Therapeutic Inversions
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“All men have stood for freedom..., and those of the richer sort of you that see it are ashamed and afraid to own it, because it comes clothed in a clownish garment...Freedom is the man that will turn the world upside down, therefore no wonder he hath enemies” (G. Winstanley, 1649, A watch-word to the city of London, p. 316-317. Cited in Hill, 1972, p. 107).

“In this sense, then, the task in psychotherapy was to make, using Jasper’s expression, an appeal to the freedom of the patient. A good deal of the skill in psychotherapy lies in the ability to do this effectively” (R. D. Laing, 1960/1990, p. 61).

Introduction

In feudal times it was the fool, dressed in clownish garb, who turned the world upside down, bringing freedom. This image has lived on; for example, it was used in the 17th century by religious and political radicals calling for reform. Today we still have clowns, but madness and mental illness are the more common clothes forced on those who stand for freedom by upsetting convention. And the problem remains: challenges to the established order are still viewed as revolutionary, and those with privilege tend to repudiate their own potential to effect change. How do we, “the richer sort [who] are ashamed and afraid to own” this potential freedom, respond to those who turn the world upside down, and who we label mad? In his interview with Leila, a “homeless,” “treatment-resistant,” “schizophrenic” woman, psychiatrist R. D. Laing offers a “demonstration” of his therapeutic technique. In this paper I propose that what is in fact demonstrated is the complexity of notions like sanity and madness, expertise and illness, treatment and cure.

Laing appeared at the first Erikson conference in an auditorium crowded with mental-health professionals. As an expert psychiatrist presenting his therapeutic approach to eminent peers, Laing might seem unequivocally to represent the culturally privileged. But in fact, Laing’s position as “expert” within the field was especially contested and tenuous at this point in his career. At this time “Laing did not enjoy a favourable reputation in the minds of conventional psychiatrists” (Mullen, 1995, p. 340). His own son recounts that by early 1985, the year of the conference, “Ronnie was turning into a running joke” (A. Laing, 1994, p. 222). Nonetheless he was one of the main attractions at a conference that included more than 7,000 participants, his demonstration
was reported in the *New York Times*, and the lecture hall was packed with more than 1,000 therapists who came to watch him work (Burston, 1996; A. Laing, 1994).

The demonstration is thus an interesting event, and a particularly ambiguous one. Who can it be said to have benefited? For whose benefit was it performed? Did it take place for the benefit of the audience attending this session of the conference, increasing their knowledge and understanding? Or for Leila, helping her overcome her psychiatric problems? Or for Laing, confirming his expertise and reputation at a time when his professional standing had started to slip? Or the conference organizers, for whom Laing was a keynote speaker, still a “big name” bringing publicity and a certain notoriety to the first Erikson conference? Or did it in fact benefit the skeptics, who declared that nothing had happened and who judged Laing’s description of his approach mystifying and empty?

In this paper I intend to put the interaction between Laing and Leila back into its larger context; to recontextualize it. This context is the conference, and I suggest that the conference is, at best, a confused and contradictory occasion. It is, after all, an event that Laing suggests is the “conspiracy” that Leila has tried to escape:

180  T: Well, I mean, this whole sit up set up is an enormous
181                conspiracy and you’re right in eh, right in the heart of
182                the conspiracy just now....
189  L: You mean the conference is a conspiracy?
190  T: Yah. Course.

If Laing is correct then it seems appropriate that we should be a little paranoid ourselves in our reading of the dialogue, and a little suspicious in our interpretation of the kind of event the demonstration is. Laing is implying that ambiguity, even duplicity, attend this event. I propose that the demonstration itself has an equivocal outcome. I shall argue that two types of inversion were taking place, one done by Laing, the other done to him.

