes, now its... No, no; it's not one more time. We're going to do it now for real, but we're going to compete. It's, it's... the deals are off is what I mean.
The immediate response to the burning has aspects which by now will be familiar. There is a shocked uncertainty ('What's going on here?') that resembles the disbelief and indignation of the previous two groups. There is a clearly expressed impulse to stop the ongoing action of the game ('Wait'). There is an element of blame expressed which has similarity to the accusations seen earlier ('LM1, you ...'). LM1 is seen as a 'dummy', as the person who 'broke this thing'; in short, as stupid and incompetent. People laugh at him. He is accused and blamed for what is occurring, though as yet his crime is scarcely named. Similar movements are made by members of both teams, with LM1 the common object of their acts and emotion. It is noteworthy that the accusations take the form of accusations of incompetence, not moral blame. I will return to this when I contrast the four sessions, at the end of this chapter.

But there are also differences in the way that conflict proceeds for this group. The most notable is that participants want to negotiate, whereas in groups C and A the Losing Teams refused to negotiate. We shall examine these differences in more detail in later chapters, but briefly, it seems to be the case that resolution between the participants proceeds further in this group than in most others, with a more rapid recognition of the disparate perceptions that are operative in the situation. It seems likely that this is a consequence of the fact that those participants who criticize the cheating are responding not on their own behalf, to defend not their own interests, but those of another, namely the staff leader. The burning in group D involves, then, a situation somewhat different to the cases of burning directed against friends. First, participants can accuse LM1 of wrongdoing without opening themselves to the charge that they are motivated by self-interest. Second, they are leapin to the defense of the staff leader, a figure whom they presumably see as invested with authority and prestige. The indignant team members feel that the actions of the one person who cheated have made them all culpable for wrongdoing a respected and powerful figure, and so the teams begin to pull together rather than one team distancing the other. For the purposes of this chapter, however, the similarities between this and the other groups are of most interest. We find movements very similar to those we've seen before, but here they are directed by both teams towards a single person - LM1 - while in the other groups they are directed by one team against the other.

The reader may be interested to learn that group D was selected during a pilot analysis because, on a cursory preliminary viewing of the videotaped sessions, this group appeared to get involved in a salient moral con-
frontation. Closer examination of this and the other groups has led me to revise this judgement; the conflict in this group may indeed be more 'obvious', but this impression is largely due to the more detached and verbal behavior of the participants. This actually makes group D somewhat atypical, and in a way less interesting than the other three groups, where the covered up and deeply engaged form that the confrontations take renders them less apparent to a superficial look, but ultimately more rewarding and instructive to examine. For group D there is an absence of the problematic but covered-up moral concerns which trouble the other groups. It provides a useful contrast case.

**Group B**

The description of group B's actions requires some subtlety of interpretation, and for this reason I have placed it last. Immediately after the burning the Losing Team give few clues as to what their perception is, and at first sight their response seems different from what we have seen in other groups. Their actions seem controlled and deliberate. When the burning occurs they sit saying little, save for an exclamation from LF2 ("That’s it!", # 333), and they continue to play cooperatively. We begin just as the burning occurs:

> /WM1 puts down a blue card, with a huge grin on his face. WF1, WF2 and WM2 all cover their faces to try, unsuccessfully, to suppress their laughter./

332 SL Choose. One and zero. Five and two /points/.

333 LF2 That’s it; that’s it! /To LM2. The other members of the Losing Team say nothing./

334 WM2 If they’re gonna go down here see ( ) /To WF1 and WF2, pointing to the payoff matrix./

335 SL Winning Team have 147 points; Losing Team have minus 31.

337 WL1 That was mean! /Laughs./

338 WM2 I know! /Members of the Winning Team laugh, and talk together in whispers./

341 SL All right, ready to go another round?

342 LM1 Yeah, oh yeah (please). /Winning Team members nod their head./

At the end of this round, LM1, talking for the Losing Team, is actually eager to continue playing, an action which appears to be significantly different from the reactions of other groups. During the next round both teams play cooperatively. If the Losing Team feel any impulse to punish the Winning Team for burning them, it is not manifest. However, in the subsequent round it becomes clear that the Losing Team are playing in an organized way, with motives that are not apparent immediately. Midway through the round the Winning Team burn again, and the Losing Team this time respond promptly:


407 SL Four and four /points/.

408 SL Choose. /All four members of the Winning Team play blue cards, in a manner which is clearly prearranged. They laugh as they do so./ Four, zero /cards/.

409 SL Eight and minus four /points/.

410 SL Choose. /The Losing Team now also play blue cards./ Four, four /cards/.

411 WM1 That one hurt! /Called out in a loud voice./

412 SL Zero, zero /points/.

Now that the Winning Team have burnt a second time, the Losing Team play four blue cards for the remainder of the round, and for the following round. Their perception of the situation begins to become clear in the negotiation which then takes place, at their request. WM1 and LM2 get up from their tables to talk:

407 LM2 Okay, here, we came up with a new option (since) you guys violated the trust ( ). /Laughter from the other members of both teams./

409 WM1 What’s your option? Ah, okay, wait ... let me, you wanna ... okay, because you violated our trust on the last option, (but) we’re willing to give you this ... 

413 LM2 /Interrupting/ No! We want ... /He raises his index finger, to emphasize his point./

414 WM1 You want? /His tone is incredulous. WF2 and WM2 laugh./

415 LM2 No, listen ... 

416 WM1 /Interrupting/ You’re not in much of a position to demand ... 

417 LM2 /Interrupting/ No, listen, listen. We want four rounds where we get to use four and you guys go zero. That’s the first four. And then the fifth one, we’ll, we’re willing to go zero, zero every time. You guys violated the trust, not us. 

419 WM1 That’s pretty stupid.

420 LM2 Right now we’ll just go four, four every time (pick up).

421 WF2 /Calling out/ No!

422 WM2 /Calling out/ Hey, no way!

423 WM1 And we’re going to end up winning. /He points to himself./

424 LM2 It’s not a contest.

425 WF2 /Calling out/ Don’t give in.

426 WM1 We get 50 cents though, each, I mean that’s quite a ( ).

428 LM2 Aaw, alright, fine, you have to remember, you have to remember that what you’re doing to get that 50 cents.

430 WM2 /Calling out/ That’s okay!

431 WM1 Yeah!

432 LM2 Okay, I mean as long as you guys realize what you’re doing.
We now see similarities between the Losing Team’s response in group B and that in other groups. The movement of distancing has now appeared in two forms; the competitive play of the Losing Team after the second burning (though they don’t go so far as to try to stop the game altogether), and their attitude that the other team now have low moral status. The issue of trust has been raised (# 407). There is accusation, again in an unarticulated form (‘violating the trust ...’), which I will examine in more detail below. The differences that remain are, first, that the Losing Team are apparently not surprised or shocked by the burning – indeed, they seemed to anticipate it – and, second, that they are keen to negotiate, where the burnt teams in groups C and A refused to do this. The explanation for the second of these differences lies in the first, in the fact that the Losing Team know how they will now act. Why this is the case, why the Losing Team are prepared for the burning, I will consider shortly. Let us first examine in more detail the moral stance that the Losing Team now adopt.

Note the way that LM2 repeatedly uses the imperative voice during this negotiation, saying ‘No, listen!’ twice, and ‘No, we want...!’ WM1 and the rest of the Winning Team clearly feel that he is making ‘demands’ of them. As WM1 puts it, he and his team are ‘willing to give’ something to the Losing Team, despite the fact that the latter have been playing competitively for some time. LM2, in contrast, apparently feels justified in making ‘demands’, because of the ‘trust’ that he describes as being ‘violated’.

What LM2 demands is essentially ‘compensation’ or ‘restitution’ for the loss which his team have suffered, rather than mere reparation for the points lost. He is asking for twice the points that his team lost. These abstract terms of course fail to capture the concrete sense of being wronged which LM2 is so moved by. He simply wants to be treated in the way which he understands as appropriate at this point. He wants ‘four rounds where we get to use four and you guys go zero’; that is to say, rounds (he means ‘choices’) where his team gain eight points while the Winning Team lose four. Then, after this, he is ‘willing to go zero, zero every time’; that is, to return to a mutually cooperative strategy.

In addition to making these demands, LM2 talks in terms that introduce – but still indirectly – moral condemnation. When WM1 cockily reminds LM2 that the Winning Team stand to make 50 cents per person at the conclusion of the game, LM2’s reply is, ‘fine, /but/ you have to remember, you have to remember that ... what you’re doing to get that 50 cents’, and then he again ominously threatens WM1: ‘... as long as you guys realize...

what you’re doing’. His implication here is clearly that the Winning Team are doing something perfectly awful in their search for material gain, but he is unable or unwilling to put into words just what it is that is so reprehensible. His skirting away from naming the offense is demonstrated by the hesitation half way through his words at # 428; ‘you have to remember that ...’ Just where it would be appropriate to say what the Winning Team should remember, LM2 hesitates and reframes his utterance. Recall that in the sessions of several other groups we have seen a similar inability or unwillingness to say exactly what is wrong with the burning. In groups A and D accusations are made that have little or no explicit content, just like LM2’s threats here. At the same time, LM2 manages to convey to the Winning Team that they know exactly what he’s talking about.

We can now put a name to the emotional structure which is operative for the Losing Team in group B. I suggest that the members of the Losing Team are expressing what can be called contempt or disdain for their fellow participants. We shall find more evidence for this later in the session, but already we see that the Losing Team feel able to make demands for restitution, from which it follows that they are in no doubt that a wrong has been committed. Turning to Webster’s Dictionary for clarification, we find contempt defined as ‘the act of despising ... Lack of respect ... May imply any quality provoking scorn or a low standing in any scale of values’, while disdain is ‘a feeling of contempt or aversion’.

We can also explain why it is difficult to see this emotion at first glance; it is a structure which tends to obscure itself. Part of the disdain is a denial of the other team as worthy or responsible individuals. This is the attitude behind the Losing Team’s silence and self-control, which make it hard to see at first how they perceive the burning. It is difficult to convey in a transcript the bitter and condemnatory tone of voice with which LM2 speaks to WM1, though some of the hostility that develops between the two teams, described in the following chapters, will give a flavor of the Losing Team’s demeanor. It would appear that they do not respond immediately to the burning in a competitive manner, like other teams, because they instead intend to wait until the Winning Team burn again. In so doing, the Winning Team are, so to speak, ‘caught in the act’; they can make no excuses for what they have done.

But why are the Losing Team, unlike other victims of burning, not caught off guard by it? Why are they not shocked and surprised; why, on the contrary, do they seem to have an already-prepared manner of response? In answering this question, we get a clearer picture of the way that the Losing
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Team perceive the situation. The explanation lies in the events of the early portion of the game. It will be recalled, from chapter 4, that both teams showed strong emotions as a large points disparity developed early in the game. This topic is raised by the teams during the discussion after the game. Here, LM2 describes the early portion of the game:

/Early/ we were showing them we wanted to compromise, and that's where it seemed really selfish /what the Winning Team were doing/.

I agree very much with LM1 that once we started discussing /i.e. negotiating/ that's when the trust thing entered, but for me at the very beginning, when they /the Winning Team/ were going for them .... /He hesitates, was he about to say, `... going for themselves?'/ ... for the, for the eight points and we were losing four each time, we were definitely showing that we wanted to compromise at zero, zero. For me it was sort of ... that's when it was very selfish of their group /i.e. team/.

The Losing Team in group B had to endure the largest points disparity of all the groups; after ten rounds of play the Losing Team had negative seven points to the Winning Team's 203; a difference of 210 points between them. Since, as they say, they felt that they were clearly expressing a desire to play cooperatively, the Winning Team's actions at that time must have seemed a rejection of their needs, an insensitivity to their feelings, and a selfish search for points, motivated solely by personal gain. The Losing Team experienced it as a diminution of their moral status. LF1 articulates clearly during the discussion that it was not the points disparity per se which led to their perception of the Winning Team, but that team's own self-understanding; their emotion over their winning:

I don't think that it was the fact of losing the game; I think it was the attitude that was exchanged, by losing the game, because like whenever something would happen and you guys would gain some more points and we'd lose them there was a big uproar of, like, 'Alright!' and that's what developed the anger, you know, between the two teams, the attitude of, like, 'Yah! We are beating them!' That's where the angry attitude developed. It was kinda like you guys were rubbing it in, you know?

Recall also the one verbal response to the burning, LM1's exclamation 'That's it; that's it!' Its sense is that the burning is the final straw in a series of acts which the Losing Team have had to endure.

The interpretation that the Losing Team – especially LM2 – experience a mobilizing contempt towards the burners will receive further support when we examine the reaction of the burning team. In our interpretation of group B we have had to move into territory which actually is part of the

5. Phase One: The Immediate Reaction to the Burning

province of the next chapter. This has been necessitated by the opacity of the Losing Team's response to the burning, which forces us to trace its antecedants and consequences elsewhere in the session. In terms of the analytical scheme presented here, the 'demands' that LM2 makes are part of Phase Two, and not truly part of the first phase of the conflict.

Comparing the Sessions

We can now take a step back, and document the aspects common to these four sessions, and also the differences between them, in terms of the threefold interpretive scheme introduced in chapter 2. The three aspects – intimacy, moral status, and mythology – overlap to a considerable degree in this first phase of the conflict. This is in part due to the problems of dealing conceptually with all that occurs in the brief time-span of this phase, but it is also genuinely the case that action, perception, and rationale – movement and mythology – are intimately related at this point. The response of Phase One is predominantly holistic and immediate. It is an undifferentiated valuative structure, a unity of impelled action and experienced situation, with a minimum of deliberative articulation.

The Region of Intimacy

All four of the groups show a similar movement within the region of intimacy. There is an increase of distance between the two teams, and it is the Losing Team who are the agents of this increase. Yet they regard the distancing as a response to the actions of the Winning Team: it is self-defence. They see their action as a passive being-moved, impelled by the aggression of the Winning Team's act. As LF1 of group C says:

I thought they were doing it /the burning/ to put a permanent, little, gap, you know, in our relationship. /Loud laughter from the Winning Team./ I'm serious!

In all cases there is some kind of change in the ongoing action in the game, with a shift from the cooperative play of the agreement to a competitive stance. The victims of the burning may explicitly call for the ongoing game action to stop, or their outrage may itself cause a halt in the proceedings. All the Losing Teams show a very clear refusal to cooperate any further. Some of them put their cards down on the table and no longer make active selection on each choice. By default they are taken as playing 'com-
petitively', in a manner which precludes the other team gaining any points. In other cases they actively play competitively. In either case the burning team is faced with the choice of playing competitively themselves, in which case there is a 'stalemate' with neither team winning points, or sacrificing points by playing one or more white cards. For group B this competitive play is postponed until after the second burning, but it occurs nonetheless.

This refusal to play is accompanied in groups C and A by a refusal to negotiate. LM1 and LM2 of group C reflected upon this in the post game discussion:

LM1: And for a little while we didn't want to negotiate with them. /Loud laughter./
LM2: We didn't want to have anything to do with them.

In group D, the situation is different in that the agreement which is broken was made with the staff leader, and so the two teams experience a need to negotiate in order to agree on what is to be done next. However, the teams both distance themselves from the one person who they hold responsible for breaking the agreement, LM1, and they show a marked unwillingness to include him in their discussions. In group B, the Losing Team want to negotiate in order to make the demands that they feel are justified by the treatment they have received. Earlier in the game, however, a marked withdrawal on the part of the Losing Team was evident. In all cases, then, the Losing Team sever contact with the Winning team, in a manner that is expressed symbolically by the 'cut' gesture of LF2 in group A.

What motivates this distancing? It is a move of self-defence; the Losing Team are moving away from the hurt they have experienced, and their refusal to participate in the game prevents a repetition of the burning. It follows from this that the Losing Team must see such a repetition as a real possibility. Whereas a few moments before they felt no threat from the other team, now they see them as a source of threat and harm. Group C's LF1, who was quoted above talking about the 'permanent little gap', went on to say:

I don't want to take it just too heavily, but I always had this little tiny feeling like, they blew it once, I really don't know if we can trust them the rest of the time ... my feelings got weaker. Towards the end I was feeling really chummy towards them but at the beginning /i.e. just after the burning/ I was like really worried you know. ( ) they blew it once and I thought I believed in them and, you know, they blew it so that adds something ... that does something to a relationship ...

5. Phase One: The Immediate Reaction to the Burning

The Losing Team are also in a position where they have no adequate means of retaliation. They even lack the kudos to enforce their demands for restitution or reparation. Withdrawal provides a passive way to cause the Winning Team at least a minimum of frustration and irritation. The pleasure the Losing Team take in this is evident (e.g. LM1 in group A), as is its effectiveness (e.g. WM2's anger in group B).

The concern associated with this region is predominantly one of 'trust'. This term is frequently used by the Losing Teams at this point in the conflict, and I believe that it accurately reflects the concern that motivates movement within the region of Intimacy. The concern, as it grasps the Losing Team, is that the Winning Team have behaved in a manner which runs counter to the taken-for-granted practices which are constitutive of 'friendship'. This 'background' of obligations and expectations is very rarely referred to by either team, but implicit appeal is made to it. We cannot interpret the actions that are performed without calling upon such a background and, conversely, as we come to understand what is done, we find ourselves beginning to comprehend something of the character of this background. The surprise and indignation that the Losing Team feel finds its source in the fracture they have experienced between the practices they took for granted would continue, and what the Winning Team have actually done. The emotional movement they are thrown into is the consequence of this, and is an attempt to deal with the unanticipated and threatening turn of events.

Background practices also dictate the content of appropriate action for the Losing Team. It is already evident that there are constraints on their actions. In particular the inhibition of their accusations, and the laughter that accompanies such outright moral reprimands as do occur, suggest that the Losing Team feel uncomfortable with the very status that they find themselves adopting. This is one reason why the type of moral conflict we are examining here is a difficult one for these college students. This point will be examined in more detail in chapter 8, where I shall consider the Winning Team's reaction to the Losing Team's moral stance, and the light this throws on the background of friendship.

The four groups also show differences in the responses of the Losing Teams. I said above that the Losing Team were responsible for the movement, but they ascribe its motivation to the Winning Team. Now I wish to make a further distinction between cases where the Losing Team 'move themselves', and those where they 'move' the Winning Team. All Losing Teams increase the distance between themselves and the Winning Team,
but some do this by withdrawing while others ‘push’ the Winning Team away.

In group A the Losing Team withdraw; they back away from the Winning Team, and refuse to actively play their cards or negotiate. They have removed themselves from the ongoing joint activity, and ‘cut’ their connections to their friends. In group B, in contrast, the Losing Team actively play competitively, and they are keen to negotiate. But their competitive stance, and the tone and content of the negotiation, make it clear that they are no longer treating the other team as trusted friends. The contempt of the Losing Team in group B entails a rejection (a casting away and throwing off) of the other team, whereas the indignation in group A involves a pulling back in umbrage.

For group C the distancing is initially a withdrawal, but the restructuring results in an uneasy state of affairs where both teams play at random. There is a sort of Intimacy limbo, where the Losing Team have in part withdrawn themselves, and in part distanced the Winning Team. Play continues, but in a cautious and detached manner.

In group D both teams actively expel the person whom they regard as responsible for the burning, LM1. Again the movement increases the distance between him and the other participants, as both teams actively halt the game and demand to negotiate, rejecting LM1 as a trustworthy individual.

The Region of Moral Status

A second type of movement occurs at the same time as the withdrawal, in the region of Moral Status. Here, we again find a common occurrence; the Losing Teams present themselves as superior to the other team. More accurately, they present the other team as inferior; their actions are directed towards the others, and self-perception is hard to observe. The burner or burners are perceived as stupid (group D), contemptible (group B), or, as in group A, a variety of expressive devices are employed which represent their inferior status; namely LM1’s comments, such as ‘Eat this!’ Such expletives serve a double function; they represent the Winning Team as being morally inferior, and they also constitute a violence directed at this team. Here, reference to sexual and excretory functions expresses the experienced difference in status.

In group C, LF2 actually rises out of her chair as she exclaims ‘I don’t believe it!’ on the occurrence of the burning. Her movement can be seen as a preparatory phase of action, but – at the risk of overinterpreting – it is also a rising above the other team, and an acting upon them from a superior position.