The inversion done by Laing is seen in the moves he repeatedly makes that seem designed to place himself and Leila on equal footing in their interaction. During the demonstration he steps into rather than rejecting the contexts she invokes, he aligns with her use of language, offers preferred conversational continuers, gives positive assessments of what Leila has said, and makes extensive revisions of his own talk seemingly to clarify for her what he is saying. But turning the world upside down is not an easy thing to do: Laing is frequently returned to the position of expert and authority, both by his own and by Leila’s actions. In part this is because his disavowal of his own expertise and authority requires an exercise of expertise. So in the moves of the conversation we find a continually shifting positioning, that reverses several times between the boundaries of the opening and closing of the conversation, one which does not simply reproduce the status quo of doctor and patient, but which at the same time cannot entirely turn this hierarchical relationship upside down.
The second inversion, done to Laing, is due to the fact that this is a demonstration. He too is an object of observation, being judged and evaluated. I shall argue that the effects of these two inversions linger when Leila steps onto the podium at the end of the demonstration. At first glance it might appear that Leila shifts here from being the patient with a disorder to being Laing’s collaborator, even becoming an active participant in the conference, a member of the panel, a participant in the language game of power and prestige. But in a real sense the demonstration continues: Leila is still a spectacle for the entertainment of those with power. And she is still in thrall to Laing’s power and prestige, not as “happily indifferent” as might at first glance appear.

Opening moves

The turning upside down of status, authority and expertise between Laing and Leila is a process that extends throughout the course of the conversation. There are, however, particular moments in the conversation where we can see this repositioning most clearly. Leila’s position as a disenfranchised, mentally ill person is structurally essential for the demonstration to take place. Yet at the very start of the conversation we see Laing attempting to align the two of them in such a way that he and Leila have equal standing, or even that he is lower than her. Before mutual understanding can be forged through the creation and maintenance of a conversational alignment between the two participants in this demonstration there must be an initial negotiation of who they are, the character of their relationship, and the language-game they will play (Nofsinger, 1991, p. 137). This is true of all conversations, even psychotherapy sessions. Early in the exchange Laing says, “Ah, I don’t know anything (.) about you at all, ah, and I don’t know what (.) to ask you about yourself” (12-13). Here Laing is disclaiming his own expertise, but in doing this he is steering the interaction in a particular direction. We see very quickly and clearly here a recurrent pattern in the interaction: what Laing says about himself and his abilities differs significantly from what he actually does. Here he gains and exerts control by claiming to have no control. His expertise consists in part in his insistence that he has no special expertise.

Laing opens the conversation collaboratively, positioning himself as a conversational partner equal to Leila, but he quickly has to change his strategy to that of the interrogating expert, primarily as a result of her moves. Leila’s conversational actions at this point presume that he will ask questions designed to display her psychological dysfunction and disorder. And within a few short turns he has reformulated his position, asking “what is it that’s creating the static in you system, the disturbance in your system?” (28-29). As Laing’s questions become more formulaic and narrow in scope, Leila’s responses quickly change from uncollaborative laughter and disclaimers—“I don’t know…”(16)—to displays of her “problem,” for example in her reply to Laing’s (28): “I think my brain don’t work right” (30).
Leila articulates the presumption that she is mentally ill. Direct reference is made to mental disorder as Laing asks Leila about her medication. In a collaborative completion of Laing’s utterance, she says the medication Nux Vomica is taken “to sharpen my stupid wits” (27). Laing calls for elaboration, for further detail, asking, “what is it that’s creating the static in you system, the disturbance in your system”? (lines 28-29).

30 L: Oh, um, I think my brain don’t work right.
31 T: In what way?
32 L: [laughs] Well, let me see. Well, I guess, I get the
33 Nux Vomic doesn’t treat this per se, I’m getting another
34 remedy for that. Well, I get things turned around, I get
35 opposites confused, I get (.) when I write, I get my
36 letters confused, I get words confused. (.) And, eh,
37 either I tend to be paranoid or errr, they really are after
38 me I don’t know which.

Leila’s reply—“I think my brain don’t work right”(30)—is a display again of a position both “down” and “other.” However, her medication “doesn’t treat this per se” (33)—she quickly reformulates her problem as one of confused language: opposites, words, even letters, are in disarray (35-36). By Leila’s own account there is a disorder of meaning for her, a disorder of language, and it leaves her unsure whether she is paranoid or not: “if they really are after” her (37-8). She offers a succinct description, as well as an illustration, of the kinds of symptom that define her as mentally ill, object of this demonstration.

Who is the object of the demonstration?