The concern here is one of responsibility. Although this is not a term that is used by the students, the concern is implicit in what is done at this point in the conflict. Depiction of the burners as stupid, contemptible, or irresponsible reflects a change in their perceived status vis-à-vis the Losing Team, and in particular it reflects a new view of their status as responsible individuals, capable of acting in a reasonable, appropriate manner. We shall come increasingly to recognize that, for each of the four groups considered, responsibility is a significant concern in the new situation which the Losing Team find themselves in after the burning. We have noted that accusation is frequently an explicit part of the actions that the Losing Team are impelled into in the first phase of conflict, and the occurrence of accusation – although its content is still largely implicit – points to the fact that each Losing Team find themselves grappling with a new and problematic perception of the relationship which obtains between the burners and their act of burning. It is this relationship – between agent and action – that I refer to with the term ‘responsibility’. Furthermore, and counter to both the behaviorist and cognitivist views of emotion, the ascription to either self or other of some type of responsibility is an intrinsic part of many emotions, as well as being, of course, a central concern in moral considerations. Solomon [1980, p. 257] sees normative judgements as being central to emotion: ‘...emotions are judgements – normative and often moral judgements. “I am angry at John for taking (“stealing’ begs the question) my car” entails that I believe that John has somehow wronged me .... The (moral) judgement entailed by my anger is not a judgement about my anger ... My anger is that judgement. If I do not believe that I have somehow been wronged, I cannot be angry (though I might be upset, or sad).’ Lest it be thought that he is arguing that judgement is identical with emotion, he goes on to add that ‘...emotional judgements are essentially nonreflective and prior to deliberation’, and that an emotion is ‘never a single judgement but a system of judgements’. Solomon sees clearly that responsibility ascription is central to many emotions:

‘Our emotions involve more than evaluations; they also ascribe responsibility, praise for gains, blames for losses. Anger and indignation, for example, involve not only judgements of loss but also a judgement of blame, an accusation. Someone is responsible for that loss, which thereby, taken personally, becomes an offense. Admiration and gratitude, on the positive side, include judgements of praise. Inner-directed emotions also include such ascriptions of responsibility; shame and guilt include judgements of blame, pride (like other-directed admiration) includes a judgement of praise.’
The word responsible is defined as 'liable to be called upon to answer as the primary cause, motive, or agent ... able to answer for one's conduct and obligations'. In general, then, the issue of responsibility concerns the same problematic relationship which I addressed in earlier chapters from a theoretical point of view: the relationship between agent and action. If this relationship is merely causal (as behaviorism maintains), then it would appear that an agent can never be held responsible, for all actions are beyond deliberate control. If the relationship is logical (as cognitivism maintains), then the agent must always be held responsible, for each act is a consequence of rational assessment, calculated to be the necessary and correct thing to do, even if such deliberation is 'unconscious'. 'He who knows the good chooses the good', says Kohlberg, following Plato. I have argued that the relationship between agent and action is not so straightforward as either of these two paradigms makes it out to be, and find it significant that responsibility becomes problematic for the students in these conflicts. We are reminded that the relationship between agent and act is never merely a causal or logical matter; it is always (perhaps at the same time) a moral matter.

Fingarette [1967], in an analysis which proves helpful to the progress of our interpretation, describes three ‘essential dimensions of responsibility’:

'[The first] is that of acceptance, of commitment, of care, and concern, and of the attendant elements of choice and of the creativity of choice; the [second] dimension is that of the “forms of life”, initially socially given and ultimately socially realized, which constitute the form and content of responsibility. Responsibility emerges where the individual accepts as a matter of personal concern something which society offers to his concern ... The third dimension is that of obligation. The notion of obligation is the essential mediating one between that of acceptance and that of the proffered life-forms which are accepted.'

In other words, an individual is responsible when she accepts as her own those social ‘forms’ of action which she is ‘obliged’ to accept, according to the dictates of social practices. We are obliged not to break the law, and we are responsible when we choose to accept this law as applying to us. It follows that the absence of responsibility can take several forms: we can fail to be responsible by accident, by design, or by several other forms of lapse.

How does this conceptual framework apply to the case in hand? Let us examine the Losing Team's point of view. The Winning Team are their friends, and we presume that they have tacit understanding of background practices, of ways in which friends should treat each other. The burning is not part of this anticipated conduct; the teams differ, how peculiar relationship which they perceive as obtaining between act of burning. From the Losing Team’s perspective, in burning Team have failed to acknowledge as applying to socially binding forms of life corresponding to 'friends' conduct such as not hurting their friends, not subordinating of financial gain, not gaining pleasure from their losses, and of group C put it, 'I thought I believed in them'. Bail describes the tacit obligations in the following way:

'Think about morality and trust. Certain relationships require us tion. Neither friends nor family members should count the cost of the improper to ask ourselves if such a relationship is profitable in terms of power, because the relationship itself is its own reward. The partner one another an infinity of credit, and they trust each other not to ex advantage'.

One implication of this is that without the background and expectations that are part of ‘friendship’, the burninr experienced as it is here. The young adults we are watchi continue to relate to each other after the experimental se cannot just walk away from one another, as they could if gers. If the teams were composed of strangers (as of coucas in game-theoretic studies of PD), then competitive plament is made would not be grasped against the same back ton of fairness and, one imagines, might be seen inste merely by financial concerns, and hence not as blameworth not stand out as a problem at all, and nothing ‘moral’ w circumstances the game becomes reduced to a purely lo puzzle; and this shows up a major limitation in taki research involving relative strangers as indicative of what persons more intimately related.

The ascription of responsibility which I have described become fully uncovered in the Losing Teams' actions in victims of burning do not fully articulate for the other te they now experience them. Yet there is clear evidence that they act towards the Winning Team in a new way, as h moral status (with the exception of group D, to be precise already experienced such a change earlier in the session), understanding is a crucial part of the conflict that now de
onstrate its role will be one of the tasks of the following chapters, but it is essential to recognize that responsibility ascription forms a tangible and real facet of experience at even this early phase of the conflict.

In fact, we can interpret the varying forms of movement adopted by the four groups as involving different types of responsibility ascription. The members of the Losing Team in group B adopt the most extreme degree of raised status, while those in group C show the least, in the form that their response finally takes. What varies is the type of responsibility ascribed to those held accountable for the burning. In group A they are seen as immoral, while in group D, LM1 is seen as inept. In group C the Winning Team are pranksters, while in group B they are selfish, and so contemptible that they have no choice in what is to be done next. In all cases the burners are now regarded as less than full partners in the game, but the precise nature of their lapse varies, and in the case of groups C and D the complaint scarcely seems at first a moral one.

The Mythology of the Situation

The third aspect to be considered is that of the mythology of the situation. To understand this we must examine what the participants in the session talk about, where the other two aspects – intimacy and moral status – have concerned themselves with what is done by means of this talk. When we consider the way that perceptions of the situation are framed or expressed in participants’ talk in this first phase of conflict, we find a holistic and undifferentiated account. In some cases, participants say they don’t know ‘what’s going on here’ (group A); in others, the image of something having been ‘broken’ is introduced (group D). We have already noted the apparent inability of participants to put an articulate name to what they have experienced. Common to all sessions are expressions of ‘indignation’ and ‘disbelief’. The shock, disbelief, and indignation which are consequences of the burning suggest that it is not simply an unexpected act, but that it is also experienced as improper; it is a transgression of some kind. We’ve also noted that the participants refer to the concern of ‘trust’ in their speech and, I have argued, make implicit reference to a concern of responsibility. There is, however, a lack of outright moral accusation. Later chapters will consider more carefully the relationships that develop between the three aspects of persuasive action: between what people do, and what they say.

In conclusion, the major findings of this chapter are as follows. A pattern of reaction to the burning is discernable, applying, with some individ-
6. Phase Two: Accusation and Response

Moral indignation is jealousy with a halo (H.G. Wells).

I have argued that the notions of trust and responsibility are of necessity introduced as one examines the sequelae of burning in these conflicts between young adults. We must ask next how these concerns are experienced. In the case of the Losing Team’s experience after being burned, three aspects can be discriminated for each of these two concerns, corresponding to a temporal organization. Where trust is concerned, the experience is apparently that trust has been ‘broken’, or ‘violated’. First, in the past, there is pain from the act of burning. Second is a sense of risk, and a fear that the same thing may occur again in the future. Third, in the present there is a diminished sense of self. The Losing Team feel an increased vulnerability, and they also regard themselves as foolish and unimportant, perhaps as stupid. Their sense of their own status as moral individuals is thrown into doubt: to treat them as they did, the Winning Team must have regarded them as of little moral worth.

Where responsibility is concerned, there are also three aspects. First, there is confusion over ‘what happened?’ The Losing Team experience confusion over the form of responsibility in the Winning Team’s action. What was their aim as they acted? Second, there is the lowering character of the other team as individuals to be interacted with here and now; they are seen as irresponsible, but in just what way? Third, with an eye to the future, will the Winning Team come to accept responsibility for what they have done? Will they acknowledge that they erred, will they attempt to excuse themselves, or will they simply ignore the moral aspect of the accusation?

I ended the last chapter with an examination of the various forms the ascription of responsibility took in the four groups, pointing out also what was common to the Losing Teams’ responses, whether they involved outrage and anger, contempt, or strained amusement. In the present chapter I consider the ways in which the burning team respond in turn to these emotions of responsibility ascription and to the form of interchange which is consequent upon them. We shall see that here, too, a variety of forms of action are observable, but that they are also linked by the concerns of trust and responsibility.

What is most interesting to look at in this portion of the analysis is the relationship that develops between the perspectives of the two teams (and in addition there is variation of understanding within some teams). It will become clear that the two teams do not understand what has been done, and what is occurring, in ways that are at all similar. Phase Two involves a gradual articulation by each team of their own position, which must occur before there can be any appreciation of the other’s grasp of events. At the start of Phase Two we, as retrospective and calm interpreters, are aware that the Losing Team have adopted a particular orientation as a consequence of the burning. At this time, however, the Winning Team are largely unaware of what this orientation is. We shall see what aspects of the Losing Team’s mood become apparent to them: how the Winning Team comprehend the Losing Team. The following will come to light in the course of the interpretation: the practical problem that the Winning Team find they are facing; the underlying concerns of trust and responsibility which are apparent in the movements of the team’s actions; and the issues that are explicitly talked about.

Group A

In group A the Losing Team’s reaction to the burning entailed a movement in the region of Intimacy which was primarily one of withdrawal. This team refused to play or negotiate, for – as implied by their accusations that the Winning Team were no longer worth playing with – the Winning Team’s moral status was lowered to such an extent by the act of burning. If we turn our attention now to the way in which the Winning Team respond, we find that they become subdued, as the game continues with the Losing Team playing four blue cards on each choice. The elation and amusement they showed immediately after the burning rapidly fades, as they begin to see that there is no way around the Losing Team’s blockade; they can make no further points unless the Losing Team act differently. It is apparent to an interpreter, however, that at this point they have an inaccurate understanding of what the Losing Team’s form of involvement is. WM1 says, loudly, so the other team can hear:

356 WM1 It was funny to do it, but ... /He laughs./
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about this’, #397), and finally becomes frustrated and angry, mocking the Losing Team as they declare that they still will not negotiate. On the one hand WM1 feels a necessity for the teams to talk in order that the game continue (‘like, we gotta negotiate’); on the other, his overture to the Losing Team ends in their rebuffing him. He is unable to understand why this is so, as his criticism of the Losing Team as ‘not very logical’ indicates.

There follows a long discussion within each team, and finally the Losing Team agree to negotiate. WM1’s words seem to have had some effect after all, because the Losing Team now ask explicitly for the return of the points they lost during the burning. This will apparently satisfy them, so that they will consent to play cooperatively again. The two teams have now settled, as it were, on an explicit issue; a conflict which becomes the focus of their talk. The issue of points won and lost returns again and again, both for this group and for others. Particularly striking, however, is what the Losing Team do not talk about, namely the underlying concerns of trust and responsibility. These are still silent, and remain so for a long time.

Yet the two teams see even the simple issue of points lost and points to be repayed in different ways. LM1 and WM1 stand up in order to negotiate:

447 LM1 /To his team./ Okay, they’ve got to give us all our points back. (We’re not going to give them anything.) /Laughter from the Losing Team./ Are you gonna give us (all our points)? /To WM1./

448 WM1 (Okay) yeah, what we figured out, you have to go (for this).

449 WF1 /Calls out/ No, we’re not giving you points back.

450 LM1 Okay, well then...

451 WM1 The most efficient way... The most efficient way is zero, three.

452 LM1 Why? Then you can only get three in each turn.

453 WM1 Well, that way we don’t lose money, but we still give you whatever you had back.

454 LM1 No, the most efficient would be zero, six for two times.

455 WM1 Oh, yeah.

456 LM1 You give us the four you burned us.

458 WM1 Yeah, okay, okay, okay.

WM1 offers to ‘give you what you had, back’, but at the same time ensuring that ‘we don’t lose money’. He clearly feels no need to do penance; his offer of points is more conciliatory than compensatory. That his teammates still see no need for even this minimally beneficent gesture is apparent from WF1’s interjection at #449, and in the exchange that follows, once WM1 has sat down again with this teammates:

460 WF1 We’re not giving them any points!

461 WF2 No, we’re not doing that.

In response WM1 says to them, incidentally at the same time admitting more culpability to his teammates than he did to the other team:

468 WM1 It was funny, but we screwed (them). /Laughter./

There continues to be some dissension within the Winning Team, but compensation is agreed upon, followed by a recommencement of the cooperative play.

476 LM1 Okay, okay, good. So we (lost) how many, twelve points there, ( ) zero, zero. So we (lost) twelve points. /Pointing at the score, explaining that they were ’shafted’ of twelve points./

477 WM1 Right.

478 LM1 So the first two we do zero, six, zero, six, and you do zero, zero, zero, zero.

479 WM1 We do zero you do two.

480 LM1 You do zero, every time.

481 WM1 Okay.

482 LM1 Okay, is that (a solution)? (If you don’t behave) I’m gonna wake you up at two in the morning. /Laughter./

The game starts again, and LM2 ironically claps at the end of the first ‘retribution’ round, applauding the Winning Team for playing as they ought:


/LM1 slowly claps: applauding the Winning Team./

517 WM1 How much do we have?

518 SL Four and four. Losing Team has 48, Winning Team has 86.

519 ? Okay.

520 LM1 That wasn’t so bad, was it? /Patronizing tone of voice./

521 WM1 Isn’t that 90?

522 WF1 They’re catching up on us.

523 LF1 Well, it’s not a contest.

525 WM1 Oh, no, sorry, sorry.

526 LM2 (He wants more money.) /Laughs./

So the game has been restarted again, and the Winning Team’s problem of being unable to gain further points is now ostensibly solved. The issue of how many points are owed also seems to have been resolved; the Losing Team has received repayment. Yet still something smells in the State of Denmark. Note the sarcasm and irony in the remarks exchanged between the two teams; at #520, 523, 525 and 526. One gets the sense that some sort of covering-up is involved here; that a source of conflict remains
which has not been addressed. LM1's comment at #523 gives an indication of what this difference of understanding is; the Losing Team do not regard the proceedings as 'a contest', while the Winning Team, it seems, do. There remains an incommensurability between the two situations that the teams find themselves inhabiting; no 'meeting of minds', as the legal phrase has it, has as yet occurred.

It becomes apparent very soon that the Winning Team utterly fail to appreciate the Losing Team's feelings and concerns: for the Winning Team burn again! This leaves no doubt that they are oblivious to the Losing Team's feelings of being betrayed. We will examine this behavior, and the Losing Team's response to it, in detail in the next chapter. Suffice it to say that the Winning Team still understand themselves as 'winners', and so as able to burn freely.

When we compare this group with others it becomes clearer how they have failed to resolve their conflict. The 'issue' of returning points operates as a 'pseudo-issue'; it covers up and prevents articulation and resolving of the more profound disagreements and disappointments which are involved. The disagreements between the teams are grounded in fundamental differences in understanding of what the game is 'about' — whether it is 'fun' or not — but for this group these differences go unnoticed.

Group C

During Phase One, it will be recalled, LF2 of the Losing Team in group C at first expressed indignation towards the burners, in a clearly accusing manner. However, possibly because of the pressure from her peers, who were uncomfortable with the moralistic tone of her outrage, she reframed the situation, 'choosing' an alternative understanding of the action that cast the Winning Team as irresponsible, but not malicious.

The Winning Team do not counter this ascription, and the play now continues with both teams playing randomly, throwing their cards onto the table in order that chance determine their choice and, consequently, the score. It is of course inevitable that the Winning Team will win, since the disparity of points is large.

As a consequence of the reframing the Losing Team withdraw, but in a manner which poses no practical problem for the Winning Team. Unlike group A, where the Winning Team were prevented from winning points, in group C the random play introduces no further breakdown of the game.

Conflict between the teams exists to the extent that LF2 — and perhaps others in the Losing Team — regard the Winning Team as being lower in Moral Status, and as unreliable and irresponsible, but the conflict is hidden; it presents no problem to the Winning Team, and the only 'issue' that is raised is that of making the game 'fun'.

In a sense, then, the Losing Team have 'chosen not to choose'; their new form of engagement with the Winning Team is really no engagement at all. Playing randomly is a way of avoiding confronting the other team with the objections that they feel, and working out an arrangement with them. The concerns of responsibility and trust remain unresolved, indeed not even raised to the level of explicit talk. One consequence of this is that both teams get progressively more bored with what they are doing. The boredom is apparent as they play, and it is also talked about as the game ends.

In the discussion following the game the issue of the burning, and participants' feelings about it, is raised by the staff leader, and several things finally become apparent. First, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, LF2's indignation and sense of there having been a transgression remain. She continues to say that the burning is not something she would have done, or gone along with.

Second, the members of the Winning Team are surprisingly unwilling to admit responsibility for acting as they did, even though the Losing Team have not really called them to account. The following conversation takes place:

WF1: I don't know. It /the burning/ disrupted the trust there was, and I didn't want to do it.
LF2: Who did it? Did you /to WM1/ do it?
WM1: I didn't do it.
WM2: Wasn't me; I didn't do it.
LM2: I thought it was WF2's idea.
WF2: Sure; I'll take the blame. Put the weight on my shoulders, no problem. Um, wait a minute. No, it was like pseudo-unanimous, except I didn't know you /WF1/ didn't want to do it?
WF1: (Oh I didn't want to do it.) Consequences (?) serious.
WF2: It was more like, it was more like to liv ..., to liv en things up, I mean like when I did it it was more like out of sheer, sheer ... Like, how dull can this be, to just keep doing this, you know. It was more like for the effect (than) to, to beat you. /She grabs the table in a mock dramatic gesture./

Only WF2 is prepared to 'take the blame', and she then turns around and states that the burning was a team decision, and not her responsibility alone.
Third, it becomes clear that the Losing Team’s reactions to the burning—LF2’s actions in particular—were salient to the Winning Team, though understood in a way which minimized their moral force. WF2 reflects upon what the Losing Team did in an amused manner:

WF2: It was funny the way you guys (said) ‘No! Don’t want to (with them). No!’ /She imitates them, sarcastically./

To the Losing Team this comment must appear indicative of a shocking insensitivity, as WF2 mocks the Losing Team’s pain.

Group B

In the last chapter, as we traced the events which followed the burning, we began to consider the start of Phase Two for group B. The Losing Team, it will be remembered—after enduring an extreme points disparity—react to the burning with a distancing which involves a pushing away of the Winning Team, seeing them as selfish and contemptible. In the negotiation which follows the burning—described in the last chapter—LM2 demands compensation from the Winning Team. However, WM1 does not see any cogency to LM2’s ‘demand’, responding ‘You’re not in much of a position to demand’, and ‘That’s pretty stupid’. LM2 is asking for recompense that amounts to twice the points that his team actually lost as a result of the burning, so one presumes that there is a punitive component involved here, in addition to any restitution for the loss of points. Punitive action is, of course, a fairly natural concomitant of anger. LM2 indicates, next, that his team will simply block all further winning of points if this ‘option’ is not accepted:

434 LM2 Right now we’ll just go four, four every time (pick up) /so that the Winning Team will gain no further points./

WM1 replies that he feels that this is in actuality no threat at all. Against the moral stance taken by the Winning Team, he pits his team’s high status in terms of the game’s outcome. It seems that he is unable to recognize the Losing Team’s position; he cannot grasp how they can maintain that they have a higher status than his own team:

435 LM2 We’re going to end up winning. /He points to himself./

LM2 then adopts a high moral tone, saying, in a tone full of implication:

436 WM1 And we’re going to end up winning. /He points to himself./

437 LM2 Okay, I mean, as long as you guys realize what you’re doing.

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LM2’s accusation in this conversation is stated in the subtest of terms, but it is still very evident. An explicit objection is never stated, but it is apparent that LM2 holds the Winning Team responsible for ‘violating trust’, for ‘doing’ something they should be ashamed of, and as now owing recompense. Clear ascriptions of responsibility are being made; contrast this with, for example, the Losing Team’s actions in group C, where no accusations like this were made. Even so, WM1 apparently doesn’t at first understand the moral force of LM1’s words. Even when he eventually sees what is being implied he does not accept the way that LM1 sees things. His response to the demands is now direct and confrontive:

438 WM1 So, what, we violated the trust, what, twice?
439 LM2 Yeah, I think a few more times than that. /Sarcastic./
440 WM1 No, seriously, it was tw, tw, twice.
441 WF2 Twice.
442 ? Twice.
443 WM1 Okay, I mean, you only have to violate trust once, to ( ).

WM1 here makes no attempt to give excuses for what has been done. He clearly acknowledges that his team has a certain responsibility for the act of burning, saying, twice, ‘We violated the trust’ (#434, 440). Yet in doing this he is in effect challenging the moral stance that LM2 has adopted. By treating the burning as an established fact, he calls LM2’s bluff. In quantifying the complaint (‘...what, twice?’), he treats the unstated moral concern as though it is a simple issue of lost points, despite LM2’s protest at #439. In acknowledging and accepting responsibility for the burning, it is striking that WM1 says nothing which admits guilt in the broader and derivative connotation which LM2 is implying. Like WM1 in group A he does not, or will not, see the burning as an immoral action, and hence he cannot, or will not, share LM1’s understanding of the situation. Notice that, just as in group A, payment of points has become the focal issue of the talk, but that again the two teams have disparate understandings of this issue. The exchange proceeds as follows:

444 LM2 We violated your trust twice. /Laughter. /Interrupting./ We violated your trust twice.
445 WM1 How much did we take from you?
446 LM2 Well...
447 WM1 /Interrupting./ We took, we took, um, eight and you lost four.
448 LM2 No, twice.
449 WM1 Twice. /Agreeing with LM2./
450 LM2 Right. So you took 16.
451 WM1 So we took 16.
452 LM2 And we lost eight.
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the restitution appropriate to their sins. We must infer that LM2 sees WM1’s intransigence over the number of points to be repayed as further proof of the Winning Team’s selfishness; no wonder he feels that, as he says, ‘there’s no reason to go on’.

WM1 in the same way grasps LM2’s actions as they fit into the situation as he understands it. From his point of view the fact that his team is far ahead in points is a source of pride and confidence; he sees no reason to be ashamed or guilty for what his team has done. My interpretation here of the nature of his experience receives corroboration from the post-game discussion. When LM2 explains that the Losing Team played zeroes at the start of the game to ‘show... that we wanted to compromise’, WM1 exclaims:

Actually, we /the Winning Team/ didn’t even notice that you guys were trying to compromise ... It was like, we’ll stay at four and there’s no way we can lose.

LF1: It’s still selfish.

WM1: In a game you don’t play to lose, you play to win!

In the same spirit, the Winning Team regard their burning as being of rather small consequence. How, then, do they understand LM2’s intransigence over the issue of restitution? They see it as an unjustified attitude of moral superiority and judgmentalism. Furthermore, this understanding receives only confirmation from the negotiation with LM2, as WM2’s ‘Phew!’ at LM2’s refusal to accept WM1’s offer of restitution (#452) illustrates. And through the remainder of Phase Two for this group – which is quite extended – we find several points where members of the Winning Team express their understanding of LM2. Later, for example, the Winning Team mock LM2’s style as he asks:

588 LM2 Can I have the scores, please? /Very serious tone./

/Laughter./

589 ? Yes, sir! /Mock respect. /

590 WM1 Pushy, pushy!

591 WM2 Pushy team over there! /The Losing Team laughs at WM2’s comment, as though they see it as ironic./

We can see here that the two teams have almost mirror-image views. The Winning Team see LM2 as being arrogant; this only confirms the Losing Team in their opinion that WM2 is mocking and selfish. A second very clear illustration occurs towards the end of the session, when the teams make a final agreement to play cooperatively again. The following interesting and illuminating exchange occurs:
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Perhaps they can see that their friends are upset; perhaps they do now feel some guilt for gloating over their past successes. It is difficult, if not impossible, to be sure in the absence of a recording of their whispered conversations together. Whatever the motivation, they are prepared to give points to the Losing Team, but not because they have to.

It is worth noting here that the Winning Teams in both group A and group B act similarly in this respect. It is as though they are trying to assure the Losing Teams by doing what is asked of them. Yet they will not go so far as to accept the guilt that is part of the Losing Team’s understanding of the situation, for this does not fit with their own view. However, we shall see below that the assuaging fails to move the conflict towards resolution, because contrary to the Winning Team’s intentions it fails as a challenge to the Losing Team’s perception; the Losing Team are able to take it as an admission of guilt.

The interpretation that the Winning Team see themselves as acting from choice rather than obligation is consistent with later events. At the next negotiation the Losing Team claim that, by acting as they did, the Winning Team essentially did ‘make a deal’, because they ‘filled the agreement’. WM1, on behalf of the Winning Team, protests:

622 LM2 Our deal is, you violated our trust four times.
623 WM2 Four!
624 ? Yeah.
625 LM2 Four.
626 LM2 And we have not, every time we made a deal, last time we made a deal, you go four times, you guys said you wouldn’t, but you did surprise us, so you did it. We held through on our bargain. We have never violated trust, and we’ve never broken any bargain we made.
627 WM2 We did not violate trust on that one, because we never said we would go four.
628 LM2 No, I know. And then, well, once you went four ...
629 LM1 You did.
630 LM2 ... you filled the agreement, and went the four (.)
631 WM2 No, we never made an agreement, so we didn’t fill it.
632 LM2 Well, I mean ...
633 WM2 There was no agreement to fill.

A second piece of supporting evidence occurs a little later when LM2 remarks, sarcastically, that the other team have made ‘a lot of progress’ (i.e. none) in their score in the last few rounds. WF2 replies to this:

646 WF2 I know, we’ve been nice. /She grins./
I take this to indicate that the Winning Team regard their zero, four plays as being 'nice' to the Losing Team, though this is apparently lost to LM2, who sees the action only as a sign of ineptitude. This is no doubt a consequence of— and of course it adds fuel to— his understanding of the Winning Team as being of lower status.

To summarize, the reaction of the team responsible for the burning in group B—the Winning Team—is as follows. Faced with the Losing Team's presentation of them as having been selfish, and as being morally inferior, the Winning Team see the Losing Team as adopting an unfairly and inappropriately morally superior attitude. They see them as 'demanding' recompense for the burning despite the fact that their position—as losers in the game—gives them no basis for being so presumptuous. The Winning Team refuse to accept blame, and acknowledge no feelings of guilt. Yet at the same time they apparently do feel a motivation to act in a conciliatory manner towards their friends—they play so that the Losing Team win the points that they 'demand'. In more abstract terms, they refuse to acknowledge responsibility in the form and to the degree that the Losing Team grasp it, but they begin action that seems motivated to decrease the distance between the two teams—a distance which was established by the initial points disparity, and increased by the moves taken by the Losing Team, who withdraw through the adoption of a morally superior and judgemental status.

The practical problem for the Winning Team in group B is, then, somewhat similar to that faced by the Winning Team in group A. The two teams have in common a need to start the game again, and that the Losing Team are demanding that they be given points before they start to play again. In group B the Winning Team face the concrete issue that the Losing Team are demanding the return of more points than were actually lost by them. The talk about the issue of points is more overtly 'moral' than that in group A, yet the moral concerns are still largely covered up. Broken 'trust' is treated as quantifiable, rather than as a real source of pain to the Losing Team. One suspects, however, that some degree of pain is what the Winning Team want to accomplish, given their gloating and the pointing out that they are ahead.

**Group D**

Finally, group D. The movement in the region of Intimacy in Phase One was one of the distancing of one particular participant: LM1. For this group the articulation of understanding is much faster than for any of the other three groups; it will become clear that this is a consequence of the fact that there are no vested interests in keeping it covered up (except possibly for LM1, who is notably vague throughout).

What becomes a matter of contention now for the participants is whether LM1's cheating means the loss of the 'eight times' which the staff leader had agreed to give the teams, or not. A complex disagreement centers around this issue. What happens first is that a simple, apparently factual question arises:

120 WM1 (__) eight times (is what) we're talking about. We already had the eight times. That was what we meant by the eight times.
124 LF1 (Do) we have the eight times or not? /To WM1./
125 WF1 Definitely ( ).
126 WF2 No, we don't! No, no! Once we start ... once we start screwing off we don't have our money.
127 WM2 We can't trust that ( ).
128 WM1 But we do have the eight times. We have the eight times. That's what we ( ) we're counting (like we have $1.20 ( ), had $1.20, and then (now we're fighting) yeah.
129 LM1 I don't care about the (it's only 30 cents, I wanna have some some fun).

The question 'do we have the eight times' bears a resemblance to the issue that arises for other groups, concerning the number of points lost during burning. And, as in the other groups, it is the vehicle of a moral concern, though ostensibly just a question of 'fact'. For this group, like group B, the moral aspects of this issue become apparent relatively quickly, as will be seen. The concern in this case is that LM1 has broken the trust which had been established with the staff leader. Recall that in group B the Winning Team refused to accept the accusation of moral fault; here the same is true, in that LM1 refuses to accept that he has 'screwed off'. 'We had the eight times', he says in his defense.

In this situation there is nothing that LM1 can do which is equivalent to the returning of lost points, since his own teammates are criticizing him. There is no simple solution to the problem which faces him (as it faced the burners in other groups): that the game has stopped and the other participants refuse to start again. LM1 responds to the moral accusations in WF2's talk ('screwing off', etc.) by saying that he only wanted to 'have some fun'.

If we look at the form of the talk here we see that, at this point, the participants' accounts are presented in the form of incontrovertible 'statements of fact'. Accounts are given in terms such as 'definitely', 'we do', 'we don't'. The confrontation of totally opposite accounts among the partici-
pants occurs several times more. In this we find again the 'enthralling' character of the initial perceptions of the situation after the burning. The emotion immediately following the burning continues as a persisting mood.

Along with these definitive-sounding statements of the 'facts of the matter' WF2 in particular begins to articulate an account of the situation as she understands it, giving grounds for her sense of what is right. She and LF1 get up to negotiate, and she soon begins to argue with WM1, who shares LM1's understanding of what has transpired:

136 WF2 But we, we don't get the eight times since we started playing around.
137 LF1 Right.
142 SL Listen to what WF2's saying here.
143 WF2 Eh, I mean the whole ... she /SL/ was saying if, if there was going to be no more playing around we could just have ... we could have our vote, our, our 20 cents or whatever is everytime, but since we started playing something different, that doesn't ... we don't get those eight times.
144 WM1 /Stuttering/ What I was talking about was, was going, going to a certain limit, $1.20, so we all had it (whereas) everybody had it ...
145 WF2 But we don't have that; that's not what we did.
147 WM1 /Stuttering/ But, no, we said that we had that. What I said when I talked to her /SL/ ...
148 LF1 /Interrupting/ But we don't!
149 WM1 I said eight times, I would, we would just skip the eight times, because we all, we're gonna stay the same. I meant that we were all gonna stay the same, make the money, and then ...
150 LM1 And then play one more game for real.
150a WM1 ... Not play one more, but just then start playing for real since we had it and see (what comes up).
151 LF1 /Interrupts rapidly/ But we don't have it!
152 WF2 But we don't, no, I mean if LM1 can screw up on that last one then he could have done it on any of those eight times and so could we.
153 WM1 No no, but /stuttering/ we, we have our (beer) and if they want to (put a fool) on it then that's their choice, now ...
154 WF2 But that's not, that's not the agreement that was made.
155 WM1 The agreement I, I, I was only in the agreement until $1.20, I wasn't in the agreement any farther.
156 WF2 But we don't have $1.20; we've got 111 cents.
157 /Several people talking at once./
158 LM1 No, that doesn't (apply), there was a contract, there was a contract established.

As was the case for group B, the two sides of the disagreement have two distinct and opposed ways of understanding what has occurred (the nature of the agreement, the significance of breaking it, and the current situation). Unlike group B, it is not the case that each team holds to one of these positions. Rather, WF2 and LF1 seem to share the view that breaking the agreement to cooperate means that they do not 'have the eight times', while WM1 and LM1 feel that they do have these points, with WM1 maintaining that the agreement was not to cooperate, but to 'play for real'.

Consequently these understandings are not bolstered by the participants' status as winners or losers, as they are for group B. We would expect that this will mean that they are more readily articulated – there is not the same motivation to avoid the uncovering of these concerns, and so participants are more able to articulate accounts of their experience. As I noted before, LM1 is accused of breaking trust, but it is the staff leader who has been wronged, rather than some of the participants. WM1 and WF2 are able to engage in an open if heated exchange about the 'facts', because neither of them has hurt the other, and so neither is defensive. There are genuine moral concerns here, but they are not felt so personally for this group as they are for the others.

In all these remarks WF2 and WM1 do more than merely state what they see as the facts of the situation (though this might appear to be the surface form of their remarks) for their remarks also have an implicit evaluative aspect. In one respect they are returning to and elaborating the accusations of LM1 that began back in Phase One. Much of their talk ascribes some form of responsibility – deviant – to LM1. WF2 is developing an account of what has occurred, framed in moral terms: over the course of the argument there is a progressive elaboration of what has gone wrong. Before the breakdown, WF2 talked as though what LM1 wanted to do was simply an alternative course of action ('playing a different game') with its own consequences (then 'we gotta keep going'). Immediately after the game stops for negotiation, she expresses a preliminary sense of moral turpitude; 'screwing off' and 'playing around' are the terms used (#136, 143). At first, her account refers to the terms of the original agreement as she now perceives them; 'if there was going to be no more playing around we could just have ... our 20 cents ... but since we started playing something different ... we don't get those eight times.'

In the face of WM1's continuing claim that 'we had it', WF2 begins to talk about the import of LM1's action for the agreement which had been made with the staff leader: 'if LM1 can screw up on that last one he could have done it on any of those eight times, and so could we' (#152). She articulates her sense that LM1's action threw doubt on the good faith that
the contract with the staff leader entailed, and refers to it explicitly as an 'agreement'. And later she talks for the first time about the understanding that the staff leader must have had in order to suggest the contract: 'Right, right, right, but that was, on their part that was assuming that we would stick with our ...' (#166). WM1's lack of acceptance or comprehension of WF2's position is forcing her to provide grounds for what she feels, to articulate what she has hitherto taken for granted about the events. Her talk provides grounds for why the group can't 'have the eight times', and the grounds are essentially moral ones. What she says is consistent with her initial undifferentiated sense of outrage, following LM1's cheating, but it is now a much more developed account. It has been developed in opposition to WM1 and LM1, as they continue to maintain that the eight times 'had occurred'. It is an articulation, an explanation, that is guided by her rhetorical purposes, growing out of the need to convince others.

But notice that LM2's account does not really address WM1's understanding. Everything that LM2 says is based on her unexamined understanding that agreement to cooperate was made in order to demonstrate that the teams were worthy of being given free points. This is precisely what WM1 does not think occurred. LM2 is articulating the moral grounds of her own position, but they are inconsequential to WM1. This continues for a while, and then WF2 begins to become aware that her comprehension of the situation was not shared by all. For the first time she asks LM1 what he meant by his talk, rather than taking her original grasp of it for granted:

174 WF2 /To LM1./ So what was your 'let’s do it one more time'? /Her tone is calm and reasonable./
175 WM1 ()
176 LM1 I just wanted to do it for fun for one more time (I didn’t wanna) do the zero, zeroes.
177 WM1 Well, LM1 was giving up; he figured she /the SL/ was gonna close down our operation anyway, since ( ) he just wanted ( ) ...
178 LM1 See, we already had our money.
179 WF2 But we didn’t.
180 LM1 No, we did, there was a contract established.

Everyone is much calmer for these few utterances, until LM1 again becomes dogmatic, at #178. The conversation then becomes heated again:

181 WF2 We didn’t.
182 LF2 No there wasn’t, not yet.
183 WF2 No!

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184 ?M (Could have sworn ...)
185 LM1 But there was.
186 LF1 There was, there was!
187 ?F No!
188 WM1 We asked for eight more times, we asked for eight more times because, I mean, to skip the eight times because we were going to stick.
189 LF2 No, but ... We broke it (before we started).
190 WF2 Yeah. No, no, it was, ‘We’ll do it one more time and then we get eight times.’
191 LM1 No, I said, ‘We do it one more time for real.’

Now both sides of the disagreement have been given a gloss, in citation quotes. For WF2 it is ‘We’ll do it one more time and then we get eight times.’ For LM1 it is ‘We do it one more time for real.’ The understandings have now been glossed as explicit statements, and are now out in the open to be contrasted, and for their coexistence to become apparent.

At this point, with a fairly articulated statement by WF2 of the ‘facts’ as she sees them, dialog between the participants still takes the form of alternative presentations of ‘the facts’. But very shortly hereafter a transition begins. LM1 is the first to talk in a manner which presumes that the two accounts of ‘the facts’ are actually discrepant or alternative ways of comprehending the same events. He does this almost in passing, as he suddenly takes for granted this new understanding of the current situation:

197 LM1 No, that’s not what I understood.

And then, for the first time, he appears to allow the validity of the women’s position:

198 LF2 So we don’t get the eight times.
199 WF2 Right.
200 LM1 No, but ... Renegotiation! If we lost our money all we have to do is play it through eight times.
201 WF2 We did, we lost our money!

Thus begins the transition to Phase Three.

Comparing the Sessions

The strong emotional restructuring of Phase One settles down into persisting moods in Phase Two. In terms of our first two regions there is little movement; Phase Two is perhaps characterized most clearly by a rigid maintenance of the status quo between the teams, as both steadfastly attempt to accomplish their own aims.
6. Phase Two: Accusation and Response

The Region of Moral Status

Phase One involved a diminution of the Winning Team's status in the eyes of the Losing Team, and vice versa. The notion of responsibility ascription was introduced to describe the ways in which the various Losing Teams perceived the relationship between the Winning Team and their act of burning. As a rule, the Winning Teams do not, in Phase Two, accept the form of responsibility which is ascribed to them.

The talk of getting points returned does not facilitate the resolution of the underlying concerns of trust and responsibility. First, it is framed in such a way that the Winning Team can return points without addressing these concerns. Although the issue is linked to the underlying moral concerns, it is couched in pragmatic terms, concerning the number of points lost during the burning. Even in group B, where LM1 actually makes an accusation (albeit vague) of moral lapse, the Winning Team make a point of returning points in a way that admits no guilt. But, second, in both group A and group B, the Losing Team appear to feel that some resolution has been reached when the points are returned, yet the Winning Team remain unappreciative even of the other team's initial feeling of violation. The third problem with the talk about points is that the attitude with which the Losing Team frame their demand for reparation frequently alienates those accused. The Winning Team in groups A and B, and LM1 in group D, are all surprised and displeased by what they see as the unreasonable, 'illogical', and overbearingly moralistic stance of the other participants.

So the main intention or desire on the part of the Winning Team during this phase is to restart the game action. At the outset of the phase they are unaware of the gravity which the Losing Team see the burning as involving. Both aspects of the Losing Team's movement – the withdrawal from cooperative play as a result of mistrust, and the rise in moral status that takes the form of an ascribed lack of responsibility on the others' part – seem to catch the Winning Team by surprise. They now view the blocking of their further acquisition of points initially as a practical problem, rather than a moral one. It would be inaccurate to say simply that they are unwilling to accept responsibility, or accept blame, for the burning: rather, they are astonished that such a view of their act can even arise.