But Laing doesn’t accept the diagnosis of paranoia here. He jokes about it, and in doing so again disclaims his status:

46 T: [laughs] You might be after me, for all I know.

So much so that Leila offers him reassurance, telling him she is at the conference to offer assistance:

47 L: Oh, I’m just trying to help you guys um get some sense
48 into your brains.

Again the status has been flipped; it is Leila--who a moment ago was saying “I think my brain don’t work right”—who is there to work on the “brains” of Laing and the rest of the “guys.” The topic has been shifted away from her confusion and paranoia; Laing has downplayed these by colluding with them; by sharing them with her.

But when Leila now makes reference to her “guru” and his teachings:

49 I had a guru for a long time who said da
50 there isn’t any sense in it.
Laing is skeptical and dismissive:

55 T: What sort of guru is this character?

His criticism of her formulation of the guru’s teaching (“I don’t see how you can be conscious of the universal mind, the universal mind’s conscious of you but you’re not conscious of it,” 66-68) continues his skeptical appraisal of this invoked authority figure. Yet when Leila grants his point (“Well, maybe so maybe so...,” 71), and they come to align on the problem of figuring out why the “universal mind allows” “all the pain and suffering and stupidity and confusion in the world” (80, 78), Laing offers her advice for dealing with this:

90 But, eh I I still put a collar and tie on
91 under the circumstances. (. ) Why not? Heh, heh.

Once again he has represented himself as having no answers, but at the same time he gives her advice on how to act. And Leila accepts the suggestion, drawing out the implied contrast with giving up--specifically, with suicide:

92 L: Yeah. I asked him why he didn’t kill himself and he
93 says he not ready yet.
94 T: Uh huh.
95 L: Well, I guess if you’re dead, you blow any chance of
96 make, of doing anything good, huh
97 T: This time round.

Though here too Laing is a little deflationary: qualifying her assertion that to give up, to kill oneself, would be to “blow any chance” of “doing anything good,” in a rather odd and indirect reference to life after death, or perhaps reincarnation.

After Leila’s silence at this he brings the conversation back to the here-and-now; to what he and Leila are doing, to the demonstration. Strikingly, he tells her:

102 I feel impelled to eh eh make an effort to keep talking
103 for the sake of eh people who are listening to it.

He talks here in a manner that again downplays his control over what is occurring. As he characterizes it, he is a spectacle too (“these uh, uh cameras on us,” 100). And when he speaks of needing (“I feel impelled”) to act, to keep talking, “for the sake” of the audience, we are reminded that his reputation is on the line, that he is putting on a performance.

Leila displays discomfort at this reminder that they are being observed:

109 L: Wait, nobody told me the tha the camers uz on.

But Laing dismisses her concerns (“It doesn’t matter,” 115) and quickly and expertly shifts the topic (“How long you been in Phoenix, then?” 115). It is important to appreciate that although they could have spoken at this point about the experience of talking in front of so many people, Laing chooses instead to distract Leila from this. His distraction,
however, is not entirely successful, since Leila shortly explains the tone of her remarks she has been making at this point in the conversation by saying:

178 Well, cause cause they are watching us.

Laing chuckles at this and then goes on to confirm that the conference is “an enormous conspiracy.” Both now and earlier Laing has confirmed the perspective on the world that Leila’s accounts have offered. The universal mind exists; pain and suffering and confusion exist; the conspiracy really exists. Note that this attitude displays a form of authority on his part. He uses his expertise to grant, to legitimate, her knowledge, saying in effect, “You know this as much as I do.” But he makes it clear that he, unlike her, is not scared or discouraged by what they both know. We see Leila respond to and align with this display of expertise when she now begins to question Laing: lines 187 (“What do you mean?”), 191 (“What kind of conspiracy?”), and 205 (“What do you know about it?”).

Older but not wiser

Both Laing and Leila now align themselves with what we might call an anti-authoritarian Christianity. What I wish to focus on here is Leila’s complaint at line 274:

274 L: I think it’s awfully mean that humans (.) are at the consciousness we’re at. We’re just, we’re just half just
275 just half way some place. We’re we’re intelligent, but
277 we’re not intelligent enough. (1)

Leila problematizes the “we” of her formulation, first repairing it so that it applies more narrowly to herself:

277 At least I haven’t
278 figured anything out.

Then asking Laing whether it is true of him too, or whether he’s an exception:

278 Have you? You’re older.

The declaration that follows her question implies that wisdom increases with age, and tentatively attributes this expertise to Laing. He disavows this, however: “What difference does that make,” (279), he first says, and goes a step further, adding, “You don’t get any wiser when you get older” (282). The implication is that he is no wiser than she is; he is only “half way” also.