This reaction throws fresh light on the nature of the burning itself. Obviously the Winning Team intended that the burning should result in the Losing Team losing points, but it now becomes apparent that they would not accept that such a consequence can be accurately described as 'causing harm' to the Losing Team, or as constituting a moral wrong. Nor does this

The Region of Intimacy

This second phase of conflict has a number of salient characteristics. First, it focuses around a central issue – an explicit topic of talk between the teams – which seems to have its origin in the form of emotion that appeared in Phase One. We can see the issue as a dual tendency (which remains unfulfilled) to change the degree of intimacy between the two teams. On the one hand, the Winning Team attempt to reduce or otherwise deal with the distance which the Losing Team established in Phase One. This distance presents the Winning Team with the practical problem that the game has been halted, otherwise they would probably not be aware of it.

The Losing Team, on the other hand, are unwilling to reduce the distance between the two teams. They have no grounds, after all, for feeling that trust (the concern for Phase One, in the Intimacy region) has been reestablished. The Mythology of this phase, as a consequence, centers around the issue of restitution, in varying forms and varying degrees of articulation. We will deal with this in detail below, but here it is pertinent to point out that, since 'broken trust' was one motivation for the Losing Team’s distancing, then reduction of distance – which I have argued is now the Winning Team's goal – clearly requires that the breakage be repaired.

The Losing Team's demand that they get points returned to them is an action that melds straightforwardly into the indignation and anger of the first phase. Implicit in the issue is an accusation, a complaint that wrong has been done to them, and a demand that the Winning Team need to do something – either reparation or compensation – in order to show good faith, or redeem themselves. But there is no explicit reasoning carried out to reach this conclusion: the return of points is simply seen as a fitting action in the current situation. None of the Losing Teams see it as necessary to explain to the other team why they must do this, beyond pointing out such things as 'you guys violated our trust', and 'they've got to give us all our points back'. The perceived necessity of revenge is a sine qua non of anger. Citation is hardly necessary, but Rawls [1971, p. 483] remarks that 'an angry man characteristically tries to strike back, or to block the purposes of the person at whom he is angry', and Aristotle goes so far as to define anger in terms of revenge; it is 'An impulse attended with pain to a conspicuous revenge on account of a conspicuous slight shown in some offense against oneself or one of one's friends without any natural reason for the slight.'
claim of innocence seem to be a reaction to the severity of the victims’ accusations: even in group C, where random play takes the place of explicit accusation, the Winning Team are sarcastically critical of the Losing Team’s attitude.

The manner in which the Winning Team attempt to achieve their goal of restarting the game is to assuage the Losing Team, but not to accept that they are culpable. They are willing to return the points they took during the burning, but at the same time they are not prepared to accept the Moral Status distinctions that the Losing Team present in their movements. But this means that, even when they succeed in getting the Losing Team to play again, they do not successfully reduce the distance that the Losing Team have established between the two teams. The explicit issue of this phase – the talk of points – was described earlier as a ‘pseudo-issue’ because, once it has been dealt with, distrust and conflict still remain between the teams. The explicit issue carries far more moral significance than meets the eye at first. Yet it is highly ambiguous, so it is really no surprise that little is actually resolved about it.

The Mythology of the Situation

Phase Two of the conflict is a phase where the understandings which the two teams have of the burning (as moral act), and of one another (as moral agents and critics), are incommensurate. This is the main source of explicit conflict at this point, and the force behind what will occur through the rest of each of the sessions. If both teams were to agree on the culpability of the burners – if they shared common understandings of what has occurred – then there would be, one presumes, no conflict, or it would be quickly settled with the choice of the appropriate ‘punishment’ or reparation. But in almost every case the burning team are not prepared to accept the victims’ account of what has occurred, and these disparate perspectives remain unresolved. Consequently trust is not reestablished, and the game cannot continue, nor can the teams remain friends.

Yet this is not just a simple disagreement about the ‘facts of the case’ (though we have seen that this is usually how it is framed by the teams, as a consequence of their emotional embeddedness). There are strong moral – i.e. evaluative – concerns running through the conflict of understandings, as can be seen by the heated way the dialog is conducted, and the forms of condemnation and criticism that are adopted. Issues of intent, anticipation of consequences, goodness of ‘faith’ (moral integrity) are being raised.

6. Phase Two: Accusation and Response

It should be clear, also, that this is not simply a matter that, when a group of people come together, divergence among their opinions is likely to occur before consensual agreement is finally reached. Rather, the incommensurateness of points of view is not simply the result of divergent beliefs and opinions, but instead is a certain egocentered perception of events on the part of the participants, an inability to get beyond their mood and examine its grounds.

Nor is the egocentered experience, I should emphasize, a simple inability to see or understand what the other team is saying and doing. On the contrary, it is a salient aspect of the phenomenon we’re considering that the other person or team is seen with great clarity; their acts are carefully examined and responded to. However, each act is subsumed to – is seen and grasped from – a perspective which is discrepant from that of the agent. This is a context effect; acts are noted, and noted with clarity, but the context in terms of which they are understood, and which gives the act its significance, is not the same for the agent as it is for the recipient. For example, when the Losing Team in group B ask to be given double the number of points they lost when ‘burned’, they see this as a just request: as fair reparation for the wrong that has been done them. The Winning Team, on the contrary, see it as an arrogant and ridiculous ‘demand’, which the Losing Team are in no position to make. A single act, in two different contexts – structured by the two very different moods of the two teams – is understood in radically different ways.

Nor is it necessary to say that the two teams are in ‘two different worlds’. They are certainly, in a meaningful sense, communicating adequately; neither of them is in an autistic vacuum. They can, for example, agree that LM1’s words constitute a ‘demand’, though the term has different connotations for each of them. What makes the absence of deeply shared understanding apparent at this juncture is that a breakdown of action occurs, and motivates the articulation of these discrepant understandings. What genuinely marks the moral conflict here is not the inability of the two teams to agree on what is the case, but the concerns of trust and responsibility which underly the breakdown in practice in the first place.
7. Phase Three: Articulation or Standoff – the Outcome of Conflict

In this chapter I shall examine the remainder of the session for each of the four groups. This will require covering a considerable amount of material, a move which is justified by the fact that the teams do not manage to accomplish a great deal in the way of resolving their conflicts. It will become apparent that, sadly, for most groups the conflict does not progress very far beyond the point we have traced it to thus far. This is, in itself, a substantive finding: concerns of trust and responsibility appear to be irresolvable for these young adults, at least in the limited duration of the sessions.

In this chapter, then, I consider the outcome of the conflict for each of the four groups. We shall see that in no case are the underlying concerns completely resolved, for in no group do the two teams return to a mutual orientation which is equivalent to the one they started with. In all cases a distance remains, in regions of both Intimacy and Moral Status, despite the fact that the ostensible ‘issue’ is resolved, as is the ‘practical problem’; points are exchanged, and the action of the game is started again.

If this is the case, what evidence do I have for arguing that the conflict remains in some way unresolved? This will become clear with illustration, but the points are in summary the following. First, in several of the sessions the Winning Team burn again. That they do this, and the manner in which they do it, makes it clear that they have failed to grasp what this act means to the Losing Team. Second, the Losing Team respond to this repeated burning in a manner almost identical to the way they reacted the first time it happened; they in turn have failed to appreciate what the burning means to the Winning Team. Third, at the end of each of the sessions the teams still hold one another at a considerable distance. But, fourth, overt criticism has hardly ever been formulated. For group A, for example, it is only at the very end of the session that overt accusation of the Winning Team finally begins. Fifth, conversation between the students after the game has ended strongly suggests that distrust continues, and that both teams are dissatisfied with the position they found themselves in.

To anticipate, I shall draw the following conclusions: first, that there is something inherently problematic about the type of conflict faced here. Second, that the problem involves specifically the difficulty that these young adults have in resolving, at the same time, the two concerns of trust and responsibility that arise as a consequence of the burning.

Group C

This group will not be considered in any further detail. They continue to interact in the manner described in the previous chapter. They continue playing cards randomly, and become increasingly bored with the game. The teams in this group do not reach the form of interchange which characterizes Phase Three of the conflict.

Group A

As described in the previous chapter, negotiation between the two teams finally begins again following the burning and the resulting disaffection between the teams. A new agreement is made, that the Winning Team will play two, zero twice so the Losing Team can regain some of the points they lost (as LM1 puts it; 'get the twelve points back we've been shafted'), with cooperative play subsequently. This agreement is followed for the next eight choices, and then the Winning Team again burn, quite deliberately:

540   SL Ready? Choose.
542   SL Zero, four. /Laughter from the Winning Team; they think it's very funny./
543   LM1 I don't believe it. /LM2 turns over his card. The rest of the Losing Team show no overt reaction./
544   SL Minus four and eight.
545   WF1 We were getting bored.

The Losing Team respond in almost exactly the same way as they did the first time they were burned. The Winning Team 'justify' their act in a way that must seem offensive to the Losing Team, and perhaps is even intended to be. The 'excuse' that WF1 gives implies that mere boredom motivated the burning, and that there was no concern for the Losing Team's feelings. WM1's next remark is even more derisory. Clearly he is able to state the other team's perception of the act, but at the same time he shows absolutely no appreciation of its validity:
the Winning Team reaffirming their status in their own and the other team’s eyes? This seems most likely; the Winning Team give no indication that they feel the burning is wrong. They clearly are aware that the Losing Team see it as ‘breaking trust’ (recall #550), but they take this way of talking as part of the Losing Team’s unreasonable moral stance.

There is discussion within each team for several minutes, and then play begins again with the Losing Team continuing to play competitively. WM1 calls out to them:

632 WM1 This is worthless, you know.
633 LM2 Shut up.
634 SL Zero, zero. /Zero points to each team. WM1 bangs the table, looking bored now./ Ready? Choose. Four, four. Zero, zero. Losing Team has 68 cents, Winning Team has a dollar.
637 LM1 Wah, wah, wah, wah. /Laughs./

LM1 mocks the Winning Team for winning no points. Then, like the Winning Team in group B, WM1 points out to the Losing Team that they suffered no material loss of points as a consequence of being burned:

638 WM1 You guys made it back, on the time that we went zero and you went four. /Angry./
639 LF1 No way, you guys.
640 LM2 Shut up.
641 WM1 ‘No way!’ ‘Shut up!’ /Angry mocking imitation of the Losing Team’s response./
643 SL Do you want to negotiate? Do you want to negotiate with each other?
644 LF2 Well, you burned us twice. On principle we don’t want to negotiate with you.

Another round begins, the Losing Team still stubbornly defiant and obstructionist in their competitive play. WM1 again calls out to them:

674 WM1 This is dumb! Can you hear me? /Frustrated./
675 LM1 Yep! /‘I don’t care.’/

The round continues. WM1 again tries to give a well-intentioned account of the burning, which LF2 immediately calls into doubt:

688 WM1 We just did it for a little fun. And we give them their money back, and (/).
690 LF2 Twice, WM1?
691 SL Zero, zero /points./ Losing Team has 68 cents, Winning Team has a dollar.
694 WM1 It was funny, the second time. /Laughs./
695 SL Okay. Do you want to talk among yourselves, or negotiate?
7. Phase Three: Articulation or Standoff – the Outcome of Conflict

Each negotiator articulates his understanding a little further in this exchange, yet each has a total lack of appreciation of the other's position. WM2’s talk at #726 and #731 shows a complete absence of any guilt about the burning; his account of why the Winning Team now wish to act differently is a purely pragmatic one: they will gain more points. LM1 is astonished at this (#732).

LM1 asks WM2 to say how many points his team lost, ‘on that one where you took eight points’. Then he proposes a new agreement, which will return some points to his team:

752 LM1 You take zero, zero for five times, and we’re gonna do two ones and four zeroes. Okay, is that our negotiation?
756 WM2 Yeah, that’s okay.
757 W? WM2!
758 LM1 Okay, okay.
759 LF1 Shake on it! /She points at WM2, and speaks intently./

The two negotiators begin to return to their seats. They pause, however, as WM1 begins to speak. He is furious at the new agreement:

760 WM1 Don’t you understand, they didn’t lose any. We lost it. Look what we lost, too. /To WM2, very angrily./ We lost too.
762 LM1 There was no agreement. That was no-man’s land. That was free for all. /WM1 makes a dismissive wave of his hand./

Despite WM1’s objections (and note the certitude of both his and LM1’s words), cooperative play begins again and continues without a hitch for six more rounds. Now that both teams are fulfilling their obligation not to burn, a sense begins to develop that the game is effectively over, and consequently that what they are doing is boring.

821 LF1 Well this way, this way at least, everyone’s getting their points.
822 LM2 It’s boring, though. /Waves his hand lethargically./

At one point LM1 suggests changing the arrangement in order to reintroduce an element of ‘fun’, by varying the number of cards played on each choice, but he drops this suggestion when he sees that it will result in fewer points for both teams.

Finally both teams agree to play only one more round. On the fourth choice of this round the Winning Team burn for a third and final time. The Losing Team are disgusted by this. Their response is in strong contrast to that of the Losing Team in group X, where the only cheating in the entire session was at the very end of the game (see chapter 4). Both teams found it
innocent and 'fun'. Here, however, it's the final straw for the Losing Team, and leaves the two teams further apart than before:

986 SL Ready? Choose. Choose. Zero, Four. /Winning Team laugh./
987 SL Minus four, eight.
988 SL Ready? Choose. /The Losing Team turn all their cards over./ Four, four.
989 LF2 Nice way to go out, fellows. /Tone of sarcastic accusation./
990 WM2 Yeah!
991 WM1 We heard you doing ...
992 WF1 We heard, 'on the second to the last one, let's have all ones', so don't say that.
993 SL Ready? Choose.
994 LF2 I didn't say that. I said you were going to. /Angry./
995 WM2 We weren't going to.
996 SL Just a minute, just ... Choose.
997 LM1 Okay, one more, we gotta choose.
998 SL Four, three.
999 LM1 Well thanks a lot, guys.
1000 W? Cut it out.
1002 SL Two and minus one.
1003 LM1 I don't believe it.
1004 LM1 You knew they were going to do it, just to ( ).
1005 L? They're cheats, yes they're cheats.

This last comment by L? is the first explicit public reference which has been made by members of the Losing Team to the moral character of the Winning Team.

1006 LM1 It's cool.
1007 ? ( ) as bad as the other time.
1008 SL Losing Team has 216, Winning Team has 251.
1009 LM1 You see, you got one less if we'd stuck to the original plan, so there.
1010 WM2 I bet you got a lot less! /Laughter from the other members of the Winning Team./
1011 WM1 But we got the satisfaction of (seeing) you guys ...
1013 WM2 That's pretty stupid logic.
1014 SL Ready to quit?
1015 LF2 Yeah.
1016 ? Yeah.
1017 LM1 I don't believe it.
1018 LF1 It's really, it's really cheap of you guys.
1019 WM1 So what, it's only a game.
1020 LF1 It really was ... I'm, I'm ashamed (of you).
1021 W? It's only a game.
1024 LM2 We had all the moral people on one side.
1026 WM1 And all the fun people on the other.

7. Phase Three: Articulation or Standoff – the Outcome of Conflict

So it is only at the very end of the game that the Losing Team begin to make any explicit moral accusations of the other team. Until then, their complaints have focused, instead, merely on the fact that they have lost points.

I have argued throughout that there was an implicit moral disapprobation at work in the issue which the teams argue over (and the Losing Team's talk at the end confirms this interpretation, I believe), but the Winning Team never quite grasp the wrong they are felt to have done. They see the Losing Team as being illogical, and as demanding the return of points that they don't deserve. At first they return points in order to restart the game; later they begin to feel wronged themselves by this demand for points. The Winning Team's inability to recognize the Losing Team's pain seems genuine rather than strategic; their status as 'winners' has structured for them a very different understanding of what the session entailed (having 'fun'), and the Winning Team's unwillingness to confront them with an overt accusation only compounds the misunderstanding.

Group A represents, then, a case of 'standoff'. Neither team articulate their grasp of the situation very far, and as a consequence there is no acknowledgement by the Winning Team that their friends have grounds to view them as having acted immorally (indeed, by the end of the game, as being immoral). The cross-purposes here lead instead to the repetition of the burning, rather than to any resolution of the conflict.

Group D

In contrast with the group we've just considered, group D participants articulate their disparate understandings much further. Much of this articulation I traced in the last chapter where we followed the interchange to the point where, first, WF2 asked LM1 what he meant by his desire to play 'one more time', so demonstrating that she recognized that she had hitherto not understood him and where, second, each of the two 'sides' in the dispute gave a short, pithy gloss of their understanding of what was meant by the agreement. For WF2 and LF1 it was 'We'll do it one more time and then get the eight times', while for LM1 and WM1, it was 'We do it one more time for real'.

The next distinguishable phase of resolution begins here. Two things change at the same time; LM1 begins to grant the validity of WF2's account as an alternative interpretation of what has transpired in the session and,
concurrently, WF2 makes a first suggestion about what it is appropriate to do next:

197  LM1  No, that’s not what I understood.
198  LF2  So we don’t get the eight times.
199  LM1  No, but... Renegotiation! If we lost our money all we have to do is play it through eight times.
200  WF2  We did, we lost the money. So now we got to do zero, zero... a whole bunch of times to prove that (we did).

WM1 steps in with a forceful presentation of LM1’s position:

201  WM1  That was the whole fault; we were going, we were going to take the eight times, then we were going to start playing for real and see who lost.

It is interesting that WM1 puts this in the conditional tense (‘we were...’) where before he has said ‘we have it’ (#128, 153): another move away from the certitude which hitherto characterized the talk. LM1 agrees with what WM1 has said, and then gives a similar account himself, also in conditional form:

202  LM1  Yeah!
203  LM1  We were (just gonna) play for real, for fun.

The women no longer contradict what he says; they instead acknowledge that there has been a misunderstanding:

206  LF2  No, that... Okay, well, that’s not what I understood from it, but that’s okay.
207  WF2  I mean, same here.
208  LF1  Okay, so what do we do, then?
209  WM1  We talk more between our groups and get better communication, for one thing.

But suddenly this fragilely constructed consensus falls apart! LM1 calls out:

211  LM1  No way! Wait, we already did it!

And WM1 also moves back to a ‘factual’ account of what’s occurred:

213  WM1  Well we, I think we have the eight times already.

WF2 turns to the staff leader to arbitrate, appealing to an authority figure to determine whose account is ‘correct’:

214  WF2  Do we have our money or not? /To SL. /

The staff leader throws the decision back to the teams, saying that it is up to ‘you guys’ to decide what is the case, and to decide ‘what you feel is fair’. The women now suggest that something must be done to demonstrate their

7. Phase Three: Articulation or Standoff – the Outcome of Conflict

good faith. As before, this suggestion is built up slowly, through a progressive articulation:

224  WF2  I don’t think... I don’t know... do you...
225  WM1  I think (we should)
226  LF2  I think we should play out, we should play it for it, not just...
227  WM1  Okay, we will, yes.
228  LF2  Let’s play for it.
229  WF2  We should play for it enough times to prove that that’s what we’re gonna do.
230  WM1  ?
231  LF2  Okay, let’s, let’s play for eight times and then let’s play (for it).
232  WF2  And then if you wanna keep playing a game we can do that and then at the end add on the eight times.

This course of action, agreed upon by the women, is the one that the group as a whole finally adopts, with a minor modification made on non-moral grounds. LM1, however, makes several further interjections, trying to convince the group to act otherwise:

234  WM1  Okay, let’s do it eight times.
236  LM1  No!
244  LM1  Why do we have to do it eight times? It’s a waste of their time and our time.

He is sticking to his original account of what has happened:

248  LM1  No, what I understood that, that a contract was established...
249  LF2  That’s what I thought.
250  WF2  Yeah, but (the contract)...
251  WM1  (The point of having that contract (established)).
252  /Many talk at once./
253  WF1  The contract was established when (you). /Laughs./
254  LM1  Because it was done! /Defensively./
255  WF1  Oh, I see. /Without irony./
256  WM1  I know.
257  LM1  (Suppose if) we do it like, the contract was established, we had our money; the money’s in our pocket; then we say, let’s play a little bit for fun, just (‘cos) we had an opportunity to play the game.

But WF2 disagrees with this:

260  WF2  But, but LM1, if...
261  LM1  So that’s how I understood it.
262  WM1  Yeah, that’s how I understood it.
263  WF2  If I misunderstood you and I’m playing with you, I think that, that ().
264  LM1  Well, ().
265  WF1  Well did you misunderstand?
266  LF1  Well, I didn’t understand.
267  WM1  /In a dismissive tone./ Let’s just do it eight times right now and ().
Unfortunately the end of WF2's remark at #263 and LM1's reply to it are inaudible. Yet it is clear that WF2 has recognized that there were disparate views of the agreement, and that she feels that this renders LM1's suggestion unreasonable. The discussion now moves quickly to the issue of how many times they should play.