Leila’s subsequent “See!” unproblematizes the “we”; her implication is that she was correct in her first assessment. This utterance punctures Laing authority, and draws carnivalesque laughter1 from the audience which so invades the ongoing conversation that Laing comments on it. Laing takes pleasure in this effect (“That got a laugh,” 284), but once again he distracts her from the audience, from yet another reminder that they are being observed, by changing the topic:

285 What ‘bout your
286 em mom and dad an that sort of thing, what sort of (.)
are they alive, eh?
Having (not without paradox) stepped down from the position of expert, Laing now can ask Leila about her parents without the presupposition that he will draw upon his own “wise” authority to interpret her response. However this is still a difficult question for Laing to ask, as is seen in his conversational work at this point. A self-initiated self-repair--“are they alive” (287)--follows a brief pause, displaying the care with which Laing is asking this question. He appears to be trying to ask the question in a disarming manner, but nonetheless it falls within the confines of typical therapeutic discourse, a question asked by one in power.

L: Who my parents?
T: Yeah.
L: Yeah.
T: What sort of chap was your father, is your father?
L: Oh, well ah eh he’s a Christian preacher. Yes.
Leila’s reply displays awareness of the newsworthiness of her answer. After initial hesitation, “Oh, well ah eh,” she announces, “he’s a Christian preacher. Yes” (292). The “Yes” with which she ends her turn punctuates the news and anticipates a strong reaction. Laing’s reply both marks the presumption of a particular knowledgeability on his part and comments on its absence:

T: Oh, I ought to have known. [laughs]
Leila self-selects, taking the next turn in the conversation:

L: Yeah, my parents are very religious. At least they say they are.
In this moment of self-disclosure Leila questions her parents’ authority in a way she didn’t earlier with other authority figures, such as the guru. Her assessment is a skeptical one. The distinction between what people “are” and what they “say they are” is very close to the distinction we’re drawing in this paper between what people do and what they say they do. Here Leila’s skepticism about authority starts to become an explicit topic of the conversation, no longer operating as a concern that grounds despair and meaninglessness.

I suggest that Laing has granted Leila the authority, the standing, with which to speak of this central concern. In disclaiming the interpretive authority traditionally granted to one who occupies the position as psychotherapist, and the conversational control that goes with it (albeit typically indirect control), Laing has given Leila an opportunity to become a participant in a new speech game; he has allowed her to voice her concern at the confused, deceptive, hypocritical language of the dominant culture.

Challenging Leila; challenging authority
And yet when Laing says “Well, you’re very religious” (296), his utterance has the force of a challenge. Leila has offered her father’s Christianity as the topic of conversation, but Laing shifts the topic back to Leila herself. Indexing Leila’s Christianity he resumes control of the conversation. Challenging her, he has again adopted a position of power. The alliance they have built is threatened by this move: this can be seen both in Leila’s reply and in Laing’s attempt at repair. Although she starts to contest the challenge, saying “you know my...,” she ends her utterance by agreeing with Laing’s declaration, “yeah, I guess I am” (297). Laing attempts to undo the effect of what he’s done by saying, “No it’s not meant as an insult, na,” (298).

But it is an insult. The insult consists not in calling her “religious,” but in intervening in this way, aggressively forcing the topic back to Leila herself. Now she quickly returns to the topic of her family, saying that her parents “are currently running a shelter up in Michigan (299-300). But Laing once more turns the topic back to her:

307 T: How do they feel about you?

Once again laughter interrupts, but this time from Leila herself. Her laugh is further evidence of an insult. She displays uncertainty at how to respond, and she clearly doesn’t accept Laing’s projection of the course of the conversation. Although this is not an easy question for her to answer, she does complete her turn.:  

308 L: [laughs] [T: heh] I don’t know. [laughs] I don’t know
309 um, I wrote them, I don’t know, I wrote’m a letter and
310 asked ‘em. And, I haven’t picked it up in the mail yet. I
311 asked ‘em ah if if it was okay for me to send a
312 Christmas present. [laughs] That’s, I don’t know.

Out of this discord comes a story. Leila tells of wanting to give her parents a Christmas present, an element we can interpret as symbolic of her investment in her relationship with them. But she hasn’t “been to the Post Office yet” to pick up their reply to her letter asking permission; that is “if they did reply” (314-315). The undiscovered answer to the letter seems a metaphor for the unclear and ambiguous nature of Leila’s relationship with her parents.

316 T: Do you expect them to send you a Christmas present?
317 L: Oh, God [whispered] I don’t know....

Just as Leila’s “words” and “letters” are “confused” (36), so too is her role as daughter. Her phrase “I don’t know” (317) carries, as symptom, Leila’s disenfranchisement. Framed by a horrified, whispered “Oh, God,” Leila’s “I don’t know” (308, 309, 312, 317) has become a refrain that re-plays her ambivalent relation not just to her parents, but to authority in general. How can she know what they think of her, when they may not be what they say they are? How can she know, when she is only “half way some place,” intelligent, but “not intelligent enough” to penetrate the confusion and ambivalence of human relationship? And yet when Leila acknowledges that she hasn’t
gone to collect the letter she suggests that she doesn’t want to know. She prefers not knowing with having certain knowledge of her parents’ rejection of her. She prefers being “half way some place.”

Laing responds with another challenge, locating himself amongst those who do “know,” and so don’t need to ask:

325  T: Uh huh. (4) I would never have thought of, uh sending,
326            writing my parents and asking them if it was okay for
327                          me to send them a present for Christmas. Eh ah and
328            why wouldn’t it be ok?

The pause, emphasis, and slow meter of Laing’s speech reflect his care in creating a first pair-part that will elicit further detail about the problem between Leila and her parents. Laing’s question, “Why wouldn’t it be ok?” (328), amounts once more to an asking of his earlier question: “How do they feel about you?” (307).

But Leila’s answer is no longer, “I don’t know.” (308-309, 317). She says:

329  L: Well, ‘cause maybe they hate me after all, after being,
330                                an unfaithful daughter.

Leila’s account of herself as an “unfaithful daughter” shows how the context of Christianity is, for her, merged with the context of family (cf. Bortle, this issue). At the same time it is a depiction of herself as down, as hated and rejected. The other papers in this issue have interpreted this part of the conversation in detail. The perspective I bring to it is one from which authority and expertise stand out, and from this perspective it is striking that as Laing and Leila discuss the biblical passage they do so almost entirely as equals. When Laing first cites the passage he does so in a way that presumes Leila has familiarity with it, and in her response she display this familiarity:

340  T: Well, if you’re faithful to the Lord Jesus Christ,
341            how can you be unfaithful to your father?
342  L: Yeah.

Then Laing, even as he moves to emphasize his point, continues to address Leila as a knowing recipient:

343  T: But, eh, I mean he said that didn’t he eh eh unless you
344            hate your father and mother and follow me, you can’t be
345            eh my disciple.
346  L: Yeahah.

In contrast, Laing quickly calls into question the expertise of Leila’s father, the “Christian preacher”:

347  T: What does your father make of that?

And he will pursue this line further a short time later, suggesting that she:

367  T: Call his bluff.
Leila consistently, but without fanfare, displays her familiarity with and knowledgeability of the passage, as she aligns with Laing to question its translation.

Laing is not telling Leila something new here; rather he is drawing her attention to something she already knows. At the same time he is suggesting that there is “something wrong with that translation” and enlisting her collaboration in fixing the problem. The wisdom contained in this bible passage doesn’t lie on its surface, he implies, but must be excavated. Yet it can be retrieved, he implies; this is not an impossible task. And the “sense,” once they obtain it, is quickly applied by Leila to her own situation:

Leila’s laughter (370) suggests relief, hints at a new-found freedom. Should we conclude that, freed from the confusion—the madness—of a world that required faith in the face of persistent parental disconfirmation, Leila’s confusion has abated? But surely this promise of freedom is illusory. The gloss Leila has given (368-369) is a little too good to be true. The outcome here is not as straightforward as it seems to be; and this is illustrated by what happens next.

**Termination**

Laing—once more illustrating that he is in control—moves to end their conversation with an announcement of his need (“I have to go back”) to return to the podium in the auditorium. But Leila surprises him, regaining the initiative by asking if she can join him on the stage:
L: Hey, can I come?
T: Do you want to come?
L: See what you say, yeah.