We have now traced the articulation of the two sides of the conflict to the point where there is a resolution, and a suggestion of what forthcoming action should be. The two factions get to a point where they for the first time recognize that theirs is not the only way of comprehending what has occurred, and so they begin to appreciate that the others have acted in good faith, though with a different grasp of what was the 'right' course of action to adopt. This new appreciation is apparent for WF2 when she asks LM1 what he meant (#174), and for WF1 when she grasps why he acted as he did (#225).

Now that the two ways of comprehending the situation have been mutually recognized, the game can move forward again. Once WF2 sees LM1 capitulate, she can suggest what further action is appropriate. One of the perspectives has become dominant, accepted by the majority of the group, and the basis for future action. For WF2 does not accept that LM1's understanding is a valid one for the group as a whole; only that it was how he understood the situation when he acted in the way she felt was immoral. LM1 is no longer seen as having acted badly, but he still lacks the status to make his account stick; he is regarded as incompetent, and not to be trusted.

Group B

Phase Three is long and drawn out for group B, but the patience of close examination is well rewarded: it has a rich and complex organization. Recall that when LM2 demanded that points be returned to his team after the burning, the Winning Team did as he requested, while not saying explicitly that they would. There was then disagreement concerning whether an agreement had been made or not. The argument arose because – immediately after playing zero, four times, as LM2 had demanded – the Winning Team behaved in a way which the Losing Team took to be another burning.

At the start of the next round, the Winning Team now play a single blue card. LM2 holds up a finger, commanding his teammates to wait. The next three choices are zero, zero, then the Winning Team play one blue card again. Now all four of the Losing Team turn their cards over, preparing to play competitively on the next round. There is a clear parallel here with the way the Losing Team responded to the first burning; they waited for a repetition of it before they responded. And as with the first burning, they are prepared to play on competitively, and so do not move to stop the game.

For the next two rounds the Losing Team play four blues; the Winning Team play three occasionally, as though trying to establish cooperation again. Then a third negotiation begins after both teams postpone, in a little power struggle. As might be expected, the Winning Team begin by suggesting cooperation, and say that they'll let the Losing Team catch up. LM2, however, accuses them again of breaking trust:

613 WM2 We're willing to stay at zero, we're willing to stay at zero for you, okay? /Loudly./
614 LM2 For how long?
615 WM2 For as long as you want. We'll let you catch up to us. Once you pass us, we're going back down to four. You get into the threes and fours, we're going back down to four. You have to stay within zero, one, or two. If you go on two too long, we're going back down to four. So try to stay in zero. One, we'll let you hit some two's also.
616 LM2 What, wha, wha ... alright then we'll ...
617 WM2 /Interrupting./ But if you get out of zero, one, two, we're going back down to (.).
618 LM2 That way ...
619 WM2 We, we don't want to lose any money.
620 LM2 Listen to our deal.
621 WM2 Okay.
622 LM2 Our deal is, you violated our trust four times. /The Winning Team all laugh./
623 WM2 Four!
624 LM2 Yeah. And we have not ... every time we made a deal, last time we made a deal, you go four times, you guys said you wouldn't, but you did surprise us, so you did it. We held through on our bargain. We have never violated trust, and we've never broken any bargain we made.
625 WM2 We did not violate trust on that one, because we never said we would go four.
626 LM2 No, I know. And then, once you went four you filled the agreement, and went the four (.).
627 WM2 No, we never made an agreement, so we didn't fill it ...
628 LM2 Well, I mean ... 629 WM2 There was no agreement to fill.

The Winning Team are surprised, and derisive of the accusation made by LM2 at #622. WM1's offer to let the Losing Team catch up in their points
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appears to be an attempt to reduce the distance between the two teams, in terms both of points and feelings. For the Losing Team to gain points would ameliorate their position of lowered status in the game. We might anticipate that the Losing Team would find this suggestion objectionable, since they believe themselves to be already elevated in moral status. Indeed, LM2 rejects the offer, and instead establishes still greater distance between the teams, by accusing the Winning Team of breaking the trust again. The Winning Team find this almost preposterous; it just doesn't jibe with their understanding of events. LM2's point is that, since the Winning Team played in the manner which the Losing Team had demanded, they 'filled the agreement'. When they subsequently played blue, they consequently violated trust again.

As WM1 and LM2 talk, they articulate their disparate understandings of events, but they fail to go beyond the form of presentation which I have described as characteristic of Phase Two. That is, they progress no further in the resolution of their points of view than they did in the first confrontation. Each states his position as the 'facts of the matter'. At one point, LM2 appears to begin to accept the validity of the other team's perspective:

634 LM2 Alright, then. Our anticipation was... All right.

But he then again proposes an arrangement whose basis is the understanding of what occurred that he had appeared about to drop:

635 LM2 Nevertheless, what we're willing to do is, you give us, you go zero, five full times, and let us choose which one we want to go.

He then presents the grounding for his proposal, in explanation:

638 LM2 See, you guys have to earn our trust back. /Laughter from Winning Team./ I mean, it's honestly gone.

LM2's refusal to accept the Winning Team's offer of points is illuminating of his concerns at this juncture. WM2 is offering to play zero while the Losing Team catch up, as long as they do not play three or four. The Winning Team are not, however, prepared to do this in the manner, or under the description, that LM2 desires and deems fitting. A glance at the payoff matrix will show that such an arrangement ensures that the Winning Team do not get a negative score, while the Losing Team can obtain between four and six points on each choice. LM2 is apparently determined to get retribution: not to have his team constrained in the choices they make, and to have

the Winning Team lose points. His stance here is clearly uncompromising, and gives an indication of the degree of frustration and powerlessness he must feel. His stance is similar to that of LM1 in group A, for whom the issue is not to regain points, but to remake trust. The negotiation ends with a mutual standoff, and the conflict continues unabated:

652 WM2 Well, we, we'll just stay at four, four. It's either our deal or none. We're staying at four, four.

653 LM2 Well, it's either our deal or none.

It is necessary to examine the next few rounds in great detail. The Winning Team now play zero while the Losing Team play four. This is done for three choices, and the Winning Team then switch to one blue. LM1 throws up his hands at this; the Winning Team had been doing what he had demanded of them. At the end of the round the Winning Team begin to talk among themselves, discussing whether or not they do indeed want to let the Losing Team catch up with them. Any good will they had is diminishing rapidly. A competitive round follows, and the Losing Team refuse to negotiate. The subsequent round is significantly different; on the first choice, the Losing Team play no blue cards while the Winning Team play four; the Losing Team lose points. The Winning Team play cooperatively thereafter, only to find that on the fourth and fifth choices the Losing Team play competitively. LM2 is the first to turn his card, and his teammates follow suit. The Winning Team begin to discuss what is going on, and as they talk they become angry about the issue of 'trust' that the Losing Team have raised. WM1, talking with his team, essentially accuses the Losing Team of hypocrisy. He reflects that the Losing Team have just played competitively after a string of cooperative choices; a situation which, in the Losing Team's own terms, should have constituted 'unwritten trust':

771 WM1 You know that argument on trust they're talking about? About this unwritten trust that they broke... Like starting and going zero, zero twice, and then they created a trust, and we were going to go zero, zero the rest of the time.

773 W? I know.

774 WM1 Then they went zero, four. That broke the unwritten trust.

775 WF1 () okay to retaliate now.

776 WF1 Now we're even. Now we're even. Now, as far as trust goes, we're pretty much even.

As far as WF1 is concerned, the slate is now clean; 'we're pretty much even'. Throughout the session the Winning Team have introduced apparently superficial issues of balance of points, while at the same time skirting
underlying concerns of moral balance. They have returned points that they won during burning, but without addressing the Losing Team’s moral indignation. WM2 was the first to ‘quantify’ occasions of broken trust (back at #434; see chapter 6), in a manner which roused the Losing Team to heights of ire at the time. LM1 later refers sardonically to this way of talking as ‘the trust game’. LM2 adopts the same talk (e.g. #622), but his original point that ‘you only have to violate trust once’ has some validity to it. Now the Losing Team begin to talk in terms of the equating of occasions of trust breaking – a questionable moral line, but one which allows them to avoid considering their own culpability.

On the next round a similar set of events occurs. This time both teams begin cooperatively, but the Losing Team play four on the third round. The Winning Team immediately turn over their cards and play four on the fourth round, but the Losing Team now play zero again. On the final round the choices are zero, two. It seems as though each of the teams is unsure about trusting the other, and uncertain whether a play of four blue cards indicates a desire to burn, or a self-protective blocking. Finally another negotiation is called, with two new negotiators, LF1 and WF1.

WF1 offers again to let the Losing Team catch up, with an arrangement where, by playing zero, two, the Losing Team gain six points each choice, while the Winning Team lose none. WF1 makes this offer, however, in a patronizing manner:

865 WF1 Okay, well, um, as you notice, the score is 215 to us and 133 (to) you now, and, uh, we want to stay friends with you, so that what we’re /laughter from WF1, WF2 & LF1/ gonna do ... We’re gonna, okay we gonna stay at zero, provided that your only move would be to stay at two. Cuz, we don’t want to lose by this, but we, we’ll, we’re willing to let you catch up.

LF1 responds by denying that her team is concerned with their status as losers:

866 LF1 No, we don’t want to catch up. We can, we can both have, um, we can stay at, um, zero, zero, and that way we’d be both earning four, and we could split it.

An agreement is made to cooperate and ‘split’ what they earn. ‘And then we’ll take all that extra money and go to MacDonald’s for dinner’, adds WM2.

873 LM1 We’ll go zero, if you go zero. The one time, the one time, there’s any mess, any time there’s a one, a two, anything, we’ll mess you up.

WF2 notes, ‘that’s what we wanted to do about two discussions ago’ (#888), and LM1 replies:

889 LM1 We wanted to give you a little taste of what trust is. (WF2 pulls the curtain which is between the two teams. Laughter.)

WM2 responds to this immediately, with sudden anger:

890 WM2 Wait a minute, nah, open it up, open it up. /The curtain./
893 WM2 Now, we’re talking about trust. Okay, you know that unwritten trust that you guys said we violated? /Curtains are closed by LF1, opened by LM1./
894 LM1 You guys, you guys proved to us that there was no trust involved.
895 LM2 That there was no trust.
896 WF1 Right, but then...
897 WM2 I have nothing else to say. You can close it /the curtain/. /Said in a formal tone./ /Curtain is closed./

Once more, open confrontation about the underlying moral concerns is skirted. Play continues, with mutual cooperation, for three further rounds. Then on the last choice of the third round the Losing Team play four, under LM2’s direction. The hostility between the teams becomes apparent immediately:

976 LF2 Okay, we’d like to talk for a second.
977 WM1 We don’t want to talk. /Called out loudly./
978 LM2 Not with you! /Sarcastic tone. LF1 and LF2 laugh./
979 WM2 We don’t want to talk anyway. /He laughs./
980 LM2 (Don’t be so flattered).
981 LM1 Boy, what an ego.
982 LM2 /To staff leader/ We’d just as soon not really play anymore.

The Losing Team’s lack of desire to play any longer seems to stem from a feeling that the ‘issues’ of the game have now been resolved, insofar as cooperative play has been reestablished. In other groups’ sessions, the feeling that the game is over was a clear indication that teams felt that an obligation to continue to play cooperatively was now taken to be binding by both teams; LM2’s remarks at #1010 indicate that the Losing Team feel this way. At #1163–1169 (below) the participants reflect upon what they were doing at this point in the session, and what they say supports this interpretation. It appears that the Losing Team took a last opportunity to strike back, with a final competitive play, and then moved to withdraw from the game. The Winning Team are disagreeably surprised at this move, and will not agree to it:

1010 LM2 I think we’ve proved our point.
1012 WF1 Proved what?
The Structure of Moral Action

1013 WF2 What? You guys violated our trust!
1015 WM2 No, wait, do we want to talk between each other? Like, we'd like to keep on playing you know, if you guys want. Even if you guys don't want, we want to. /Laughter. /
1016 LM1 You guys play yourself and maybe lose. /Laughter. /

The session continues for one further round with the Losing Team playing four and the Winning Team zero, thus losing points. At the end of this round the score is 247, 237, the Losing Team now only ten points behind.

The fifth and final discussion now begins between the teams. It is here that the game action is suspended completely and hostility between the teams becomes overt. Both teams now feel aggrieved; they each feel they've been hurt by the other team, whom they no longer trust. The discussion is heated and complex, with four distinct issues being raised to the level of explicit discourse: trust; the Winning Team's motivation; the Losing Team's hypocrisy; and the teams' status at the start of the game. The issues are, first, whether 'trust' can be 'won back'. Second, whether the game is to make money, or to 'play': to compete for the fun of it. Third, the breaking of 'unspoken trust'. And fourth, the attitude that the Winning Team showed in the early stages of the game, as they pulled ahead in points. The appearance of these issues is very significant. They mark the articulation in explicit discourse of concerns which we have noted earlier in the session. The concerns were apparent in the movements of interaction between the teams; their presence in talk now is a consequence of the participants' reflection upon their conduct, now that involvement in the game is suspended, and aspects of their behavior have begun to be uncovered. The resolution of the teams' conflict has moved through the articulation of accounts of what people have done to, now, the uncovering of the concerns, grounds, and attitudes which formed the context of those actions.

The first issue, then, is that of 'trust', and whether it can be 'won back' once it is 'lost' (notice how competitive metaphors intrude):

1088 LM2 We would just like to say that, uh, the last, whatever, two, three rounds ago, whatever it was, um ...
1089 WM2 Wait, wait, you mean, you mean, when we set up our, our trust?
1090 LM2 Yeah, that that trust that ... that we ...
1091 WM2 The sacred trust. /Laughter. /
1092 LM2 If you want to, yeah. /Laughs. /
1093 WM2 Yeah, the sacred trust, okay?
1094 LM2 Yeah, sacred, from somebody's viewpoint anyway.
1095 WM2 Go ahead.
1096 WF2 ( ) committed a sacrilege.

It is interesting that the disagreement over whether trust can be re-established once it's broken is addressed not as a theoretical issue, but as an empirical question. LM2's question at #1113 concerns fact, not principle. At #1116 he strengthens the 'criteria' of the test: can they honestly say; someone's total trust; and then they are lucky that this happened (#1120). WM1 sees it differently; it is not 'luck' when trust is restored; rather it requires an act of forgiveness, motivated by the need to keep friends. Here we have a reference to the first major concern at work in the conflict – the need to strike a balance between the pain and loss of trust consequent upon the burning, and the expectations and obligations of continued friendship.

1116 LM2 You can honestly say you lost someone's (total) trust and got it back?
1117 LF1 Yes.
1118 LF2 Yes.
1119 LF2 Yes, I can honestly say that.
1120 WM2 Say, you're real lucky.
1123 WM1 LM2, if you don't forgive people, then you're never gonna, you know, keep your friends.
1124 LM1 We (don't want to be good) friends.
1125 WM1 Okay! Okay, fine.
1129 WM1 See if I play basketball with you.
The Structure of Moral Action

If it was my basketball, I (assume you would).

Are you sure we can trust you, because the trend has been for you guys to break the trust immediately?

We’re not so sure you can trust us, but we’re gonna (stay all white).

That’s to say, we’re sure you can trust us, okay.

We’re not so sure.

We’ve been trustful.

Yeah, we’ve been...

The second issue which the participants raise is that of the motivation behind the game. Was it to make money, or ‘to play’; to participate in a cooperative arrangement?

The last round of, um, us getting eight and you getting negative four, was, was the statement that we really didn’t want to play anymore. You guys kept saying that you wanted to play. Was it that you really wanted to play, or was it just you wanted to make money? And we (thought) that you really wanted to play? Because we’re willing to...

I saw, I saw that it was more... I thought it was, I saw, I thought it was more of a thing that we were willing to keep the trust and you weren’t.

No, it was a matter of... No, we wanted to know if you guys were really serious about playing.

Each team is now confronted with an explicit account of the other’s position. WM2 turns the Losing Team’s words around against them, as an indication of bad faith, as he raises a third issue; that the Losing Team broke an ‘unspoken trust’:

Wait. What does it matter; whether we were really serious about playing or whether we just wanted to make money?

Because, we didn’t want to play anymore, and you guys...

Yeah, basically we were.

You mean, after you guys broke the trust, you just didn’t want to play anymore?

Uh hum.

We, we just said, ‘Yeah, we’re sort of tired of it.’

You said, ‘Let’s break the trust, we won’t play anymore.’

No, basically we said...

No, ‘We, we, we... (don’t want to) play anymore, why don’t we just break the trust?’

Right.

WM2 paraphrases again:

‘...We’re not, we’re not going to make any more money anyway, why don’t we just, why don’t we just screw up the whole trust, and why don’t we just go back on our word.’ Is that what the?

There was no word given there.

There was.

Yes there was.

We’ll stay at zero, you guys stay at zero. That was the word.

It was unlike, it was unlike the unspoken trust before that we broke...

No, it was the same.

No, the same, you said...

...the quote, unquote, unspoken, this was a spoken trust, it was a word. /Angry./

No, no.

You said, yes you did.

Both cases we said, okay, the first time we said, ‘You give us four whatevers, then we’ll, we’ll have this trust.’ And you said ‘no’, and then you went ahead and did it. This time was the exact... it was...

Unspoken trust, unspoken trust.

...the exact same thing. We said, ‘We’ll keep it if you keep it.’ No one said yes, no one agreed, we just stated that fact, you stated your fact, okay, you said...

And then we (guys) went on to do it. /Very heated interaction./

WM2 is again accusing the Losing Team of being hypocritical; of doing just what they are criticizing the Winning Team for having done: breaking an ‘unspoken trust’. The question here is whether a certain joint action was agreed upon by both teams.

The first time, the first time we opened the curtains for a group, a group discussion, you said you were going to stay on white, we said we were going to stay on white. We did for the first round, then you guys went to four, and we stayed on white. /Silence./

Violation of trust.

/Laughs/ All right. That’s one.

Perhaps with a dawning recognition of the various perspectives involved, the question of what is to be done next is now raised by some members of both teams:

I think that you guys... Can I say something?

Yeah.

Go ahead.

What’s this going to get us?

I know. Exactly. I’m just wondering what is this arguing getting us?

Okay, now, we’re nitpicking now, and it’s not going to get us anywhere; we’re almost even now.

Yeah, okay.

(whether all) this trust is broken or not.

But what is that going to get us? I mean, determining that?

Others go on as they were:
The Structure of Moral Action

1283 LM1 If we're gonna play the trust game...
1284 WM2 Well, that's what this whole thing is about, isn't it? (It's not) about making money, do you think they have us in here to see how much money we can make?
1288 LF1 So, how is fighting over what happened in the past going to ...?
1290 LM1 Okay, let's play the trust game. How many times did you guys ... did we set up ...  
1291 WM2 You said we weren't going to count. 
1292 LM1 /Furious/ We're playing the trust game, okay? So that's what I'm saying, we're counting now. 
1293 WM2 Okay, we're counting now.

By the phrase 'the trust game', LM1 refers to the talk which has been going on concerning the number of times trust has been 'broken', and by whom. Such talk reduces trust to the level of a game, equating trust and points, and reducing it to a quantity. LM1's anger at #1292 indicates that in doing this he is adopting an approach - that of the other team - which he finds disagreeable. He agrees to count and compare the occasions of broken trust; he seems to expect that this calculation will show his team to be moral victors.

1315 WM2 You broke it once, you broke it a second time, you broke it a third time ...  
1316 LM1 No. 
1317 WM2 ...you broke it the fourth time ...  

LM1 continues to acknowledge the existence of the other team's perspective, but he does not share it:

1318 LM1 I mean, I'm sorry, I don't see that. I don't see that. I see you, you don't break it once and then every time you break it there, every time in that streak thereafter, is quote, I don't know what we're talking about, trust. /Faltering/

Finally the fourth issue is raised. It centers around one of the original sources of conflict; the Winning Team's attitude towards their winning in the earliest portions of the session:

1324 LM2 Can I say something? 
1325 ? What? 
1335 LM2 Okay, can I ask you a question?  
1337 LM2 Can I ask a question? /He raises his hand./ 
1338 WM2 Sure, go ahead. 
1339 WM1? Go ahead. 
1340 WM2 Have we got, and you can go check the record, from the very beginning we tried, uh, a zero, zero from the very beginning, and if we both started as zero, zero from the very beginning, we'd both have the same amount of money, and we could have made a whole lot of money, and ( ).