Leila’s coming on stage can be read in a variety of ways. She sits now with a panel of experts, apparently no longer low in status. This is surely a transgression of the typical course of events in an occasion like this; it is a breach of protocol. Yet, tellingly, it delights the audience. Her appearance on the platform brings cheers. She is praised by the session chair for her “graciousness” and “courage,” yet there are reasons to think that she is still an object of observation and fascination for the audience. The first question from the audience is (in so many words) “Did anything happen in the demonstration?” To this the chair replies, “There is an observation you could make about who’s up on the platform which might partly answer your question.” In other words, Leila’s presence is turned into an indication of the effectiveness of the demonstration. And Laing himself speaks of Leila in the third person, though she is sitting right next to him, “Here she is, compus mentus, before this very intimidating situation....” In these respects the demonstration continues.

Furthermore, Leila has come on stage to be with Laing; to “see what you say.” She has followed this man, of whom she says to the audience, “This guy would make a great therapist.” The audience laugh again at her remark, enjoying the joke that they know who Laing is while she doesn’t. Leila is not “happily indifferent,” if by this we mean indifference to the sway of prestige and authority. It is as though Laing has become another “guru.”

And surely this was what Laing was forced to set out to prove: that he still is “a great therapist.” Comments from members of the audience make it very clear that not all of them agree with Leila’s assessment, and Laing’s anger at some of them makes very clear just insecure of his standing he is. Laing—a man who stood for freedom—certainly had his enemies. Had they forced him to compromise his revolutionary agenda at this conference?

Conclusions

In this paper I have interpreted the conversation between Laing and Leila with special attention to their positioning along a dimension of high-low, where high corresponds to a position of power, and expertise, occupied by one who knows, who is in control, who is master or leader, active agent, judge and evaluator. Low corresponds to a position of powerlessness, sickness and insanity, occupied by one who doesn’t know, but is known, who is confused or deluded, who is controlled, disciple or follower, the object of inquiry and investigation, passive patient, judged and evaluated.

I have pointed out that Laing’s status and expertise were under attack at the point in his career when the conference took place, and that as a result the demonstration
was an event in which he was forced into a low position. He sorely needed to put on a convincing show; this was an occasion in which he was the object of investigation and evaluation just as much as Leila. It is no surprise, then, that we find Laing drawing Leila’s attention away from their circumstances, from the fact that they are being observed. But the effect is to hide the exercise of power that the demonstration amounts to. Laing does acknowledge that the conference is a “conspiracy,” and he hints that he can’t speak the truth about it and still leave “in good order” (195), but he then retreats and calls the conference merely “quite a benign conspiracy” (196). And the consequence of this equivocation is that the demonstration never really ends: when she walks up on the stage Leila is still an object for the curiosity, even entertainment, of the audience. As is Laing, too.

The other phenomenon I have pointed out is the way the Laing, during his interaction with Leila, systematically seeks to invert the typical hierarchy of doctor-patient. He uses his therapeutic skills to insist that he is no different from her. Throughout the demonstration he questions authority, including his own, and he challenges her to do the same. His talk appears designed to have the effect that she becomes “happily indifferent” to her parents, and perhaps to other authority figures, particularly those that are judgmental and punitive. But this effect can only be achieved as a consequence of the exercise of his power. Again, then, power is being hidden here. And a consequence of this, I suggest, is that Leila is at the conversation by no means “happily indifferent” to Laing. She has become enthralled by him. Leila walks out into the conspiracy, into the heart of the conference, the “very concerted deep plan” that Laing described to her, and she participates directly in it herself. Should we view this unequivocally as a sign of her health, of her cure? There is surely a central contradiction to existential psychotherapy. If schizophrenia is, to put it simply, a sane response to a crazy world, then how healthy is someone who returns to that crazy world? In the question-and-answer period Laing speaks with sympathy of those people who are judged crazy when they have difficulty living in the world, because they more than others “can see how stupid it all is, how obvious it all is, how inexpressibly confused it all is.” Has Laing offered Leila freedom? Has he enabled her to choose who to be? Or has he lured her back into the conspiracy she has struggled so hard to escape from?
References
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Notes
1. Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) writes that carnivalesque laughter “is ambivalent: it is gay, triumphant, and at the same time mocking, deriding. It asserts and denies, it buries and revises. Such is the laughter of the carnival.”