7. Phase Three: Articulation or Standoff - the Outcome of Conflict

1342 WM2 You guys, wait, you guys started at zero, zero.
1343 LM2 From the very beginning.
1344 ? Yes, from the very beginning.
1350 LM2 And, once we ... And you guys said you weren't out to make money I mean it was this trust thing, but from the very beginning, every time you guys made money and we lost, you guys were real pleased about it.

LM2 continues to talk about the points the teams would have had if they had cooperated from the beginning of the game. But this issue is not dealt with any further. Instead a form of renewed game action is proposed: cooperative play will continue:

1379 LM1? You broke the trust five times, we broke it six. Look, we'll all agree to that, okay?  
1380 ? Okay.  
1382 LM1 Are we gonna go zero, zero from now on, or are we gonna sit back and pitnick some more?  
1385 WF1 We've (been going) zero, zero (for a while).  
1386 LF1 Okay, okay, so we're going zero, zero.

However, residual resentment still lingers. Each team claims a superiority: the Winning Team point out that they were already cooperating; the Losing Team imply that the Winning Team are unreliable:

1394 LF1 Okay, okay, that's established. We're going zero, zero from now on. /She turns away, back to the table./ 
1395 WM2 Wait, I think we've been going zero, zero for four rounds ( ). /Sarcastic./ 
1396 LF1 Let's continue to play the game. At least, okay, for four rounds, for six rounds.

As the game starts up again, LM2 makes what is both a sardonic comment on the game - that cooperative play has finally occurred - and a release of tension. This is the first real overt expression of emotion he has made since the start of the session:

1416 LM2 All right! Whoa! /He cheers, claps, bangs his knees, and leans forward in his chair. Others laugh./

Now that cooperative play is reestablished, and both teams are apparently satisfied that the other is feeling obliged to follow this course of action, the sense develops again (this time for the Winning Team) that resolution has been reached, and so the game is in effect over:

1439 W? Now the game's over. 
1440 SL Ready to go? 
1441 L? We're ready.
The Structure of Moral Action

1442 WM1 No, the game’s over...
1443 SL Choose.
1444 WM2 It is over. We’re just gonna sit here for.
1445 SL Zero, zero. Four and four. Choose.
1448 WM1 Let’s end it after this round, okay?
1454 WM2 Let’s go for four times, then we make a dollar.

At the end of the round the score is 287 for the Winning Team, 277 for the Losing Team; they are very close. Now each of the issues, save the third, is raised again. The first to be returned to is issue one:

1472 WM1 Can I make a comment? I think the game’s over now. Cuz we’ve learned that, to trust each other.
1473 LF2 I want to make a dollar. /Mocking tone. WF1 and LF2 laugh./
1475 WM2 Just a minute, LM2. I’d like to say something to you. I think the trust has been remade, as to your earlier comment, when a trust cannot be remade. I think we’ve remade the trust here.
1476 LM2 I think we’ve built up something else.
1478 WF1 What, what have we built up?
1479 LM2 What have we built up? Never mind.
1480 WM2 Yes, I trust you guys. Every time you guys you pick up the card and slam it down I’m positive that it’s gonna come out zero, zero. I think we’ve built up trust. Um, LM2, that’s that’s a comment to your earlier remarks.
1484 LM2 Well, I ( ) that’s fine. I mean, I ( ) I don’t think trust (can) be remade. I really don’t.
1485 WM2 I think this has been totally remade, because I trust you guys, that you’re going to keep it at zero, zero the rest of the time. And I think the game’s over because of that, I mean, I know we’re going to, and I’m positive they’re going to. /Last remarks addressed to SL./
1486 LF2 I agree. I agree that I, I felt that way back when we messed up that last time, that you were going to keep it that way.
1488 WM1 Oh, we learned our lesson.
1491 WM2 See, the trust was made, back then.
1492 LF2 Okay.
1494 LM1 Cos, okay, in the beginning we were, we were out to make money, right? And then after a while we started, you know, seeing what, what was happening. We were gaining all sorts ... of money.

The teams fall over each other in attempting to be the morally superior, showing that they trust the other team. Whereas before it was superior to doubt, now it is superior to trust.

Another issue remains problematic, however. Was the game about trust, or about money? The second issue is raised again:

1499 LM1 What was the whole point of the whole game to start with? I mean, what ...

This remark is made with apparent seriousness, but it astonishes and amuses WM2:

1509 LM1 I mean, if you, you just wanted money in the beginning, if you’d just wanted money in the beginning you could have just gone zero, zero.
1511 WM2 That was good, LM2. /Laughs./
1512 LM1 Yeah, like do we have a trust, or did we just work out a, a partnership ... ( ) lots of money.
1515 ? Yeah, really!
1517 LM2 You see, that’s why I’m curious, whether ... is it a trust, or a partnership?
1518 WF2? No, it’s a trust, I (don’t) want (to have) snatched every round.

LM2 now puts into words his understanding of the distribution of power at the start of the game. The resentment and anger that are part of this become apparent. The fourth issue is returned to again: what he articulates is the status difference which the Losing Team originally felt themselves subjected to, and innocent and powerless victims of. The talk has now backtrack to the first source of moral violation, yet it is one that the ‘violators’ are themselves at first unable to understand or even recognize:

1551 LM2 One thing that’s never come up, and it really has to be taken into consideration, our group has had the disadvantage from the very beginning.
1552 L? Yeah, yeah.
1553 LM2 You guys chose which row /i.e. which row of the payoff matrix/ we play in.
1555 ? I don’t quite see ... /Slowly, uncertainly./
1556 LM2 I noticed that, cuz once that they choose, they get the first choice ... so they choose which row we play in.
1559 LM1 But we supposedly pick at the same time.
The Structure of Moral Action

1561 LM2 Well, it doesn't matter, I mean, they still choose.
1564 WM2 It's like, there's no way, there's no way we can we can ... there's no way, if we put it on four, we're gonna lose, well, same with you. No, it's not, it's not true, LM2.
1568 LM1 No, it is in the fact that you decided whether we were going to start up here or down here, from the first, from the first flip, that's here nor there.

What LM1 refers to here is that the team that plays competitively ‘forces’ the other team to do the same, or lose points (which of course no choice at all). But WM2 cannot grasp this at all.

1571 WM2 You guys cho ... chose it too. How did we just choose it?
1574 L? Because you said four and we said zero.
1575 WF1 Yeah, but we didn't know you were going to say zero.
1576 WM2 You guys, it could have been the other way round.
1578 LM1 Yeah, it could have been, but ...
1580 LM2 We didn't know you guys were going to say four.
1581 LM1 As soon as you said, as soon as you said what, you know, that you being the first, as soon as you said that, we said, okay, that's what they're after, we're gonna, you know, we'll flip down and mess them up, or whatever, we said.
1582 WM2 You're saying that we set the rules of the game.

WM2 demonstrates here, to us and to LM1, his lack of comprehension of the Losing Team’s point. He finds what is being said ridiculous. LM1's anger shows that he perceives the ridicule in WM2’s comment:

1583 LM1 Not the rules, no, just the trend, at the beginning. It changed, obviously. /Angry/

The Mythology of the Situation

In this third and final phase of the conflict, distinct issues develop in the talk between the two teams. The four groups differ greatly, however, in the extent to which these issues are talked about and disagreed over, with group C articulating their accounts the least, and group B the most. In group C no issues are voiced, and both teams seem determined to skirt all disagreement. In group A a single issue is raised. Faced with the Losing Team’s demand that points be returned to them, the Winning Team recognize with anger that they themselves lost points as a result of burning. There is an implicit accusation, when they broach this issue, that the Losing Team are being hypocritical: they are asking for points that they don’t deserve, and are adopting a morally superior stance when they have no good grounds for it (‘You guys are so macho’). For their part, the Losing Team do not explicitly articulate any of their concerns. In the context of their session this is not too striking, but it becomes salient when we contrast what happens here with the Losing Team’s actions in other groups, particularly group B.

In group D the central issue is whether the group has the ‘eight times’ which the staff leader had granted them, or not. Very quickly, discussion of this issue leads to the articulation of accounts of the different ways that people understood the original agreement made with the staff leader, and this in turn leads to a rapid resolution of the conflict.

In group B four distinct issues are raised. Each of them is broached once, the game action is then resumed for a while, and then the first, second, and fourth issues are raised again. The third issue, raised only once, is the only one introduced by the Winning Team, and it is an accusation of hypocrisy similar to the burning team’s complaint in group A. In this third issue, the Winning Team complain that the Losing Team have broken an agree-
ment in exactly the manner they have accused the burners of doing. ‘You said, “let’s break the trust, we won’t play anymore” says WMS at #1166.

The first of the issues raised by the Losing Team in group B (#1088ff.) is over ‘the sacred trust’ as it is called, tongue in cheek, and whether it can be reestablished once broken. The second time it is raised (#1472ff.) both teams declare that something has been resolved: WM2 that ‘we’ve remade the trust here’, LM2 that ‘we’ve built up something else’.

The second issue (#1139ff.) is that of the Winning Team’s motivation in the game: was it to ‘make money’, or to ‘play’? The second time this issue appears (#1503ff.), the Losing Team begin to recognize that they were themselves concerned with making money; LM1 says, ‘I mean, come to think of it, we were trying to make money, and then we were sitting there going, well gee, we have their trust’ (#1503). LM2 is still confused: ‘That’s why I’m curious, whether ... is it a trust, or a partnership?’ (#1517). He also talks as though trust is an instrumental matter, saying that the point of having trust is that it ‘maximizes both profits’ (#1507).

The fourth and final issue (#1350ff.) is an articulation of the deepest part of the local background: the grasp of the situation which the Losing Team had at the very beginning of the game, as a consequence of their status as ‘losers’ in the game. LM2 points out that ‘every time you guys made money and we lost, you guys were very pleased about it’ (#1350). When the issue reappears after continued game play (#1551ff.), LM2 articulates further his sense that ‘our group has had the disadvantage from the very beginning’ (#1551).

So we find a very ordered structure to Phase Three in group B’s session. The first and second issues correspond closely to the two concerns that I identified in chapter 5: Trust and Responsibility. I described these concerns as underlying the movement that the Losing Team underwent as a consequence of the burning. The fourth issue corresponds to what I identified in chapter 4 as the ground of the emotions that follow burning: namely the teams’ status earlier in the game. The third issue, raised by the Winning Team, centers around the unreasonable nature of the Losing Team’s criticism of the burning: it corresponds to the material examined in chapter 6.

If we look now at who raises each issue, we again find an interesting organization. Of course it takes two to make an issue, but it is usually possible to identify the person who first introduces the topic that gets picked up by the other team or his or her own team, because it strikes a chord of agreement or antipathy. Often the form of the utterance indicates that a new topic is being opened.

Issue One is raised at its first appearance by LM2: ‘We would just like to say ...’ (#1088). The second time it is WM1 who brings it up: ‘Can I make a comment ...?’ (#1472). The Winning Team attempt to ‘prove’ empirically to the Losing Team, and LM2 in particular, that trust can be remade. Issue Two is raised both times by LM1. Each time he is asking a question of the Winning Team: first, ‘Was it that you ...?’ (#1146); the second time, ‘What was the whole point ...?’ (#1459). The third issue is raised only once, by WM2, who confronts the Losing Team, asking ‘Wait ...’ (#1158), ‘You mean ...?’ (#1163). This issue does seem to be resolved soon, as WM2 summarizes his accusation: ‘Violation of trust’, and LM2 replies with a laugh, ‘All right; that’s one’ (#1206–7). Issue Four is broached both times by LM2. First he asks ‘Can I say something?’ (#1324; later he interjects ‘One thing that’s never come up ...’ (#1551).

What have to be uncovered, then, are not hidden principles concerning what is right and wrong. The teams differ little, as far as one can tell, in the obligations and expectations they see as binding in an abstract sense, but they do differ in their practical understanding of the situation. Discrepant understandings of the same events must be uncovered if the conflict is to be resolved, and these understandings find their ground in the discrepant ‘attitudes’ the teams had at the start of the game, as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.

Intimacy and Moral Status

For the groups who end the session with a standoff, there is little change in the position of the two teams in either the region of Intimacy, or that of Moral Status. They remain aloof from and critical of each other, with little or no appreciation of the others’ grasp of events.

For the groups where there is some resolution (groups B and D), we see some wavering on these dimensions. As underlying concerns get raised as explicit issues, each is accompanied first by a renewed accusation, and then by an apparent lessening of the distance between the teams. Yet particularly in terms of Intimacy a distance remains; even when the Losing Team seem to appreciate why the Winning Team acted as they did, there is a residual distrust. This can be seen in group B, and, for group D, LM1 – held responsible for the burning – is excluded from the discussion of what future action it is appropriate to take.

The Winning Team are at first unable to find their own behavior culpable. When the Losing Team are hurt and withdraw, at first this is seen as their immoral action, unmotivated by anything the Winning Team have done. Next, they are seen as mistaken (‘illogical’, ‘stupid’, doing something
8. Summary of the Phases of Conflict

To review what we have seen: in four of ten sessions of the PD, an action which participants termed 'burning' is carried out. Burning involves the Winning Team gleefully breaking the agreement to cooperate which has just been made by the two teams.

Burning appears a fitting act to the Winning Team in consequence of the frustration that they feel when playing in accord with the agreement. Although cooperation appeared likely to remove the boredom and frustration of stalemate, which is how the game was progressing, it actually does not reintroduce the pleasures of beating the other term, nor their status as winners, which the Winning Team were experiencing beforehand. The Winning Team are unaware that burning will appear immoral to the Losing Team, because they simply take it for granted as part of the game, and hence as just 'fun'.

All four Losing Teams respond very strongly to the burning. I have distinguished, in the course of interpretation in the last three chapters, three ‘phases’ of conflict. I shall now review these and their interrelationships, and the significance of each of them. Then I consider briefly why it is that the conflicts prove so difficult for these young adults to resolve.

Phase One: The Immediate Reaction to the Burning

As the burning - the immoral act - is carried out, or shortly afterwards, a breakdown occurs in the ongoing course of action in the game, which team members hitherto regarded as having been consensually arranged and consequently binding, and the participants change their mode of involvement in the game. This new engagement is not one of detached, theoretical reflection, as is evinced by the strong emotions that arise at this point: it marks the beginning of an activity which I have called practical deliberation. Although suspension of the game’s activity occurs, team members are still

‘useless’, and so on). Then, their perception is granted as a possible one, but still not correct. Finally, for some groups guilt starts to develop for the Winning Team, as they begin to see themselves as culpable, and causing the other team’s pain.

In group D at this juncture, one way of understanding events dominates, and discussion begins over what appropriate action should now be taken. In group B, several underlying concerns enter into the talk, and the session is ended before the question of further action is considered in any detail.

A general account of how this phase of conflict fits with the preceding three can be proposed, with the proviso that it must be tentative since not all groups pass all the way through it. Phase Three begins as the two teams are engaged in trying to influence each other. The Losing Team are seeking retribution or revenge; the Winning Team are trying to restart the game. In the process, both of them are progressively articulating their understanding of the situation in accounts which provide grounds for the action they feel is called for. The accounts are short and to the point, guided by the need to convince and influence the recalcitrant other team.

It is evident at this point just how difficult it is for the two teams to understand each other. They have participated in the same events, they were equally informed as to what is going on; from an external point of view, all have been exposed to the same events. Their only difference is that, as a result of random playing at the start of the session, one team is the ‘winner’ and the other the ‘loser’ of the game, yet this is enough to render their actions essentially opaque to one another. Their different perspectives carry with them very different interests and motivations, and these result in each team having a unique grasp of the ‘facts’ of what has transpired.

At first, articulation and talk center around the ostensible issue which appeared in Phase Two, namely the loss of points. If the interaction stays at this point, the underlying moral concerns are not openly addressed, and the conflict is not resolved. For some groups, however, articulation proceeds until at least some of the participants begin to appreciate that the other team has a different, but valid, account. Then, new issues begin to appear in the talk, not in a detached and calm manner, however, but as markedly hostile accusations. These issues represent a new level of articulation; the concerns, grounds, and attitudes which motivated the course of the game are now reflected upon and talked about. These issues may be addressed several times and the conflict seems to be diminished, if not entirely ended, as a consequence.
personally involved in what is going on: they are presenting and defending their own interests and concerns. The nature of the breakdown is not yet an articulated complaint, but is simply acted upon.

The burning when it occurs is an act which, from the point of view of the Losing Team, is unanticipated as a real possibility. It is an act which by all rights ought not to have been committed: the Losing Team see it as unfitting to the situation they are in. It transgresses the taken-for-granted context to their actions at this point in the session. This background includes deep practices—such as those constitutive of friendship—as well as more local ones pertaining to the cooperative agreement made between the teams, and their status as a friendship group, being observed and assessed by researchers. The Losing Team unreflectively adopt this agreement as a way of escaping from the embarrassment and powerlessness of their status as losers. Cooperation will permit them to make some more money and thereby acquire a new status, more equal with the other team. The burning upsets all this, throwing it into doubt. Suddenly the Losing Team again find themselves treated as losers, and mocked and teased in a fashion which fractures their friendship with the other participants.

The sudden emotions one can see at this point illustrate the emergency nature of the impelled action which the Losing Team undertake. They rapidly distance themselves, withdrawing from the game, or deliberately playing competitively. They adopt a moral stance from which they now look down upon the members of the Winning Team, regarding them as irresponsible and their act as reprehensible. At the same time as these movements occur, there is a distinct absence of any explicit statement of these new perceptions. Instead, other background practices cover up the expression of moral accusation as extreme and supercilious.

The motivation for the form of emotionality that characterizes Phase One cannot be understood without a consideration of the taken-for-granted situation into which the burning intrudes. It would not be accurate, however, to say simply that the Losing Team assumed that the burning would not take place. When we look at the grounds which the burning violates, we see why it constitutes a breaking of trust, and initiates a questioning of the Winning Team’s responsibility. The Losing Team took it for granted that, although burning was not logically impossible, it was a totally unreasonable act: something completely without sanction or grounds.

In the restructuring that follows the burning, certain facets of it become lit up—some of them as salient and clear, others as dubious and problematic. The concerns over trust and responsibility fall into the latter category, because the status of each of them has become thrown into doubt. The pain and the sense that the burning is immoral fall into the former category: they are experienced as being certain and unquestionable. Certain fitting actions become apparent: most immediately the movements of withdrawal and status shift. A demand for reparation commonly follows.

Clearly this first identification of the origin of the moral wrong is hasty and extreme. The first reaction is to pin blame unambiguously on one team; an initial premature attempt to get rid of the problem by externalizing it, by blaming it on the other. Much of traditional ethical theory assumes just the attitudes that characterize this phase: an adversarial position, and a clear opposition of right and wrong. Similarly, the most recent of Kohlberg’s scoring manuals [Kohlberg et al., 1978] requires that coders consider only the first of a respondent’s responses to a dilemma. Such an approach is likely to catch only the immediate, most polarized and provisional, primitive and elementary, response to experienced immorality.

In summary:

**Intimacy.** As the burning is carried out, there is a rapid restructuring of the Losing Team’s experience of the situation, marked by the onset of strong emotion; shock, surprise, and confusion are apparent, along with moral indignation; the Losing Team withdraw rapidly, to stop the game and avoid the hurt they are feeling; trust becomes a concern.

**Moral Status.** The Losing Team look down on the Winning Team; the Winning Team’s responsibility becomes questionable; they are identified as having transgressed an ‘ought’ which has its origin in implicit background practices constitutive of the friendship between the teams.

**Mythology.** There is talk of something ‘broken’, but no explicit moral accusation is made, though the Winning Team are clearly identified as the transgressors.

### Phase Two: Accusation and Response

One group (group A) progresses no further than Phase One. The other groups show a second phase of the conflict, where the participants present to each other their preliminary interpretations of what has occurred. These accounts are progressively articulated; they move from global, undifferentiated emotive reports (‘screwing off,’ ‘playing around,’ etc.) to differentiated, relatively articulated statements of the aspects of the situation that are relevant to the disagreement. They do not, however, result in detached theoretical statements of ‘underlying’ principles; the most fully articulated accounts are still structured by the concerns and interests of the participants.
Throughout Phase Two, accounts are given as though they are indubitable descriptions of the ‘facts of the matter’. The participants are describing experiences which they have taken for granted, and they fail to recognize that the other team members see, or even that they could see, things differently. What strikes an observer is that different participants experience and describe what has occurred from two (at least) distinct and mutually incompatible perspectives. This becomes clearer still as accounts are articulated, and presumably this enables the participants themselves to recognize the incompatibility, and so move to the next phase.

In summary:

Intimacy. The emotional reorganization which occurred in Phase One now becomes fixed as an enduring mood; the Winning Team want to engage the Losing Team in the game again; the Losing Team want reparation for the moral wrong which has been done to them; the result is an impasse.

Moral Status. The Losing Team continue to regard the others as irresponsible; the Winning Team take this as an ungrounded, overmoralistic stance: here too there is impasse.

Mythology. Talk centers around the pseudo-issue of how many points were lost, and by whom; the moral concerns (trust and responsibility) remain unarticulated, underlying the explicit issue; there is, however, a progressive articulation of what has transpired; these accounts are characterized by certainty and egocentricity: they are given in the form of certain descriptions of the ‘facts of the matter’.

Phase Three: Articulation or Standoff

Two groups (B and D) move to a third phase of the conflict, where articulation of the circumstances of the burning proceeds to the point where underlying concerns begin to be addressed. As this happens, the two teams finally recognize that they have very different interpretations of the burning. The other two groups (A and C) fail to articulate their understanding of what has occurred in this way and they end the session in a ‘standoff’: with a continuation of the mistrust and suspicion of earlier phases.

One type of outcome occurs, then, when the team members acknowledge each others’ experiences as alternative and valid ways of understanding an ambiguous interaction. Accounts of the original situation are now given in the past conditional tense (‘We were going to...’), and no longer in the simple past (‘We did...’); they lose their characteristic certitude. Once it has been recognized that not everybody had understood the situation in the same way (that there are, in a sense, two situations), it becomes possible to

8. Summary of the Phases of Conflict

interpret the ‘wrong’ act as grounded in a different point of view, and not the result of any inherent badness of the person concerned.

In summary:

Intimacy. Articulation continues; finally underlying concerns (trust, responsibility; the Losing Team’s hypocrisy; the attitudes at the beginning of the game) are articulated and addressed as explicit issues.

Moral Status. As the divergent positions are articulated, the distinction between themselves and the others is maintained by both teams, but its basis tends to change from a transgressor-transgressed relationship, where each regards the other as morally faulty, to a recognition of differences of ways of understanding events.

Mythology. Accounts are progressively articulated; they develop from global, undifferentiated reports (‘screwing off’; ‘you’re so illogical’) to differentiated, relatively articulated statements of aspects of the situation. Accounts now begin to take on conditional form.

The End of Conflict: Recommenement of the Game

Two of the four groups (B and D) move finally to the end of the third phase. The conflict in these groups appears to be resolved as discussion now begins about the action that is appropriate so they can continue playing the game, now that there is agreement about what has happened. The breakdown in the flow of ongoing activity has been successfully dealt with; consensus has been reached about the nature of the misunderstanding that has occurred; interest turns to the issue of what to do next.

In summary:

Intimacy. As the teams begin to recognize the others’ understanding of what has transpired, there is a reduction in distance between them; they begin to play the game again, without further burning: trust has been ‘remade’; however, there remains a residual uncertainty.

Moral Status. Similarly, the teams seem to regard each other as more morally equal.

Mythology. Talk now turns away from reflections upon what happened in the past, and towards consideration of what form future action should take.

The Problematic Nature of the Conflict

Two of the groups are completely unable to resolve the disagreements, and the other two teams have to go through a long and involved interaction to reach the limited resolution that they finally achieve. In those teams
which do not move into the involved articulation of the concerns that are sequels of burning, resentment and guilt linger and are brought out by the staff leader in the post-game discussion. Even in the groups where the moral concerns are faced up to, and articulated, it is clear that the conflict is still not fully resolved; some sort of problem remains. I want at this point to consider the form of this problem, on the assumption that a close descriptive look at what it is will lead us in the direction of an understanding of why it is present.

The most obvious problem is that the two teams must struggle to reach a consensus about what has occurred during the session; if they fail they are unable to remake the trust that has been lost between them. The Losing Team are faced with a situation where they distrust people whom they regard as their friends, friends who now refuse to take due responsibility for their actions: who refuse to admit guilt. The Winning Team, on the other hand, see their friends reacting in a moralistic and unreasonable way to a simple attempt on their part to have a little fun, in a situation which is 'only a game'.

For neither team is there a simple route to resolution. To continue to condemn the other team and refuse to associate with them further would, if pursued to its full extent, lead to the rupture of bonds of friendship over something which, despite the serious overtones it has assumed, is truly 'just' a psychology experiment. On the other hand, it is hard to return to full intimacy as though nothing has happened. The Losing Team have been hurt - even if much of the damage has been done to something as inessential as their pride - and they have every reason to anticipate that the same thing will happen again. They cannot constraining the Winning Team, for the latter refuse to accept responsibility for what they have done, at least under the description which the Losing Team would assign to it; nor can they protect themselves and at the same time remain friends.

Ambiguity continues to surround the act of burning: it remains unclear - both to the victims and to an observer - whether the Winning Team deliberately intended to hurt the Losing Team, or whether they were just out to have fun. This illustrates the fact that it is rarely possible to identify intentions in an unambiguous way, or without knowledge of consequences. In practice, interpretations of intention are often based upon outcome, as is the case with the Losing Team here. The Losing Team respond to the burning on the basis of its consequences for them (their pain); the Winning Team on the basis of their motivation at the time they acted (boredom and frustration at the course the game has taken). The Losing Team act as though (if one were to try to translate their actions into propositional terms) malign intentions must have been what led to the painful consequences. The Winning Team, on the other hand, feel that, since they had innocent, 'playful' intentions, the Losing Team's pain at the outcome is exaggerated ('not... very logical' - group B), and that their accusations are unfair.

It would be pleasing to be able to say that one of these interpretations is correct and the other false. But to affirm one account and deny the other would be to adopt an external and judgemental orientation, from outside the concrete situation and in retrospect, and this is not an attitude which facilitates our understanding of the form which the conflict has for the participants. It is more important that we recognize that each position can be taken as a form of truth, and that their contemporaneous existence is, in part, the source of conflict. Resolution of the conflict - to the limited extent that it occurs - seems to require that both teams give up any claim to unrivalled certitude, and this in turn requires that they no longer take their understanding of events for granted. More than a simple agreement on the 'facts' is needed for resolution to be reached: the Winning Team must come to regard themselves as responsible for a wrong which was unintended; or the Losing Team must feel that their outrage was unjustified.

Neither team can do this to more than a limited extent, however, because each is still bound by its own concerns and interests. This is the key to understanding the lingering problem: to resolve conflict the teams need not to exchange information or opinions with each other, but to somehow forge a joint interest, and this is something which the very structure of the game situation prevents them from doing. It is not until the discussion following the game, where the teams are disbanded and the group of friends is reunified, that any expression of guilt or apology begins. Until that point the two teams are irreconcilably separated by the concerns and interests which they have by virtue of being 'winners' and 'losers'.

Two sets of practices are involved and in contradiction here: those constitutive of friendship, and those defined by the situation the participants are engaged in: the 'game' structure with its competitiveness. There is a complex relationship between the burning and the grounding of friendship which holds between the young adults. I argued earlier that if strangers were playing NeoPD, then breaking an agreement would be cheating but not 'burning': it would not transgress the 'oughts' constitutive of friendship. But this means that friendship, in a sense, makes burning possible, at the same time as it condemns it. The Winning Team can feel that it is not wrong to have a little fun with their friends, even if it is at their expense. After the
burning, however, there is a real clash between what is 'proper' for friendship and what is 'proper' for competitive play. From the Winning Team’s perspective, the Losing Team should, as friends, accept their loss with good grace. That they do not indicates that they are 'really' concerned with money. Equally, from the Losing Team's point of view, as friends the Winning Team should not have burned in the first place, and the fact that they did indicates that they are concerned more with winning points with treating their friends well.

I am suggesting that the coexistence of two sets of background practices – one stemming from the structure of the local situation, the other from the longer-term and deeper commitments of friendship – sets up an ambiguity in action, and for its justification post facto. The participants themselves make reference to this ambiguity: they express their confusion over whether they are 'really' in a game or not; whether trust can be quantified (as the 'trust game'); whether their aim is to win points or not. To resolve this ambiguity would require a 'choice' between the two sets of practices and the incompatible concerns they involve, and this the students are unable to accomplish.

One consequence of this analysis is the prediction that, once they leave the game situation and return to their dormitories, the students should find the resolution of their differences easy to achieve. The contradiction would no longer be pressing in action, and the conflict should dissolve; removed from the demands of the game, the concerns of friendship will predominate in action. Unfortunately, we have no information on what occurred after the game sessions and so this prediction must remain speculative.

9. Conclusions

Only where there is conflict is behavior conscious and self-conscious; only here are the conditions for rational conduct [Park and Burgess, 1924, p. 578].

Cognitive conflict must occur first at the level of action, at a preconscious level, before it can be taken up into conscious reflection by the process of conscious realization. Any attempt to affect moral reasoning by the discussion of wholly hypothetical dilemmas will therefore be misguided; patterns of thought evolved in the course of classroom discussion cannot be incorporated into the subject’s moral understanding unless and until he has already utilized them in his own conduct [Locke, 1983, p. 163].

Reason is, and only ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them ... A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification ... 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they present [Hume, 1825, p. 415].

Several general points have become apparent in the course of studying these conflicts. In this final chapter I shall discuss the involvement of emotion in practical morality, the nature of the articulation through which the conflict proceeds, the role of 'factual' dispute in moral disagreement, and the relationship between knowledge and interest.

*Emotions' Disclosure Is an Inherent Aspect of Moral Conflict*

We cannot comprehend the course that conflict takes without recognizing the role of emotion, and the particular and special characteristics they introduce. Emotion provides a form of 'disclosure', a way of understanding a situation, which is acted upon unreflectively before it can be known conceptually. This priority of acting over knowing lies at the root of – and links together – several characteristics of the conflicts which have proved noteworthy: the inchoate movements of Phase One; the certitude of Phase Two; and the form of articulation which culminates in the articulation of concerns in Phase Three.
9. Conclusions

Emotion has generally been considered a disrupter of morality, as something which may inevitably occur but which is to be overcome or recovered from as soon as possible. I believe that the conflicts we have examined make sense only if we consider emotion as having a central constitutive role in moral conflict.

Emotions are manifest in action as unreflective forms of understanding. We have seen conflict beginning with movements which are aspects of the emotions called up by the burning. Emotion provides interpersonal understandings and actions which are prereflective and taken for granted, unquestioned (and so not reflected upon) and rapid, yet coherent and sensible. The ‘moral emotions’ (outrage, anger, guilt, sadness, etc.) entail assignment of responsibility. Emotions ‘frame’ events in complex and significant ways; the ascription of responsibility is an aspect of this framing which I have emphasized here. Moral conflict often involves a sudden recognition of wrong, characteristic of these emotions.

Can there be moral conflict which does not involve emotion? It remains an open question at this point whether emotions, perhaps in some milder manifestation, are involved also in the hypothetical discussion of moral situations. But emotions are primarily forms of – and outcomes of – practical involvement in a situation. The emotions that both teams experience are consequent upon the roles, as Winners and Losers, they find themselves in early in the game session. Interaction between the teams presupposes a common situation and shared practices (which stem from the friendships within the group and their common culture). The outrage and indignation which follow the burning stem from the break which it makes with this common ground. Emotions ‘frame’ the conflict: they provide the ground on which it develops, and a way of understanding events which is articulated – and perhaps finally undermined – in the course of the conflict. The emotions of Phase One become moods in Phase Two; they become fixed as lasting and coherent attitudes to events and towards the others.

The structuring which emotion gives to the conflict is different from that which reason and logic might provide; emotion is not simply an energetic component superimposed on a rational structuring. Emotion’s structuring is immediate, nonreflective, and provides a sense of conviction. Emotion’s disclosure is not expressed explicitly in words, but is first a global undifferentiated way of understanding the situation and the object of the emotion. Movements occur, with ‘concerns’ implicit in them. Emotion provides disclosure through action, rather than through perception or knowledge. The talk that does occur is done ‘within’ the disclosure, and takes it for granted: people accuse and complain, and refuse to play, because of the way their situation is disclosed to them.

Emotion’s disclosure provides the unquestioned and unexamined new ground for this action. New actions become fitting and salient: accusation, withdrawal, demands for recompense. The immoral act of burning stands out in a shocking way from the background of practices for the Losing Team, hence the shocked uncertainty that characterizes their comprehension of it. The agreement to cooperate was based on an assumed shared understanding, which suddenly becomes problematic. The form which the problem takes for the Losing Team is that the Winning Team must know they’ve done wrong; i.e. the shared background is still assumed.

To say that emotions provide a structuring of action is not to say that they are, primarily, simply ‘impulses’ to act. The action of emotion can be (and usually is) a ‘symbolic’ (perhaps ‘semantic’) a better term act rather than a physical behavior: an interpersonal ‘distancing’ rather than a simple running away; a changed stance vis-à-vis the other’s integrity rather than a simple impulse to strike a blow.

But if it is true that emotion plays an essential positive part in these conflicts, it is also the case that it shapes the course of conflict in ways that are not entirely positive. The egocenteredness and inability to recognize the other team’s understanding of events (or even that they have a different understanding) is a consequence of the involvement of emotion in the conflict. I shall return to this point in the third section of this chapter.

The Nature of Articulation: Rational Reconstruction or Practical Deliberation?

The next topic I turn to concerns the character of the articulation which occurs in the second and third phases of conflict. Just what is going on here? Why is this articulation needed, and what form does it take? The participants appear to be engaged in some reflection upon, and reasoning about, the actions that have occurred, both their own conduct and that of others. Is this reflection merely rationalization, as social learning theorists such as Mischel and Mischel [1976] would have us believe? Or is it ‘rational reconstruction’, a logical activity, as Miller [1980], Berkowitz [in press] and Habermas [1973] propose? As behaviorists see the relationship between action and thought, reasoning occurs after action, and it is limited to providing post hoc rationalizations which have little or no explanatory value.
The cognitivist account, on the other hand, is that reasoning restates (reconstructs) the role that it played in advance, albeit often unconsciously, in determining action.

The young adults studied here appear to do neither of these things. Their reflections upon the acts that were performed take the form of more and more explicit descriptions of the circumstances that were present, as 'facts of the matter', and they present these as grounds for their acts or attitudes. The circumstances, rather than any reconstruction of rational principles, are what are used to justify and explain. Empirical inquiry leads us, then, to draw a distinction between rational reconstruction [cf. Habermas, 1973], aimed at revealing the 'systems of rules and principles' which are presumed to underly individual competence, and practical deliberation, which articulates aspects of a lived and experienced situation in order to resolve concrete conflicts and disagreements which have arisen in the course of ongoing action. Rational reconstruction aims, ultimately, to provide a universal theory in the form of explicit rules, and considers conflict-resolution itself a form of theorizing. Practical deliberation, as this research demonstrates, aims to explain action in a manner that resolves a practical difficulty. This does not mean that the issues dealt with are local and trivial: a practical difficulty can be something which a whole culture finds itself dealing with.

The notion that systems of rules and principles are at work in an individual's choices of moral action is actually not very feasible at a theoretical level. We shall find the absence of any appeal to principles in these practical moral conflicts far less puzzling if we recognize that there are grounds for thinking that reasoning cannot play the major role in determining action. Yet this cognitivist assumption, that social perception and action depend upon some sort of theorizing activity, is common these days. Turiel [1983], for example, simply states that:

'Social development is a process by which individuals generate understandings of the social world, by making inferences and forming theories about experienced social events. ... The starting point ... is the premise that through their social experiences children develop ways of thinking, or theories, about the social world. ... In coming to understand social systems, people act like social scientists, attempting to observe regularities and explain their existence' [Turiel, 1983, p. 1-2, emphasis added].

Theories of the resolution of moral disagreements often take a similar cognitivist form. Resolution is taken to be a process of 'argumentation': the essentially logical presentation of conflicting positions, with its culmination in a rational reconstruction of the moral and logical 'principles' assumed to underly those positions.

Habermas [1973] takes the view that rational reconstruction practical consequences. By learning logic or linguistics I do not change my previous practice of reasoning or speaking.' Instead, he 'critical self-reflection' to be the practically grounded form of reflect move, however, creates problems for a rationalist program, since 're: 'practice' are separated with no account given of how they are re. McCarthy, 1978, p. 101]. Consequently, it is not surprising that He students [e.g. Miller, 1980; Miller and Klein, 1979] have treated ref practice (what I am calling 'practical deliberation') as though it too i and logical. Miller, for example, talks of moral 'argumentation', w: constitutive task is to develop an argument ... which is, roughly spe abstract structure consisting of propositions, which are connected in ("logical") way. 'The 'social functions' of moral discourse (such as 'l ing the other speaker', or 'scoring' over them) are categorized as t matics of argumentation", as opposed to the 'logic of argumentat Miller considers them not relevant for further consideration. Miller apply this framework to moral discourse among 5- and 7-year-old fately, their data concern only the discussion of hypothetical d where the children are required to reach consensus on which of two: 'worse'. Not surprisingly, these interactions can be analyzed in logi (though much is lost, even here), but it seems unlikely that such ar would grasp much of the structure of a practical moral conflict.

Berkowitz [in press] similarly sees the form of moral discou fosters moral development as being 'transactive discussion,' which t as 'reasoning that operates on the reasoning of another'. 'Transacts' actions as 'request for justification', 'competitive juxtaposition', and As with Miller and Klein, empirical research with this coding syste yet been restricted to the discussion of hypothetical dilemmas.

My claim is to have empirically demonstrated that there is ref debate in practical moral conflict, which I have termed 'practic eration', which cannot be regarded as involving the appeal to p and to logical argument. I thus reject the characterization of m course which Miller and Klein, and Berkowitz, propose. On the ot I cannot claim to have anything to say about the status of 'ration struction', where principles are postulated to underlying the practices discourse, in both practical and hypothetical situations; I am not a what would count as empirical evidence concerning such a postu
9. Conclusions

Cognitivist researchers are concerned primarily with the way in which an action is chosen, ow it is carried out. As a consequence they are unable to give a coherent account of practical action and the conflicts that arise in practice. The ideal moral conduct, for rationalists from Kant to Kohlberg, is action which shows reflection, and reflection which proceeds rationally and with conscious choice. But this is only possible if all the initial parameters of a situation are first laid out and fully examined. (Alternatively, as Rawls [1971] would have it, a ‘veil of ignorance’ can blanket all parties equally, by that means lead to a just outcome. Both ‘full information’ and ‘no information’ are taken to foster just choices, because they benefit no party or the others.) But even if full information were available, no rationalist has provided criteria which indicate what one should do; they offer logical procedures which show how to make a choice, and what formal criteria the choice must satisfy. An interviewee can reason for a particular on, while another defends its opposite, and yet both will be scored as at the same stage; the cognitivist system aims to examine the form of moral choice, not its specific content. Such a focus is powerless to provide an account of how people act in practice, where the concrete selection of a particular course of action is the sine qua non of moral activity.

It has been claimed (by Habermas and others) that cognitive structures undermine action in the same way that a grammar determines sentences of language. But the analogy does not hold, because in linguistic theory the same problem appears. The reason why in which a grammar ‘determines’ sentences is very weak; it ‘generates’ all and only the grammatical sentences of a language, but it cannot be used as a basis for explaining the meaning of an appropriate sentence in a specific actual situation. Issues of context then arise which no linguistic theory has yet come close to solving. Similarly, if the ‘logic’ of a certain stage of moral cognition can justify Heinz’s drug and also his not stealing it, what role can such a logic play in a person’s practical action? The cognitivists must admit that, if X steals a drug and justifies this action with a certain logical account, then X could eal well have acted in another, contrary manner, and justified the on in the same formal manner. What, then, explains the fact that X did as he or she did? Something else, on this account, must be invoked, internal to the logic of justification.

It is at this point that the cognitivists do indeed, like linguists, deal to a tertium quid: the situation. At all stages less than the principal ones, they suggest, an agent is swayed by factors which are external to him or her, in the situation. Only in the final stages (5 and 6) of principled moral reasoning is an individual inoculated against situational forces, and here, the argument goes, only truly moral acts can be justified by moral reasoning. Rosen [1980] describes the role that the situation plays, though he adds the comment that this analysis is supposed to hold only for ‘minor moral decision-making’, characterized by the absence of intense sacrifice.

‘... the degree to which situational determinants are paramount is a function of moral level. Kohlberg and Krebs hold that the forces operating within a situation are most likely to affect the person at a preconventional level. At the conventional level there exists more of a dual pull or battle between the forces in the situation and a person’s moral stage development. The struggle is mediated by the moral will, which in this study is construed as ego controls constituted by attentional stability. The person at the principled level is not influenced by situational forces and does not undergo a struggle of conscience, as his course is determined by rational considerations derived from principles’ [Rosen, 1980].

But is there really a point where moral principles can determine moral action, independent of the influence of situation? An example of the principled approach, the work of Hare, provides an interesting illustration. Hare is a rationalist philosopher with whom Kohlberg aligns himself (‘... whether one starts from Kant, Mill, Hare, Ross or Rawls in defining morality, one gets similar research results’; Kohlberg, 1971, p. 152), so an examination of his work is pertinent to an assessment of the cognitivist approach to moral action.

Hare is explicit about his method, which involves ‘exhibiting the formal features of the problem, as they arise out of the logical properties of the words used in discussing it’. In the book Applications of Moral Philosophy [Hare, 1973], he brings his ethical philosophy to bear on some practical moral problems. For example, he discusses the problem facing a soldier in wartime of deciding when his commanding officer’s orders should no longer be obeyed. Hare argues that there is no absolute authority, and that at some point one can say that one takes responsibility upon oneself, and refuses to obey orders from a superior. He then goes on to say that, indeed, at some point one must make such a move, ‘... the point must in the end come when a subordinate has to say, “Any policy which involves my doing this sort of thing (for example, slaughtering these people in cold blood) must be a wicked policy, and anyone who has conceived it must be a wicked man; it cannot therefore be my duty to obey him.”’ [Hare, 1973, p. 8; emphasis added]. This in itself is a strange remark, given that Hare has just approv-
As the teams try to convince each other to act as they deem fitting, they begin to articulate their ‘facts’ more explicitly. A ‘pseudo-issue’ develops: a factual matter over which the teams disagree, that is stated factually despite its being implicitly moral. This is generally about the number of points each team has ‘lost’. For group D the issue is whether the agreement made with the staff leader was ‘had’ or not. In each case the question appears to be simply factual, but what constitutes ‘losing points’ or ‘having the agreement’ is actually defined only in the terms of each team’s understanding of the whole situation, and so is not objective at all.

Practical deliberation is directed, then, to the solution of a practical problem which has arisen, not a theoretical one. It has its own grounds in a specific breakdown, not in any philosophical differences between those involved in the conflict. It stays within the practical involvements which these people have, and does not stray into a separate theoretical domain.

The superficial issue, of points won and lost, at first hides the underlying moral concerns. In part this is due to the tendency to see the situation as ‘factual’ and not ‘valutative’; the number of points lost is an ‘objective’ issue, while talk of trust and responsibility is blatantly valutative. Practical deliberation is couched in terms of the practical, and the moral concerns and values which structure or frame it can easily go unnoticed. Consequently, there is what amounts to a distortion in the first accounts articulated; an evasion of the concerns which have already been acted upon.

For several groups articulation stops at this point, and the evasion persists. For others, the Winning Team become angry and frustrated with the Losing Team, as they realize, on reflection, that they’ve also lost points during the burning, although the Losing Team’s complaint is that they alone have lost. In group A for example:

726 WM? Okay, see, we just realized that, anyway, burning doesn’t do us any good...

732 LM1 What do you mean, you didn’t realize? You burnt us, when we had an agreement, and you didn’t hold up your end of the bargain. /Astonished./

733 WM2 Do you want to make more money, or what? /Laughing nervously./

734 LM1 Curz, we’re not gonna let you make your money until we get our points back, that, that you lost.

LM1 is astonished that WM2 is unaware of the wrong his team has done. Such a recognition of the differences between the teams’ ways of understanding the burning seems to initiate Phase Three. The Losing Team have not hitherto articulated the moral aspect of their understanding, not because they are unaware of it but, on the contrary, because it is so obvious to them.
Only in the face of the Winning Team’s ‘refusal’ to do penance, which they finally recognize as an inability to ‘realize’ their wrongdoing, do the Losing Team begin to articulate their moral concerns.

The divergent ways of comprehending events which the two teams have at this point are summed up in remarks by LM2 and WM1 in group A:

1024 LM2 We had all the moral people on one side.
1025 WM1 And all the fun people on the other.

Practical involvement in the game activity is now suspended more seriously as the concerns finally come up as issues. Again, they are articulated as empirical rather than theoretical issues (‘When is the last time you won trust back . . .’). There is overt hostility between the teams; on the one hand, a genuine interest in understanding the other’s position; on the other, a strong motivation to show that it is deficient; to demonstrate that it is wrong. Articulation at this point again takes the form of accusation: a calling the others to account for themselves.

At the same time there is a shift in the way accounts are given. There is a move to the conditional tense in the speech of participants, for example, LM1 in group D:

205 LM1 We were (just gonna) play for real, for fun.

. . . and WM2 in group B:

1158 WM2 Wait. What does it matter, whether we were really serious about playing or whether we just wanted to make money?

There is also a new use of reflective formulations; for example in group B:

1146 LM1 The last round . . . was the statement. . . . You guys kept saying . . . was it that you wanted to . . . or was it just you wanted to . . .?
1147 WM2 I saw that it was more . . .

The team members also begin to employ citation or paraphrase of each other, where before there has been only mocking imitations, such as ‘No way!’

For ‘concerns’ to become ‘issues’ requires that actions be suspended, and their valuative basis, their directedness, become articulated in discourse. This requires a move of partial detachment from ongoing practical engagement in the game, and the adoption of a mode of reflective deliberation on what has occurred, which is motivated by the need to convince others to act in a certain way.

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Certitude and Egocenteredness of Phase Two

The certitude of Phase Two becomes comprehensible as a consequence of the involvement of emotion, or mood, in the conflict. Accounts given by the groups in Phase Two are often given with complete certainty, yet they are to an observer obviously partial. Such phenomena have been reported in studies of conflict situations, both experimental and natural, but attempts at their explanation have been less than satisfactory.

Bronfenbrenner [1961], for example, describes the ‘mirror-image’ quality of relations between the USA and the USSR, with citizens of each country making identical condemning comments about the behavior and intentions of the other. He notes that such (mirror) images are self-confirming. ‘Each party, often against its own wishes, is increasingly driven to behave in a manner which fulfills the expectations of the other.’ (This is not exactly what occurs in the conflicts examined here, where an act – such as ‘demanding’ by the Losing Team, or ‘appealing’ by the Winning Team – is taken in very different ways by the two teams.) Bronfenbrenner explains the phenomenon as the consequence of a general tendency that we have to assimilate new perceptions to old beliefs; to minimize any clash with expectations. However, such an explanation seems inadequate.

Most importantly, Bronfenbrenner fails to examine the motivation which lies behind the ‘mirror-image’ phenomenon. If the understanding of a situation resists change, one suspects that some advantage is provided by that understanding. There would seem every practical advantage to be gained from the USA dropping the view that the Russians are power-hungry demons – a view which brings us closer each day to nuclear warfare – although the claim is made that domestic security is furthered by missile production. More than attitudinal inertia is involved here: to admit that the Russians are not total ‘bad guys’ would be tantamount to confessing that the USA does not have all its linen starched and pressed. And, of course, certain interests, both economic and political, are at stake.

So the certitude of Phase Two is not simply the result of a tendency for beliefs to be self-confirming. They are self-confirming only because they are not questioned, and it is the motivation for this inability to question, to doubt or ‘get behind’, the mood which is structuring the situation for each of the teams which needs to be identified. The certitude which characterizes accounts of events at this point is due to the involvement of emotions in the conflict, in a way that is still as yet not entirely clear.
What is it about emotion which leads to the certitude of accounts in Phase Two? I have proposed that an emotion constitutes a form of engagement: a way of understanding a situation that is lived rather than represented. Solomon [1980] touches on this characteristic of emotions when he describes what he calls their 'conceptual inabilities'. There are particular aspects of one's situation that one is unable to make reflective assessment of while one is experiencing a strong emotion. In particular, one is unable to question whether the object of the emotion may not be the way that it appears, because that object is 'constituted' by the emotion. Solomon reminds us that: "..."what an emotion is about" is not simply a fact; nor is it even a fact under certain descriptions. The object of an emotion is itself "affective" or normative. It is not an object about which one makes a judgement but it is rather defined, in part, by that normative judgement' [Solomon, 1980, p. 258]. Each emotion experientially presents its object only under an aspect, under a certain description, to use the terms of analytic philosophy. To change the description would be to change the emotion; so experiencing a given emotion entails understanding its object in a particular way, and no other.

If I come out of my house in the morning and find that my car, which I parked on the street the evening before, is gone, then there are a number of distinct emotions I may experience, each corresponding to a way of understanding events. I may be angry that the car has been stolen, taken unfairly by some degenerate. Or, recalling all my unpaid parking tickets, I may feel guilt, certain that the police have finally found and towed the car. Or, I may feel saddened that fate has, yet again, transpired to make me late to work. Of course I may experience each of these emotions, but only in succession, for they cannot coexist. Anger entails a sense of being unfairly wronged, not of being impotent at the hands of fate. I may become angry at the police, but not while I see them as legally enforcing just laws which I have failed to obey.

The different emotions involve and are defined by different actions, too. In anger I will attempt to undo the wrong by catching and punishing the miscreant. In guilt I will tend to confess, to correct the wrong that I have done. In Berkeley it is not an uncommon occurrence for outraged citizens to call the police to report a stolen vehicle, only to find to their embarrassment and chagrin that the police themselves have taken the car, and that they must pay a fine for its return. Such an occurrence necessitates a restructuring of one's way of understanding events.

The first conceptual 'inability' is, then, that emotions provide distinct discrete ways of understanding events. Reasoning, in contrast, has as a central characteristic the ability to vary hypothetically, counter-factually, elements of a state of affairs: to 'play' with them conceptually. The second 'inability' concerns the cause or ground of an emotion. Several writers have noted that, when the cause or ground of one's emotion is not commensurate with its object, one is necessarily unaware of this while in the throes of the emotion. Solomon [1980, pp. 259–260] explains this as follows: 'If I am angry about John's stealing my car (the object of my anger), then I cannot believe that the sufficient cause of my anger is anything other than John's stealing my car. You can attribute my anger to lack of sleep, I cannot. If I attribute my anger to lack of sleep, I cannot be angry at all ... Where the cause is different from what I am angry about, I cannot know that it is.' To separate oneself from one's emotion, to call into doubt its justification and grounds, is not possible while one is experiencing it. This can only occur through reflection afterwards, once the emotion is over. This characteristic of emotion might be expected to show some developmental changes. With experience, it may be possible to develop a 'benign split of the ego', such that one can act on the basis of an emotion and, at the same time, reflect critically upon its ground. While this may be possible, I believe that the young adults studied here give every indication of being unable to reflect upon their emotions while they are acting upon them. This is, I would maintain, the more common and developmentally more basic state of affairs.

How does the course of conflict manifest these two 'inabilities'? The two teams have, of course, very different views of the act of burning; the Winning Team regard it as harmless, while the Losing Team see it as shocking and immoral. Yet the only substantive differences between the two teams (remember that membership of the teams was determined randomly) are, first, that the Losing Team are on the receiving end of the burning, and second, that they are behind in points while the other team are ahead. These differences are enough to establish a difference between the teams in their understanding of events, which occurs for each of the four groups. The points disparity, the status differences which attach to it, and the attitudes and behaviors consequent upon it, are the ground of the emotional response to the burning. The act of burning is merely the object of these emotions; the participants' status as either winners or losers provides the context in which this object is taken up. (Here I am again making use of Hume's distinction between the 'cause' and 'object' of an emotion, first introduced in chapter 2. I substitute the term 'ground' for Hume's 'cause', however, because of the connotation of material causation that the latter term carries with it.)
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The Losing Team’s disdain for the other team in this group began before the burning occurred, and was in part a consequence of the extreme disparity in points. This disparity— or the ‘upset’ felt at it (interestingly, one meaning of ‘upset’ is ‘an unexpected defeat’) — is the ground of the disdain, while the object of the emotion is the ‘selfish’ behavior of the other team. Yet LM2’s account of the situation makes no reference to his own discomfort at losing so many points; it is wholly in terms of the contemptuous character and actions of the ‘selfish’ Winning Team. LM2 can become aware that his ‘upset’ is the cause of his disdain only when he doubts the veracity of his way of understanding the Winning Team’s actions. (His very denial of the ‘upset’ shows, however, that this awareness is pushing itself upon him, now that he is in the more detached and reflective discussion.) LM2 remains ignorant of his own involvement in the situation; instead he sees the Winning Team’s actions as objective events, totally independent of any evaluative attitude on his part. We can generalize this observation: members of both teams are moved by an emotional reaction to the burning whose ground lies prior to that act, and one reason their conflict proves so intractable is that its original locus — the points disparity and consequent status disparity — is obscure to them.

If the emotions of each team present them with a situation which has its own defined ‘facts of the matter’, experienced as self-evident and unquestionable, then it is not surprising that resolution of the conflict between the teams does not proceed smoothly. The two teams’ ‘facts’ are, of course, largely discordant, but for a participant even to recognize that the other team sees things differently requires a change of stance or mode of engagement.

‘Facts’ Are the Outcome of Valuative Factors

One final area of contention which this empirical inquiry sheds some light on is the relationship between fact and value. The separation of value from fact has a long history, and it is a crucial issue for a psychology of moral behavior. The distinction is usually traced back to Hume, for whom the tendency of many writers of his time unjustifiably to deduce an ‘ought’—proposition from ‘is’-propositions ‘subverts all the vulgar systems of morality’ [Hume, 1825]. Moore [1903] first termed such a deduction the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’. Hume’s separation continues in the writings of recent moral philosophers such as Hare, who describes it as having ‘the most
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 articulate from the practical understanding which the emotions in response to burning have provided, and which has been acted upon. Consequently, these facts do have genuine valuative implications. So on the one hand we see here how ‘facts’ are valid justifications of particular courses of action. On the other, in seeing the events as ‘facts of the matter’ that are independent of interests and concerns, conflict is extended and shared understanding is postponed. The formation of a unifying joint interest is not possible while the two teams remain blind to the role that their interests play in the disagreement between them. The ways of understanding the situation have their origin in the concerns and interests that stem from playing in ‘teams’, and in an inherent ambiguity to the whole session: is it ‘a game’, where the point is to ‘have fun’, or is it a ‘moral’ occasion? The participants in group A remarked, as I noted earlier, that ‘all the fun people’ were on the Winning Team, and ‘all the moral people’ on the Losing Team.

So, to generalize, we can say that a moral conflict may validly involve a disagreement about the ‘facts’, despite the longstanding tendency in both philosophy and psychology to insist that this should not be the case. The people in conflict will generally have differing forms of engagement (if only that one will become the person held responsible, and the other the person affected) and their engagement determines what each of them understands to have occurred.

Conclusion

What I do not claim to have done – nor was it my purpose – is to have discovered some totally new, hitherto unknown, process whereby moral conflicts are dealt with. What I have attempted to do is to uncover, to bring to light and clarify, forms of human conduct with which we all have some prior familiarity, because we find ourselves involved in them on a day-to-day basis. An act of uncovering is necessary because our most intrinsic human activities are hidden from us, in part because of their familiarity and the lack of reflective attention that we consequently pay to them, and in part because they are obscured by the myths and misunderstandings which we have become accustomed to using to attempt to make sense of ourselves. Precisely because we are so engrossed in these practices, we are enthralled by them and have no pressing need to pause and consider what they mean to us, and what structure finds play in their regularities. When we do reflect,
myths such as that of the ‘rational man’ – or, equally, of emotion as an instinctual, mechanistic ‘force’ – delude us.

The method I have used here is one which utilizes a different access to phenomena than traditional inquiry, either cognitivist or behaviorist: it begins with the researcher’s own practical understanding of the actions of those studied. ‘Objective’ information (e.g. particular syntactic forms; frequency of specific events) is referred to, but only at the end of a long and careful description of what is going on. Psychological research on social interaction, including that which examines its influence on moral development [e.g. Damon and Killen, 1982] generally starts with objective measures and context-independent coding categories, and is never able to recapture the participatory understanding which it thereby eschews. I hope to have demonstrated that the approach adopted here is a systematic and fruitful one.

Two final points need to be made. The first concerns the generalizability of the account of conflict which has been developed here. Further empirical work is needed before we will know to what extent the phases of conflict I have described here are general to practical moral conflicts, or to what extent they are limited only to the particular age studied, or the particular setting the participants are in. Such generalization will be useful and illuminating in its own right, but its absence at this point does not affect the conclusions I have drawn. Both cognitivist and behaviorist theories of conflict and its resolution are intended as general theories, holding for all cases. If I have described only one series of occasions where things proceed differently, then I have raised problems which have to be considered seriously. (A hermeneutic approach is actually better capable, compared with its cognitive and behaviorist counterparts, of allowing for and comprehending any variation which the structure of conflict shows across settings, for it is precisely this type of context-effect which it searches for.) I do anticipate, however, that the basic finding of the involvement of emotion in practical moral conflicts will hold up across settings. Its existence has, after all, been noted before; what has been lacking is an account of the positive as well as the negative aspects of its involvement.

The second point concerns the complex question of the validity of the accounts and interpretations given here. I follow Taylor [1979] in believing that an alternative interpretation can be dealt with critically if it can be shown to be partial and incomplete with respect to the account which it challenges. Conversely, a better interpretation will open up fresh perspectives which have been hitherto neglected or avoided. I am aware, for example, of a certain lack of balance in my own attention to the perspectives of the two teams in the conflicts described here: I have tended to give more weight to the way the Losing Teams have understood events. No doubt improved understanding would result from a more complete articulation of the Winning Team’s situation, and their justification of their action.

To illustrate my claim that an alternative interpretation can be critiqued by showing it to be partial, consider again the topics of the first and third sections of this chapter. The first section proposed that emotion has a necessary and positive role in moral conflicts; that it provides the first recognition and understanding of the moral wrong. The third section talked of the ‘inabilities’ of emotion which underly the particular form which articulation takes, as the teams engage in practical deliberation. It might well be claimed that in the latter case we see emotion playing a negative role in the conflict; that the egocenteredness of Phase Two is a regressive and immature phenomenon which retards resolution of the conflict. However, this commonly held conception of emotion judges what occurs against a standard which is inappropriate and unrealizable: that of rational, uninvolved discourse. I believe that, if we step aside from this standard, we can begin to see the egocenteredness as a positive phenomenon in moral conflict; its appearance shows that participants are committed to the rightness of the course of action each has adopted. It may well be that this commitment is not always fully justified, but poorly informed commitment is better, I think, than none at all. A rationalist interpretation, then, would probably identify the egocentered inability to recognize another’s point of view as childish and negative. We ought to consider all viewpoints equally and impartially, goes the claim. Unfortunately, this is a maxim for living only in an ideal world; in practice we find that we have to shout to be heard; that there are inequalities of power and influence which must be overcome or at least opposed in moral discourse, if the outcome of such discourse is to be anything like those the rationalists, more reasonably, espouse: justice and fairness. The commitment with which the young adults studied here hold to their own understanding of events, to the extent of not even recognizing at first that other ways of understanding exist, should not be interpreted only negatively, but as involving a strength of will and a sense of integrity which are as important to moral action and moral development as are liberal impartiality and rational contemplation.
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Martin Packer grew up in London, England, and took his B.A. in Natural Sciences at Cambridge University. After studying the skills of neonates for two years at Bedford College in London, he came to the United States as a Fulbright scholar, thinking to spend a year luxuriating on the California coast. Finding himself instead drawn inexorably into the graduate student regimen, he received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1983. He currently works as a research associate at Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development, San Francisco, and as an assistant research psychologist at the Institute of Human Development, in Berkeley where he resides with his cat and two housemates.